關於 china sharp power ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

【#TheDiplomat🌍】難得The Diplomat讀者對香港有興趣：

The series of iron-fisted moves last month in Hong Kong may seem sudden to international observers: Hong Kong government’s earlier reinterpretation of the China-Hong Kong relationship, the election of a pro-Beijing legislator to be a Legislative Council chair through a controversial mechanism, and Beijing’s recent decision to impose a national security law on Hong Kong. The desire to bring Hong Kong under the banner of “one country, one system” is not impulsive. Quite the contrary, it’s a calculated campaign to initiate a so-called “second reunification with Hong Kong” — since the first reunification after the handover, using a lenient soft-power approach, has supposedly failed.

What are Beijing’s calculations that motivate this bold campaign now? And more important, will the campaign work?

While I remain highly skeptical of solely applying the realist framework to study Hong Kong, Beijing’s mentality is nonetheless entirely realism-driven. It is therefore essential to use this lens to understand more of their thoughts.

COVID-19: A Golden Opportunity on the International Stage?

To start with, the coronavirus pandemic seems to have created an ideal backdrop for Beijing to push forward its iron-fisted policy toward Hong Kong. The West has been devastated by the pandemic, more so than China, and has been slower to recover economically. Instead of decoupling from China, Beijing thinks the West is desperate for an influx of Chinese capital and markets. This notion encourages Beijing to pursue brinkmanship, in the form of confrontative “wolf warrior diplomacy,” its escalation of sharp power, and, most recently, Hong Kong’s national security law. As long as the international community does not put their condemnation into action, Beijing will keep pushing the envelope.

Beijing is convinced that the chambers of commerce representing other countries in Hong Kong will always place profits above all else as long as the national security law does not threaten them. Business deals struck at the crucial moment can entice foreign businesses to use their lobby teams in their home countries in Beijing’s favor.

Although anti-China sentiment has become more mainstream, Beijing, the major beneficiary of globalization in the past two decades, has tied its destiny with various elites internationally. These “friends of China” can be swayed to safeguard Beijing’s interests, but the up-and-coming leaders in many countries look less friendly. Therefore, the window of opportunity for Beijing to act is closing before the new value-driven generation comes to power.

The Lack of Incentive Behind the U.S. and U.K.’s Escalating Rhetoric

While U.S. politicians from left to right are vocal against China, their ultimate goal, Beijing believes, is to win votes in the November election. They would hence avoid hurting the interest groups they represent and go easy on actions aiming to punish China, such as denying Hong Kong’s status as a separate customs territory, sanctioning Chinese companies listed in Hong Kong, or escalating the trade war.

Even though the Trump administration is ramping up the rhetoric to sanction China, protecting Hong Kong’s autonomy is not one of the United States’ core interests. In contrast, having control over Hong Kong is China’s core interest. Beijing would rather make concessions over other disputes with Washington in exchange for claiming victory in Hong Kong for its internal propaganda.

Britain, the co-signer of the Joint Declaration for Hong Kong’s handover, is arguably most entitled to denounce Beijing’s violation, which would give mandates to the United States to act. But Beijing is convinced that Britain, not as powerful as it used to be, will not make such a move. Beijing’s recent plans to withdraw businesses from the United States and list them in the London stock market is a move to place a wedge between the two powers. U.S. President Donald Trump’s unilateralism and his harsh stance against U.S. allies also strengthens Beijing’s conviction that the West will not follow the United States’ lead.

Beijing’s Divide and Conquer Strategy in Hong Kong

Hong Kong’s parliament, the Legislative Council (LegCo), is a major roadblock to Beijing’s control, as demonstrated twice since the handover — in 2003 when the national security law was first introduced and in 2019 with the anti-extradition legislation that sparked city-wide protests. In both setbacks, Beijing lost control when moderate pro-establishment legislators broke away from the party line in the face of public outcry. As the September LegCo election approaches, the last thing Beijing wants is for the election to become a de facto referendum on the single issue of the national security law, which could result in another landslide win for the democratic parties. The law would be untenable to the international community if it’s opposed by both pro-democracy voters, which according to polls account for 60 percent of the votes, and moderate pro-establishment voters.

The moderates, despite their reluctance to embrace hardline rule in Hong Kong, differ from the more militant faction within the non-establishment camp in that the former rejects the so-called “mutual destruction” option, which risks Hong Kong’s special trade status — its economic lifeline — as a bargaining tactic to force Beijing to back off. Now that Washington is considering withdrawing Hong Kong’s privileges, the possibility of mutual destruction is becoming real. As Beijing has been promoting a narrative that all supporters of the protest movement’s “Five Demands” are bringing about mutual destruction, Beijing hopes the moderates, in fear of losing their financial assets, might turn toward the establishment.

On the other hand, the pro-democracy camp is at risk of breaking apart. Moderate pro-democracy supporters have been going to rallies to keep up with the political momentum. However, marches with more than a million participants would be impossible under the current oppressive environment. For example, the authorities abuse COVID-19 social distancing measures to suppress rallies, permits for peaceful protests are increasingly difficult to obtain, pro-establishment businesses heavily censored the social media activities of employees, and outspoken individuals are often cyberbullied.

Without support from the moderates, some within the pro-democracy camp may radicalize, as Beijing expects. The radicalization would fit Beijing’s tactic of painting protests as separatism and terrorism, justifying the imposition of the national security law. The trajectory would be similar to Beijing’s handling of the 1959 Tibetan “riots,” during which Mao Zedong’s directive was “the more chaotic the scene, the better.”

The Nationalistic Agenda to Divert Domestic Attention

But after all, to Beijing, Hong Kong is not just Hong Kong. In the wake of the pandemic, Beijing urgently needs to uphold nationalism to divert unwanted attention from its economic crisis. That includes a global propaganda campaign to promote its triumph over COVID-19. Upgrading the Hong Kong protests to a national security issue — as a battle against foreign interference to complete the “reunification with Hong Kong” — best suits the nationalist atmosphere. The all-time low sense of belonging with China among the new generation in Hong Kong further justifies a strong-arm approach. The success of the strategy would offer a way to reunite with Taiwan, which would consolidate Xi’s leadership within the Communist Party.

Also, including the Hong Kong issue as part of the national agenda means that the Hong Kong government, which has already lost its will to govern, will dance to Beijing’s tunes.

This comprehensive crackdown on Hong Kong’s civil society is unprecedented. Beijing believes that the heavy-handed approach would pervade Hong Kong with a sense of powerlessness and bring it to its knees. As long as the international response is limited, the execution of the national security law, according to Chairman Mao’s “theory of contradiction,” will follow a script of “a soft hand” and “a firm hand.” That is, after its imposition, the law will initially apply restraint and be used only on individuals to set a stern example, so that the general public would feel as if the law does not impact them at all and property and stock prices would not fall. Gradually and subtly, if the realist formula of Beijing works, the “second reunification” could become a self-proclaimed success story for Beijing’s propaganda.

However, Beijing’s evaluations are not foolproof. Any single miscalculation could lead to a contradictory outcome for the People’s Republic of China. Is it really prepared?

▶️ 國安法：中國的現實主義框架
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HjhRbV8qTgo
⏺ 中美夏威夷峰會
https://www.patreon.com/posts/38378214

[時事英文] 各國如何面對新冠疫情?

讓我最有感觸的一句:

"The rise of populism has exacerbated the problem by reducing the incentives of countries to cooperate. "

「民粹主義的興起減少了各國合作的意願，使問題更加嚴重。」

—NY Times

★★★★★★★★

In Frankfurt, the president of the European Central Bank warned that the coronavirus could trigger an economic crash as dire as that of 2008. In Berlin, the German chancellor warned the virus could infect two-thirds of her country’s population. In London, the British prime minister rolled out a nearly $40 billion rescue package to cushion his economy from the shock.

1. trigger an economic crash 引發經濟崩潰
2. dire 嚴重的；危急的
3. roll out 推出
4. rescue package 救助計劃
5. to cushion sth from… 對（某事物的影響或力量）起緩衝作用

在法蘭克福，歐洲央行行長警告說，冠狀病毒可能引發與2008年一樣嚴重的經濟崩潰。在柏林，德國總理警告說，病毒可能導致該國三分之二的人口感染。在倫敦，英國首相推出了將近400億美元的一系列救助計劃，以緩解經濟受到的衝擊。

★★★★★★★★★★★★

As the toll of those afflicted by the virus continued to soar and financial markets from Tokyo to New York continued to swoon, world leaders are finally starting to find their voices about the gravity of what is now officially a pandemic.

6. the toll of… 的傷亡；損失；破壞
7. the death toll 死亡人數
8. afflict 使痛苦；使苦惱；折磨
9. swoon 低迷*
10. find their voices about 願意開口談及
11. the gravity of …的嚴重性

隨著感染者的死亡人數持續飆升，從東京到紐約的金融市場持續低迷，世界各國領導人終於開始談及這場已正式定性為大流行病的疫情的嚴重性。

*http://bit.ly/3b7PZK8

★★★★★★★★★★★★

Yet it remains less a choir than a cacophony — a dissonant babble of politicians all struggling, in their own way, to cope with the manifold challenges posed by the virus, from its crushing burden on hospitals and health care workers to its economic devastation and rising death toll.

12. cacophony 刺耳嘈雜的聲音；雜音
13. a dissonant babble of... 七嘴八舌的...
14. manifold challenges 多種多樣的挑戰
15. economic devastation 經濟崩解

然而，與其說是合唱，這更像一種刺耳的喧囂——一群七嘴八舌的政客用各自的方式努力應對這種病毒所帶來的各種挑戰，從超負荷的醫院和醫護人員到崩潰的經濟和與日俱增的死亡人數。

★★★★★★★★★★★★

The choir also lacks a conductor, a role played through most of the post-World War II era by the United States.

這個合唱團還欠缺指揮，在二戰戰後的大部分時間裡，這個角色是由美國扮演的。

President Trump has failed to work with other leaders to fashion a common response, preferring to promote travel bans and his border wall over the scientific advice of his own medical experts. Mr. Trump’s secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, has taken to calling it the “Wuhan virus,” vilifying the country where it originated and complicating efforts to coordinate a global response.

16. lack (v.) 缺少，缺乏*
17. to fashion a common response 形成一致的回應
18. travel ban 旅行禁令
19. take to sth 開始從事；形成…的習慣
20. vilify 詆毀，誣衊；醜化；貶低
21. complicate 使複雜化；使更難懂；使更麻煩

川普總統未能與其他領導人合作形成一致的回應，他寧願推動旅行禁令和他的邊境牆，而不是他自己的醫學專家的科學建議。川普的國務卿邁克·龐皮歐(Mike Pompeo)把它叫做「武漢病毒」，醜化其發源國，使協調全球響應的工作更加艱難。

*lack, lack of, lacking: http://bit.ly/33LrOhw

★★★★★★★★★★★★

週三，川普總統在白宮會見了銀行家，討論如何應對冠狀病毒。

The same denigration of science and urge to block outsiders has characterized leaders from China to Iran, as well as right-wing populists in Europe, which is sowing cynicism and leaving people uncertain of who to believe. Far from trying to stamp out the virus, strongmen like President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia have seized on the upheaval it is causing as cover for steps to consolidate their power.

22. the denigration of science 對科學的詆毀
23. characterize (v.) 是…的特徵；為…所特有
24. right-wing populists 右翼民粹主義者
25. sow a seed of 播下了…的種子
26. cynicism 犬儒主義；憤世嫉俗
27. stamp sth out 消除，消滅
28. upheaval 動盪
29. consolidate their power 鞏固自己的力量

從中國到伊朗的領導人，乃至歐洲的右翼民粹主義者，都有同樣的對科學的詆毀和對外人的排斥，這播下了疑神疑鬼的種子，讓人們不知道該相信誰。俄羅斯總統弗拉基米爾·V·普丁(Vladimir V. Putin)和沙烏地阿拉伯王儲穆罕默德·本·薩勒曼(Mohammed bin Salman)等強人領袖並沒有去試圖消滅病毒，而是趁機以其引發的動盪為掩護，鞏固自己的力量。

★★★★★★★★★★★★

Yet it is too simple to lay all this at Mr. Trump’s door, or on world leaders collectively. Part of the problem is simply the fiendish nature of the pathogen.

30. lay sth at sb's door 將…歸咎於（某人）
31. fiendish 惡魔般的；殘忍的
32. pathogen 病原體

然而，將一切推到川普身上，或一股腦推到各國領導人身上，都過於簡單了。部分問題實際上源於病原體的殘忍特性。

★★★★★★★★★★★★

Coronavirus has resisted the tools that countries have brought to bear against previous global scourges. Mysterious in its transmission and relentless in its spread, it has led countries to try wildly divergent responses. The lack of common standards on testing, on the cancellation of public gatherings and on quarantines have deepened the anxiety of people and eroded confidence in their leaders.

33. to bear against 抵禦
34. global scourges 全球災禍
35. wildly divergent responses 截然不同的應對方式
36. quarantine 隔離
37. eroded confidence 削弱對…的信心

各國為抵禦先前的全球災禍而使用的工具，被冠狀病毒一一擊敗。詭異的感染方式，持續不懈的傳播，已經導致各國不得不嘗試各種截然不同的應對方式。在病毒測試、取消公共聚會和隔離方法上缺乏一致的標準，這加劇了人們的焦慮，並削弱了他們對領導者的信心。

★★★★★★★★★★★★

The simultaneous shocks to supply and demand — shuttered iPhone factories in China; empty gondolas in Venice; and passengers abandoning cruises, hotels and airlines everywhere else — is a new phenomenon that may not respond to the weapons government wielded against the dislocation that followed the September 2001 terrorist attacks and the financial crisis of 2008.

38. simultaneous shocks 同時衝擊
39. supply and demand 供需
40. the weapons wielded against... 為抵禦...所鍛造的武器

供給和需求在同一時刻受到衝擊——被關閉的中國iPhone工廠；威尼斯空無一人的貢多拉；以及其他地方旅客放棄前往的郵輪、旅館和航班——政府在2001年9月的恐怖襲擊以及2008年金融危機後為抵禦混亂所鍛造的武器，恐怕難以用來對付這種新的現象。

★★★★★★★★★★★★

“The nature of this crisis is qualitatively different than the one in 2008 because the traditional tools are not as effective,” said Richard N. Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations. “Even if the U.S. took a leadership role, the traditional playbook would not be all that relevant here.”

41. the nature of …的性質
42. be qualitatively different 有本質區別
43. playbook 方案

「這次危機的性質，與2008年危機有本質區別，因為傳統手段的效果不佳，」外交關係委員會(Council on Foreign Relations)主席理查德·N·哈斯(Richard N. Haass)說。「即使美國發揮領導作用，傳統方案用在現在的情況沒有多大意義。」

★★★★★★★★★★★★

Britain, for example, won praise for its robust economic response, which, in addition to billions of pounds for hospitals and workers sidelined by illness, included a sharp interest rate cut by the Bank of England.

44. won praise for 贏得讚譽
45. robust economic response 強勁的經濟反應
46. in addition to 此外
47. be sidelined by illness 因疾病而停工
48. a sharp interest rate cut大幅降息

例如，英國因其強勁的經濟應對而贏得讚譽，他們不僅為醫院和因疾病而停工的工人提供了數十億英鎊撥款，還包括英格蘭銀行的大幅降息。

★★★★★★★★★★★★

Yet stocks in London still tumbled, if not as steeply as on Wall Street, where investors brushed off Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin’s proposal to allow Americans to delay paying their income taxes, which he claimed would pump $200 billion into the economy.

49. tumbled （價值）暴跌，驟降
50. steeply 徒峭地；險峻地
51. brush off 漠視，不理睬

然而，倫敦股市仍然下跌，儘管跌幅不及華爾街。面對財政部長史蒂芬·馬努欽(Steven Mnuchin)提出的允許美國人緩交所得稅的提議，華爾街投資人不為所動，馬努欽聲稱此舉將為經濟注入2000億美元。

★★★★★★★★★★★★

Mr. Trump’s other big idea, a cut in the payroll tax, was pronounced a “non-starter” by House Democrats, who scrambled instead to introduce legislation to provide financial help to patients, workers and families affected by the fast-moving epidemic and speed it to a House vote on Thursday.

52. payroll tax 薪金稅
53. non-starter 無成功希望的人（或想法、計劃）
54. House Democrats 眾議院民主黨議員
55. scramble to 爭搶(去做)

川普先生的另一個大想法是削減薪金稅，眾議院民主黨議員宣布這「不可能」，他們慌忙提出立法，在財務上幫助受迅速傳播的流行病影響的患者、工人和家庭，並且快速提交至週四的眾議院投票。

★★★★★★★★★★★★

To Mr. Haass, the intense focus on limiting the economic blow was understandable, given the carnage in the markets, but premature. He said countries needed to put their energy into slowing and mitigating the spread of the virus before they embarked on fiscal programs to repair the economic damage.

56. carnage （尤指戰爭中的）大屠殺，殘殺
57. carnage in the markets 市場的慘狀
58. premature 過早的；不成熟的；倉促的
59. mitigate 減緩
60. embarked on sth 開始，著手做（新的或重要的事情）
61. fiscal programs 財政計劃

哈斯認為，考慮到市場的慘狀，集中精力抑制經濟衝擊是可以理解的，但為時過早。他說，各國在開始實施財政計劃以修復經濟損失之前，需要投入精力以減慢並緩和病毒的傳播。

★★★★★★★★★★★★

The trouble is that, with few exceptions, their efforts have been hapless. In the United States, the delay in developing coronavirus test kits and the scarcity of tests has made it impossible for officials, even weeks after the first cases appeared in the country, to get a true picture of the scale of the outbreak.

62. hapless幸運的；不愉快的
63. the scarcity of …的缺乏
64. the scale of the outbreak 疫情的真實規模

問題是，除了少數例外，他們的努力都沒有什麼好結果。在美國，由於開發冠狀病毒檢測工具的進度遲緩，以及檢測手段的缺乏，官員們甚至在出現本國第一例病例數週後仍無法了解疫情的真實規模。

★★★★★★★★★★★★

In hard-hit Italy, quarrels broke out between politicians and medical experts over whether the authorities were testing too many people in Lombardy, inflating the infection figures and fueling panic in the public. Italy’s response could be weakened further by the anti-vaccination movement that was once embraced by the populist Five Star Movement, which took power in the last government.

65. hard-hit 受災嚴重的
66. inflate 抬高；誇大
67. fueling panic加劇恐慌
68. anti-vaccination movement 反疫苗運動
69. populist 民粹主義政黨
70. took power 執政

在受災嚴重的義大利，政界人士和醫學專家爭論當局是否在倫巴第對太多人進行測試，誇大感染人數，加劇公眾恐慌。義大利的反應可能會遭到反疫苗運動的進一步削弱。該運動曾受上屆執政的民粹主義政黨五星運動(Five Star Movement)的支持。

★★★★★★★★★★★★

義大利倫巴第地區是世界上受災最嚴重的地區之一，人們戴著口罩。

Even comparing one country’s case count to another’s is almost impossible, given the different testing procedures and diagnostic criteria around the world, said Dr. Chris Smith, a specialist in virology at the University of Cambridge.

71. testing procedures 檢測程序
72. diagnostic criteria 診斷標準

劍橋大學(University of Cambridge)病毒學專家克里斯·史密斯(Chris Smith)博士表示，考慮到世界各地不同的檢測程序和診斷標準，連對兩個國家的病例數進行比較幾乎都是不可能的。

★★★★★★★★★★★★

In the most extreme example, China’s case count skyrocketed when it began recording positives based on people’s symptoms, rather than a lab test, the method most countries are still using. But even lab tests might yield different results in different places, depending on the targets labs are using and the ways health workers collect and process specimens.

73. based on people’s symptom 根據某人癥狀
74. case count skyrocketed 病例數大幅飆升
75. yield different results 產生不同的結果

最極端的例子是，當中國開始根據癥狀而不是大多數國家仍在使用的實驗室檢測來計算確診病例時，病例數出現了大幅飆升。但即使是實驗室測試，不同的地方也可能產生不同的結果，這取決於實驗室使用的對象以及醫務人員收集和處理標本的方式。

★★★★★★★★★★★★

“Different countries are doing different things,” Dr. Smith said of the testing programs. “You’re not comparing apples to apples.”

「不同的國家正在做不同的事情，」史密斯談到測試項目時說。「這不是蘋果和蘋果之間的對比。」

The rise of populism has exacerbated the problem by reducing the incentives of countries to cooperate. European leaders, in a three-hour teleconference on Tuesday night, agreed to set up a 25 billion euro investment fund, or $28.1 billion, and to relax rules governing airlines to curb the economic fallout.

76. exacerbated the problem 使問題更加嚴重
77. the incentives of 誘因
78. teleconference 電話會議
79. curb the economic fallout 遏制經濟危機的影響

民粹主義的興起減少了各國合作的意願，使問題更加嚴重。歐洲領導人週二晚間舉行了三小時的電話會議，同意設立一個250億歐元（合1930億元人民幣）的投資基金，並放鬆對航空公司的監管，以遏制經濟危機的影響。

★★★★★★★★★★★★

But they failed to overcome national objections to sharing medical equipment like face masks and respirators, given that health issues are the responsibility of national governments. Germany, the Czech Republic and other countries have tightened export restrictions on this gear to keep it for their own citizens.

80. failed to overcome 未能克服
81. respirator 呼吸器
82. tightened export restrictions on… 加強了…的出口限制
83. gear （從事某活動的）裝備，用具，衣服

但他們未能克服各國對分享口罩和呼吸器等醫療器械的反對，因為健康問題是國家政府的責任。德國、捷克共和國等國家已經加強了對這些設備的出口限制，以便將其留給本國公民。

★★★★★★★★★★★★

Chancellor Angela Merkel’s warning that the virus would infect 60 percent to 70 percent of people in Germany — a figure she attributed to the “consensus among experts” — was the most forthright admission of the scale of the problem by any world leader. It was fully in character for a physicist-turned-politician, reinforcing her status as the liberal West’s foil to Mr. Trump.

84. attributed to 歸於
85. consensus among experts 專家共識
86. forthright （過於）坦誠的，直率的；直截了當的
87. reinforce 強化，加深，進一步證實（觀點、看法等）
88. the liberal West’s foil 自由主義西方世界中的對比
89. foil 陪襯物*

德國總理安哥拉·梅克爾(Angela Merkel)警告說，這種病毒將感染德國60%到70%的人——她稱這一數字來自「專家共識」——這是世界各國領導人對該問題嚴重性最坦率的承認態度。這完全符合從物理學家轉型為政治家的梅克爾的性格，令她進一步成為自由主義西方世界中川普的一個鮮明對比。

*http://bit.ly/3deYyVe

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“We will do whatever is needed,” she said. “We won’t ask every day, ‘What does this mean for our deficit?’”

90. deficit 赤字

「我們會竭盡所能，」她說。「我們不會每天都問，『這對我們的赤字有什麼影響?』」

Yet even Ms. Merkel’s position has been weakened by the resurgence of the far right in Germany. Germany rebuffed a request for medical equipment from Italy, only to see China offer the Italians an aid package that includes two million face masks and 100,000 respirators.

91. a resurgence of 復甦；復興；再次興起
92. far right 極右翼勢力
93. rebuff 斷然拒絕
94. only to do sth 不料卻，沒想到卻

然而，就連梅克爾的地位也被德國極右翼勢力的復甦削弱了。德國拒絕了義大利提供醫療器械的請求，中國卻向義大利提供了包括200萬隻口罩和10萬隻呼吸器在內的援助。

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In Britain, which left the European Union in January, there are already fears that the country will not have access to a vaccine, or will have to pay more for it than other European countries. Mr. Johnson’s government, which won its recent election on a populist-inflected platform of “Get Brexit Done,” is now struggling with how to communicate the risks of the outbreak to its public.

95. a vaccine 疫苗
96. platform 綱領，政綱，宣言

在今年1月脫離歐盟的英國，已經有人擔心該國將無法獲得疫苗，或者將不得不支付比其他歐洲國家更多的費用。強生的政府在最近的選舉中獲勝，憑藉的是受民粹主義影響的「完成脫歐」(Get Brexit Done)宣言。如今這個政府正在吃力地向民眾宣講疫情暴發的風險。

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The Johnson government has put a lot of stock in a so-called nudge unit in Downing Street that specializes in behavioral psychology. But in trying to calibrate its response to what it deemed people capable of processing, the government risked condescending to Britons, said John Ashton, a former regional director of public health for the northwest of England.

97. put a lot of stock in 投入了大量資金
98. so-called 所謂
99. nudge unit 哄勸部門
100. behavioral psychology 行為心理學
101. calibrate 判斷；劃分刻度，標定
102. deem 認為，視為；覺得
103. condescending 表現出高…一等的姿態的，帶有優越感地對待…的

強生政府在唐寧街設立了一個擅長行為心理學的所謂「哄勸」部門，為此投入了大量資金。但前英格蘭西北部地區公共衛生主任約翰·阿什頓(John Ashton)說，政府在判斷人們的接受限度，並以這個限度為依據來制定自己的應對措施，這可能是在用一種假惺惺的屈就方式對待英國人民。

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Britain has only recently started publishing broad breakdowns of where people are contracting the virus. Mr. Ashton said they should be giving much more detailed information, as in Hong Kong, which has published building-level maps of patients who have gotten sick, when they were there and how they contracted the virus.

英國直到最近才開始公布感染髮生的具體地點。阿什頓說，他們應該提供更詳細的信息，就像香港一樣。香港公布了具體到建築的患者地圖，並提供他們在那裡的時間和感染病毒的方式。

“I think it’s patronizing — they need to keep the public fully in the picture,” Mr. Ashton said. “You have to treat the public as adults, instead of keeping them in the dark. That’s where you get rumor and hysteria. They actually create panic by not being open with people.”

104. patronizing 屈尊俯就的；自以為高人一等的
105. keep sb in the picture 使（某人）了解情況
106. keeping sb in the dark 蒙在鼓裡
107. rumor and hysteria 謠言和歇斯底里

「我認為這是一種哄人的姿態——他們需要讓公眾充分了解情況，」阿什頓說。「你必須像對待成年人一樣對待公眾，而不是把他們蒙在鼓裡。謠言和歇斯底里就是這麼來的。他們不向人民開誠布公，實際上是在製造恐慌。」

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完整報導: https://nyti.ms/2J070dm

圖片來源: http://bit.ly/2U1tgJS

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這篇文章你最喜歡哪一句? 辛苦的小編把所有的關鍵片語都列出來了! 同學會持續的看到這些關鍵詞彙和句型出現在我們所有的時事英文喔！

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台灣的應對: http://bit.ly/3a6NSGu

保健心智圖: https://goo.gl/seqt5k

保健相關單字: https://wp.me/p44l9b-Tt (+mp3)

時事英文大全: http://bit.ly/2WtAqop

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這一週的「時事英文」講義和使用方式: https://bit.ly/3a9rr38

The mighty Chinese juggernaut has been humbled this week, apparently by a species-hopping bat virus. While Chinese authorities struggle to control the epidemic and restart their economy, a world that has grown accustomed to contemplating China’s inexorable rise was reminded that nothing, not even Beijing’s power, can be taken for granted.

We do not know how dangerous the new coronavirus will be. There are signs that Chinese authorities are still trying to conceal the true scale of the problem, but at this point the virus appears to be more contagious but considerably less deadly than the pathogens behind diseases such as Ebola or SARS—though some experts say SARS and coronavirus are about equally contagious.

China’s initial response to the crisis was less than impressive. The Wuhan government was secretive and self-serving; national authorities responded vigorously but, it currently appears, ineffectively. China’s cities and factories are shutting down; the virus continues to spread. We can hope that authorities succeed in containing the epidemic and treating its victims, but the performance to date has shaken confidence in the Chinese Communist Party at home and abroad. Complaints in Beijing about the U.S. refusing entry to noncitizens who recently spent time in China cannot hide the reality that the decisions that allowed the epidemic to spread as far and as fast as it did were all made in Wuhan and Beijing.

The likeliest economic consequence of the coronavirus epidemic, forecasters expect, will be a short and sharp fall in Chinese economic growth rates during the first quarter, recovering as the disease fades. The most important longer-term outcome would appear to be a strengthening of a trend for global companies to “de-Sinicize” their supply chains. Add the continuing public health worries to the threat of new trade wars, and supply-chain diversification begins to look prudent.

Events like the coronavirus epidemic, and its predecessors—such as SARS, Ebola and MERS—test our systems and force us to think about the unthinkable. If there were a disease as deadly as Ebola and as fast-spreading as coronavirus, how should the U.S. respond? What national and international systems need to be in place to minimize the chance of catastrophe on this scale?

Epidemics also lead us to think about geopolitical and economic hypotheticals. We have seen financial markets shudder and commodity prices fall in the face of what hopefully will be a short-lived disturbance in China’s economic growth. What would happen if—perhaps in response to an epidemic, but more likely following a massive financial collapse—China’s economy were to suffer a long period of even slower growth? What would be the impact of such developments on China’s political stability, on its attitude toward the rest of the world, and to the global balance of power?

China’s financial markets are probably more dangerous in the long run than China’s wildlife markets. Given the accumulated costs of decades of state-driven lending, massive malfeasance by local officials in cahoots with local banks, a towering property bubble, and vast industrial overcapacity, China is as ripe as a country can be for a massive economic correction. Even a small initial shock could lead to a massive bonfire of the vanities as all the false values, inflated expectations and misallocated assets implode. If that comes, it is far from clear that China’s regulators and decision makers have the technical skills or the political authority to minimize the damage—especially since that would involve enormous losses to the wealth of the politically connected.

We cannot know when or even if a catastrophe of this scale will take place, but students of geopolitics and international affairs—not to mention business leaders and investors—need to bear in mind that China’s power, impressive as it is, remains brittle. A deadlier virus or a financial-market contagion could transform China’s economic and political outlook at any time.

Many now fear the coronavirus will become a global pandemic. The consequences of a Chinese economic meltdown would travel with the same sweeping inexorability. Commodity prices around the world would slump, supply chains would break down, and few financial institutions anywhere could escape the knock-on consequences. Recovery in China and elsewhere could be slow, and the social and political effects could be dramatic.

If Beijing’s geopolitical footprint shrank as a result, the global consequences might also be surprising. Some would expect a return of unipolarity if the only possible great-power rival to the U.S. were to withdraw from the game. Yet in the world of American politics, isolation rather than engagement might surge to the fore. If the China challenge fades, many Americans are likely to assume that the U.S. can safely reduce its global commitments.

So far, the 21st century has been an age of black swans. From 9/11 to President Trump’s election and Brexit, low-probability, high-impact events have reshaped the world order. That age isn’t over, and of the black swans still to arrive, the coronavirus epidemic is unlikely to be the last to materialize in China.