關於 define severe ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

🚩極端天氣帶來的暴風雨間接害死了海豚

一篇看了讓我覺得心裡很不舒服的報導

近年極端天氣帶來的暴雨令海水的鹽度下降
令住在沿海的海豚感染致命性的皮膚病
由2005年起相繼出現死亡個案T^T難過

這都是跟氣候變遷有關
這都是跟我們的生活有關

在這些事上我覺得非常無能為力
沒辦法讓海洋生物有一個好的棲息地

減碳這件事真的很不容易
我們都一起一直的步向滅亡

//The study, published in Scientific Reports, a peer-reviewed natural sciences journal, provides the first-ever case definition for fresh-water skin disease in bottlenose dolphins.

This study comes on the heels of significant outbreaks in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida and Texas and Australia in recent years. In all of these locations, a sudden and drastic decrease in salinity in the waters was the common factor. Coastal dolphins are accustomed to seasonal changes in salinity levels in their marine habitat, but they do not live in freshwater. The increasing severity and frequency of storm events like hurricanes and cyclones, particularly if they are preceded by drought conditions, are dumping unusual volumes of rain that turn coastal waters to freshwater. Freshwater conditions can persist for months, particularly after intense storms such as hurricanes Harvey and Katrina. With the increasing climate temperatures, climate scientists have predicted extreme storms like these will occur more frequently and, consequently, will result in more frequent and severe disease outbreaks in dolphins.

“This devastating skin disease has been killing dolphins since Hurricane Katrina, and we’re pleased to finally define the problem,” said Duignan. “With a record hurricane season in the Gulf of Mexico this year and more intense storm systems worldwide due to climate change, we can absolutely expect to see more of these devastating outbreaks killing dolphins.”

The study has major implications for the current outbreak in Australia, which is impacting the rare and threatened Burrunan dolphin in southeast Australia, and could provide professionals with the information needed to diagnose and treat affected animals. Currently, the long-term outlook for dolphins affected with the skin disease is poor. This is especially true for the animals suffering from prolonged exposure to freshwater.

The deadly skin disease was first noted by researchers on approximately 40 bottlenose dolphins near New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina in 2005.

“As warming ocean temperatures impact marine mammals globally, the findings in this paper will allow better mitigation of the factors that lead disease outbreaks for coastal dolphin communities that are already under threat from habitat loss and degradation,” said Duignan. “This study helps shed light on an ever-growing concern, and we hope it is the first step in mitigating the deadly disease and marshalling the ocean community to further fight climate change.”//

【#TheDiplomat: 沈旭暉隨緣家書英文版🇭🇰】很久沒有向國際關係評論網 The Diplomat 供稿，但國際線十分重要，不應放棄。這次他們希望分享23條、國安法、反恐法風雨欲來的「新香港」前瞻，願國際社會能多了解快將出現的危機：

While the world is preoccupied with a fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing has been tightening its political grip on all aspects of Hong Kong’s civil society. Rumor has it that Beijing will push through legislating national security laws under Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law by unconventional means, such as massively disqualifying pro-democratic legislators or even directly applying a national law, widely argued as a major step to destroy the rights and freedom of Hong Kongers, and bring Chinese authoritarianism to Hong Kong.

After the 2019 protests, the administration of Carrie Lam, who theoretically is still leading the special administrative region of China, has little political capital at stake, with its legitimacy reaching rock bottom. The pro-government camp has dwindling prospects for the city’s upcoming Legislative Council election. The government‘s ”nothing to lose“ mentality is apparent from its recent blatant reinterpretation of the Basic Law’s Article 22 (another article that limits the influence of China’s offices in Hong Kong’s internal affairs). The debate is nothing new, but the pressure this time is quite different.

This article highlights the different strategies Beijing could adopt to enact Article 23 insidiously or under disguise to avoid backlash from the international community, while continuing to reap benefits from the city’s globally recognized special status. This seems to be part of Beijing’s brinkmanship to bring Hong Kong protesters and their supporters to their knees and move the city closer to authoritarianism. To counter these moves, Hong Kongers must define the boundaries beyond which Hong Kong falls into authoritarian rule and make a case as to why the city’s downfall is detrimental to the international community‘s interest.

The Long-Term Controversy Over National Security Laws

Back in 2003, the implementation of Article 23 was thwarted by the moderate pro-establishment politician James Tien. In face of overwhelming public disapproval of the law, he withdrew support and votes from his Liberal Party. However, 17 years later, it is hard to imagine Beijing following the old legislative playbook: start with a public consultation, followed by public discourse and political debate, and end with the majority rule. This playbook only works in peaceful societies ruled by a trustworthy government with integrity.

The aftermath of 2003, as well as the 2019 protests, should have taught Beijing and the Hong Kong government a lesson: pushing through national security legislation in a flawed parliament controlled by the minority pro-government camp would inevitably set off another full city-scale protest — and undoubtedly more fierce and focused this time. Given the current government’s numerous displays of dishonesty, it is conceivable that they will embark on a less-traveled path to implement Article 23.

Strategy One: “Anti-Terrorism”

In principle, one possible strategy could be to directly enact Chinese national law across Hong Kong, which can be achieved by declaring a state of emergency in the city. However, this is risky business as it would tarnish the integrity of “one country two systems” and subsequently Hong Kong’s international standing. Beijing, a risk-averse regime, is also unwilling to see Hong Kong’s status as a middleman for laundering money disappear into thin air.

Instead, Beijing could be concocting a narrative that would see Chinese national law applied to Hong Kong while not damaging Hong Kong’s international standing and Beijing’s own interests. The key word in this script is “anti-terrorism.” As early as 2014, pro-Beijing scholars have been claiming the emergence of “local terrorist ideology” on Hong Kong soil. Since the anti-extradition bill protests last year, government rhetoric frequently described the protests, which caused no deaths at all in the entire year, with phrases like “inclination to terrorist ideology.” That was a signal to the world that Hong Kong’s internal conflicts had ballooned into a national security issue. This gives the government the legitimacy to justify the implementation of Chinese national laws across the highly autonomous region to counter terrorism. The Chinese government knows that if it can persuade the world that terrorism exists in Hong Kong, and that it is as severe as the terror threat facing many other nations today, the international community will be less critical of Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong. Enacting Chinese laws directly is a convenient path that will save Beijing from having to tackle Hong Kong’s internal conflicts, basically turning the Hong Kong issue into a nonissue.

Strategy Two: Stacking the Legislature by Disqualifying Candidates

An even bolder strategy was probably foretold by a recent incident where the Hong Kong government and Beijing’s agencies for Hong Kong affairs (HKMAO and the Liaison Office) jointly criticized lawmaker Dennis Kwok for filibustering, framing it as “misconduct in public office” and “violating his oath.” It is incomprehensible to claim that filibustering goes against a lawmaker’s main duty; rather, it is common understanding that legislative work includes debating the law and representing public opinion against unreasonable laws. In a parliament controlled by the minority, pro-democratic members representing the majority of Hong Kongers are forced to express their objections using means like filibustering. Wouldn’t a lack of different political opinions turn the legislative branch into a rubber-stamp institution?

The above allegation has set a dangerous precedent for twisting the logic behind a certain provision in the Basic Law to target opposing lawmakers. In other words, to fulfill Beijing’s interpretation of the principal requirement for holding public office in Hong Kong, one could be required to take a meticulously legalistic approach to uphold the Basic Law down to its every single wording. A public official, by this new definition, not only needs to support “one country, two systems” or object Hong Kong independence, but also must abide by every single provision in the Basic Law. Worst of all, based on the previous cases, whether an official’s words or actions oversteps a provision is up to Beijing’s interpretation of his/her “intent.”

If this approach is applied, in the next election, there might be additional official questions for screening candidates like the following: “The Basic Law states that the enactment of Article 23 is a constitutional duty. Failing to support Article 23 legislation violates the Basic Law. Do you support it?” This question would suffice to disqualify even moderate or even pro-establishment candidates like James Tien. Even if any pro-democratic candidates were elected, once Article 23 re-enters the legislative process, they could risk ouster by raising objections.

Despite the absurdity of this tactic, the Chinese regime may just be tempted enough if such a strategy could resolve two of China’s current nuisances — voices of dissent in the Legislative Council and the previous failure to implement Article 23.

Strategy Three: The “Boiling Frog Effect”

Article 23 is not yet implemented, but the dystopian world that the protesters pictured in 2003 is already becoming reality. Regular citizens have been persecuted for “sedition” for sharing their views on social media or participating in legal protests; workers face retaliation for taking part in strikes; corporations are pressured to publicly side with the government’s stance; employees who have the “wrong” political views are fired; schools have been closely monitored for teaching material; protest-supporting fundraisers were framed for money laundering; a retweet or like may lead to persecution, under a colonial-era law. Only now have Hong Kongers woken up to their new reality — although the Basic Law technically protects citizens’ rights to speak, rally, march, demonstrate, and go on strike, the government could enfeeble civil rights by bending antiquated laws and legal provisions. The frequent abuse of law enforcement power on a small scale, such as improper arrests and police violence, is desensitizing the public and the international community. In a few years, Hong Kong will become unrecognizable. This is indeed a clever play on Beijing’s part to slowly strip away Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedom, without causing much international attention.

Counter-Strategies Against Beijing’s Brinkmanship

Beijing’s overarching goal is to hollow out Hong Kong but, at the same time, avoid major backlash from the international community, which could spell the end of the privileged global status of Hong Kong not granted to other Chinese cities. Beijing also aims at preventing single incidents that could cascade down into mass protests as seen in 2003, 2014, and 2019; and eliminating any resistance forces from within Hong Kong’s legislature. The tactics outlined above are typical in a game of brinkmanship.

In response, Hong Kongers in Hong Kong and on the so-called “international frontline” must know their strengths and bargaining chips on this negotiating table with Beijing.

Unlike Xinjiang and Tibet, Hong Kong is a city with transparency and free flow of information. Hong Kongers need to make a case to the world that the protests are not acts of terrorism. Some suggestions include comparing the Hong Kong protests to similar struggles in 20 or so other counties in the world at the present time, none of which were classified as terrorism; collecting a large amount of concrete evidence of the disproportionate use of force by the Hong Kong police; and showing how enacting Chinese national laws in Hong Kong will end the city’s autonomy and spell disaster for international community‘s interests.

The Legislative Council is the institution that can counteract Beijing’s “boiling frog” strategy and to keep Hong Kongers’ hope alive in the system. Those who plan to run for legislative office must be prepared to be disqualified from running. If only individuals are banned, there need to be alternative candidates as back-up plans. However, if and when the disqualification process is applied broadly to entire camps of candidates (for example, all who object to Article 23), the pro-democracy camp must make a strong case to the Hong Kong and global public that this is the endgame for Hong Kong democracy. Then the incumbent popularly elected legislators will hold the internationally recognized mandate from the public and serve as the last resistance.

These recommendations delineates how the slogan “if we burn, you burn with us,” often seen in the protests, may play out in the game of international relations. If the national security laws are “passed” by a legislature that is jury-rigged in this manner, or if related national laws are directly implemented in Hong Kong, Hong Kongers should signal clearly to the world that it goes way beyond the promised “one country, two systems.” Crossing this red line by Beijing should be seen by the world as a blunt violation of its promised autonomy to Hong Kongers. At that time, if the international community led by the United States and the United Kingdom decided to revoke the “non-sovereignty entity” status of Hong Kong and regard the SAR as an ordinary Chinese city, it shouldn’t come as a surprise.

Dr. Simon Shen is the Founding Chairman of GLOs (Glocal Learning Offices), an international relations start-up company. He also serves as an adjunct associate professor in the University of Hong Kong, Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and associate director of the Master of Global Political Economy Programme of the CUHK. The author acknowledges Jean Lin, Coco Ho, Chris Wong, Michelle King, and Alex Yap for their assistance in this piece.

▶️ 高度自治 vs 全面管治
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pwt8wZl8jHQ

"ชีวิตคนเราต้องประสบความสำเร็จไหมคะพี่"

น้องนิสิตคนหนึ่งเดินเข้ามาถามหลังบรรยายเสร็จ คำถามนี้อวลอยู่ในหัวของผมจนถึงบ้าน ตัวคำถามเองก็น่าสนใจ แต่สิ่งที่ผมสนใจมากไปกว่า 'คำตอบ' คือ 'ที่มา' ของคำถามนี้

อะไรทำให้หนุ่มสาววัยยี่สิบต้นถามคำถามนี้ออกมา?
...Continue Reading" Do we have to be successful in life, brother

A student walked in to ask after the lecture. This question is in my head to home. The question is interesting. But what I am more interested in ' answer ' is ' source ' of this question.

What makes a twenty-year-old girl ask this question?

I don't think she is the only one who has a question if it is a representative of the same age of the same age and grievance.

Is it possible that the root of this question is the tiredness from trying to chase success, pressure from seeing the 'good life' of those who look like successful fast surround themselves, including carrying expectations from Parents, relatives, teachers, teachers, including society. You must be smart.

Does the world have space to help? Announce a lot of 'success'. TV, online media, clip, interview. Anyone who has done anything will have space to tell their own story.

But -- the world has so little space for 'failure'

...

When someone hasn't done anything or incomplete, disappointed, so he feels alone, humiliated and doesn't know where to put these ' destruction ' in the world. When they look around, there are only areas of success.

' broken ' is kept in my heart. I don't go anywhere. Slowly spread to eat. Feeling good for yourself. I can't talk to friends. It's not consecrated with parents. Or encourage you to be more diligent. Be kind. I say " you can do it. Fight him "

But no one consent to us to lose.

When the destruction becomes a personal thing to keep, it's like a bad leavening that gradually works in the body. It's a bad disease that eats our heart. We are bored of the world. I feel bad about myself. It's a grey. This symptom has happened

We feel bad that this life has to 'win' only.

But 'loser' still happens every day. Btw, everyone will lose one day.

We focus too little on ' failure '. That's the cause of sickness in modern society.

When someone is heartbroken, I think it's a little bit. You should come back to be strong soon. When someone fails, we will tell him that they will be successful.

We barely care about ' failure ' in the present, but always look at ' success ' in the future.

...

An important area that should be together is a space for losers and failure, not a depressing area where we can talk about disappointment without being shy or even tell a failed attempt.

This can happen. Attitude to failure must change first. It's not embarrassing. It's not bad things. It's a share. Learn from each other. Embracing each other's feelings. Hold each other.

We should create a society where #failure is normal. Allow children to fail. Allow friends to fail and help to support each other through the beauty within the mind.

A society that has space for failure. When we miss, we will dare to tell the mistake. There is no suffering. No need to be embarrassed. Don't rush. We feel like this normal. We will not spread to the sickness.

...

" Do we have to be successful in life, brother

What I care more about is the emotion of the person who asks, which I feel that she carries the pressure that 'must be successful'

I replied to her "not necessary I mean success in the definition of normal people" but our lives need to be happy. We are born to live the way we like, not the way others like, but we have to answer ourselves first that life. What I like to be and try to build it without anyone's ruler to measure "

'life we like' for me, it may consist of failure because what we fail may be what we want to try. What we miss. It may be learning. People who disappoint us may be good memories in some aspects.

We can lose, we can miss and we have a life that we like. In the midst of those misses. It's not strange.

But one person can be strong in his own mind. It has to go through a fragile time at a young age. These days that people around you have an important role in helping him not be too deep from falling down.

We may be wrong to think that 'success makes life happy'. The opposite, life is longing, but success may be a severe suffering life.

Life that allows yourself to fail. It's a happy life.

If we live in a society that is not crazy, success, then we can like our lives with both ingredients. That is -- normal life.

While there is not quite a lot of ' space for failure ', we may have to create this space first. Allow ourselves to fail, disappoint, defeated, assemble it to be part of life without pushing away. Don't try to live life. Only doing whatever you Only only.

You can lose... embrace it

...

In terms of society, it's time to review things that we can help to be ' hungry for success '. What brings us to the point where we need to question the pressure of life. We should do. How to unfold the weight on their shoulders

Because it's the end, the society that focuses on success will not create ' successful ', but it will create a lot of ' patients ' from the pressure.

...

" Do we have to succeed in life

Should both succeed and fail because that's real life

The important thing is don't succeed and have a life that we don't like and don't forget that we can fail and still like your life.

When we don't allow anyone to define success and fail, we may see that the answer to this question is not ' must be successful ', but the answer is

We will be 'successful' according to whose definition.

Someone else or yourself

If it's your own definition, some failure can be part of a successful life.Translated