關於 battle sign中文 ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

【After Winning Majority in LegCo: Beijing's Crackdown May Trigger International Intervention】

***感謝Hong Kong Columns - Translated，將我早前撰寫『議會過半想像：以「#國際攬炒」反制「臨立會2.0」』長文（https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.313299448762570/2887650867994069/）翻譯成英文，鼓勵國際社會關注立會選舉一旦過半的沙盤推演，在最惡劣形勢下的制衡策略。***

中文精簡版本：https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.564294826996363/2888641404561682/

Hongkongers have experienced our revolution for over half a year. They no longer take a consequentialist view to the effectiveness of their movement as they did years ago, or waste time second-guessing the intentions and background of fellow activists. Following the defensive battles at CUHK and PolyU, November’s District Council election saw a great victory of unity. More marvellous is the union between peaceful and “valiant” protesters.

In the process of resisting tyranny, the people have realised that one cannot prioritize one strategy over another. This is also how the common goal of “35+” came into being—the hope that we will win over half of the seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo) this September, such that the political spectrum that represents the majority of Hongkongers is able to gain control of legislative decisions. The political clout of Hongkongers will increase if 35 or more seats are successfully secured on our side. It is certainly one vital step to achieve the five demands within the system.

The possibility of realizing legislative majority

Technically it is not unrealistic to win a majority even under the current undemocratic system. Back in the 2016 LegCo election, we already won 30 seats. In addition to the District Council (First) functional constituency seat that is already in the pocket of the pan-democrats, as long as the candidates in Kowloon East and New Territories West do not start infighting again, we could safely secure 33 seats based on the number of pan-dem votes in 2016.

The other 3 seats required to achieve a majority depend on democrats’ breakthrough among the functional constituencies by dispersing the resources of the Liaison Office. They also count on whether the turnout this September could exceed 71.2% — that of last year’s District Council elections. Some of the factors that could affect the turnout include: will the epidemic persist into the summer? Will there be potential violent repression of protests in the 2 weeks preceding the election? Will Hong Kong-US relations be affected by the downturn of the global economy?

Therefore, the ambition of “35+” is to be prioritised by the resistance as both a means and an end. I have already expressed my support for an intra-party primary at the coordination meeting. In the meantime, it is pleasing to see the ongoing debates reaching a consensus of maximising the seats among geographical constituencies in the upcoming election.

Whilst enthusiastic coordination, we should also assess the post-election landscape and gauge Beijing’s reactions: if we do not reach 35 seats, Hong Kong will be subject to tighter control and more severe repression by China; but if the democratic parties successfully form a majority in LegCo, CCP’s fears of a “constitutional crisis” would become imminent. Hence, the key questions are how the Pan-Democrats should deal with the volatile political situation in Hong Kong and how they are going to meet Beijing’s charge head-on.

Watching out for Beijing’s dismissal of LegCo after reaching majority

To take back control of LegCo such that it faithfully reflects the majority’s principles and needs is the definition of a healthy democracy. Recently, however, DAB’s Tam Yiu-chung has warned that the plan of the Pan-Dems to “usurp power” in the LegCo would only lead to Beijing’s forceful disqualification of certain members or the interpretation of the Basic Law. This proves that winning a majority in LegCo is not only a popular conception but also a realistic challenge that would get on the nerves of Beijing. Could Beijing accept a President James To in LegCo? These unknown variables must be addressed upon achieving a majority.

While there is no telltale sign as to Beijing’s exact strategy, we are already familiar with the way CCP manipulated the Basic Law in the past 4 years. Having experienced three waves of disqualifications in LegCo, twice kicked out of LegCo with my team, and thrice locked up in jail, I have no false hopes of an easy compromise from Beijing: they would not let Pan-Dems control LegCo for half a year and wait (as is the proper procedure) until after having negatived the Budget to dissolve the legislature, and thereby giving them an easy victory in the re-elections. The greater the Pan-Dems threaten Beijing’s rule in Hong Kong, the more likely that it will trigger Beijing’s repression.

Since the disqualification and arrest of lawmakers have already become “normalised”, one can even imagine the police stepping into the LegCo building to force Pan-Dems into voting. Neither is it beyond our imagination to expect the CCP to kick out all 70 lawmakers in a fit of rage and replace them with a provisional LegCo “2.0” [HKCT note: The first was from 25 Jan 1997 to 30 Jun 1998]. To depend on a majority that could lead to a chapter of a “new testament” for One Country, Two Systems is perhaps what many elites long for, but they are overly optimistic:for a ticket to the promised land will not be available at the Chief Executive election campaign a year and a half later.

Admittedly, the Pan-Dems cannot unilaterally initiate “Laam-chaau” [HKCT note: mostly translated into “scorched-earth” mentality or “mutual destruction”; some even translated into “If I burn, you burn with us”]. The most they can do is to force a standstill of the government, and not for long the LegCo will have been eliminated from the equation to make the wheels turn again. It all leaves the plan of “Negativing the motion → Dissolving LegCo → Re-election after re-election → the stepping down of Carrie Lam” merely as overly positive speculation, probably resulting from their overestimate of CCP's capacity for rational calculation. The Pan-Dems must guard their frontlines and recognise what the biggest threat from Hong Kong to China could be. In this case, should LegCo sessions be disrupted or suspended, the Pan-Dems would have to be well prepared to surmount the expected obstacles and prevent the disqualification crisis 4 years ago—a Catch-22 indeed.

Productive tension from global intervention: Using Laam-chaau against the CCP

What aggravates the CCP the most is the potential threat to Hong Kong’s unique status as the one and only “separate customs territory”. Any miscalculation will compromise its role as the Chinese economy’s “white gloves”. Imagine if CCP were to disqualify all 70 elected lawmakers and convene a meeting north of the Shenzhen River to pass a resolution to Hong Kong’s affairs (much like the Provisional Legislative Council “1.0" in 1997), how great will the shock be in a world with an effective Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act? However hard it is to predict the future one thing is certain: With the US presidential election just around the corner, blows to the separation of powers would not be tolerated, and the West would necessarily effect countermeasures against the Hong Kong government.

Beijing has been relying upon Hong Kong to navigate the international community for decades. While clamping down on the political freedom of the cosmopolitan city, Beijing desires to maintain the financial centre’s economic freedom. Hence, we started lobbying for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act four years ago, and today we are determined to promote “Laam-chaau” on an international scale.

The will of the voters must be reflected in an election. If a “35+” legislature were to be dismissed and replaced, such flagrant violation of democracy would assuredly cause a greater backlash than the infamous extradition bill. Knowing what the reality ahead of us could be, we have to combine our election and international strategies to oppose the placement of a 35+ LegCo with an “Emergency Legislative Council 2.0”, to advance an international “Laam-chaau” to Hong Kong’s status as “separate customs territory”. Only then will we stand a chance to resist the regime and to realise the five demands.

Adjusting our mindset: Overcoming the “constitutional crisis” to reach a resolution

Upon the realization of the “35+” LegCo, it is expected that the CCP will launch a devastating counterattack. The Pan-Dems should not expect LegCo to run normally; neither can the lawmakers realise their governing blueprints they have for Hong Kong. Rather, candidates will be able to compete against one another with visions of a liberated Hong Kong through popular vote. Bringing this point up has nothing to do with undermining the common goal of reaching a majority in LegCo, but rather channels the battle of LegCo to positive use upon the rule of law’s death and a “constitutional crisis” ahead. Knowing that Hongkongers have nothing to fall back on, all Pan-Dems should not miss the only way to the realization of “35+”.

Thus, be they partisans, nonpartisans, incumbent politicians, amateur politicians, or the civil society as a whole – if we stay in the political discourse of 2016 and continue to perpetuate old stereotypes, that is to deal with the divisions on the pan-democratic camp by favouring the most “local” faction; to consider only resource allocation and self-aggrandizement as the purpose of a LegCo campaign; to ignore how potential lawmakers are fitted to what specific roles; to turn a blind eye to the journey of resistance since last summer (extending indefinitely into the future)—They would lead as astray and cost us lose a precious opportunity for change by winning a 35+ majority.

The extent to which the pan-democrats can stay united in light of the political atmosphere since last summer is another problem that our side must to address. Before the watershed moment of 12th June 2019, many democratic delegates were trapped in the mentality of needing to “preserve people’s livelihood”, “be content of what we have accomplished”, and other strategies that favours stability. As the government refuses to heed to the five demands, whether the democrats, especially those in the functional constituencies, have the political will to go all-in is the real difficult question that confronts us in the upcoming LegCo election.

All in all, if “35+” cannot be realised, it is unsurprising to see LegCo being more heavily suppressed in the next 4 years; even if "35+" is achieved, it is questionable whether the pan-democrats are able to weather multiple attacks, verbal or physical, from the regime (judging from its power in the last four years) and utilise the international Laam-chaau strategy against the displacement of LegCo. Adhering to the motto of “we fight on, each in his own way”, I can only hope that Hongkongers in elections, street confrontations and international front can reconcile with each other, so that we may collectively compel the government to yield to our demands in the next six months. It is only by reaching a resolution before a real constitutional crisis that we can combat the institutional violence of the regime and not be devoured by it.

https://hkcolumn.blogspot.com/2020/04/joshua-wong-after-winning-majority-in.html?fbclid=IwAR216gf53pG_j9JOpDfr2GItvjLfrFSekKTPzoEs3-s9KBqvPEwz865P8vw

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【亞洲究竟何時才會通過同性婚姻？】（中譯）

Foreign Policy 於日前（11/30) 刊出專文報導台灣婚姻平權法案進程，文章以伴侶盟發起「婚姻平權革命陣線」，於 2014/10/5 彩虹圍城行動中，群眾把婚姻平權四個大球推入立院作為開頭。精要勾勒了近年來台灣婚姻平權發展簡史，並詳盡分析了目前法案風雲詭譎的政治情勢，報導也委婉但明確點出，婚姻平權法案的通過與否，正在考驗著蔡總統的領導能力與政治誠信。

原文 參見
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/30/marriage-equality-in-taiwan-isnt-a-done-deal-tsai-ing-wen-legislation-lgbt-taipei/?wp_login_redirect=0
作者/LINDA VAN DER HORST
2016年11月30日
中文翻譯：Tasha Chang

標題：When Will Asia Finally Have Same-Sex Marriage?
亞洲究竟何時才會通過同性婚姻？？
Taiwan is on the verge of becoming the first Asian government to legalize marriage equality. But the public is deeply divided.
台灣即將成為亞洲第一個同性婚姻合法化的國家，但輿論仍高度分歧。
In October 2014, a crowd at an LGBT rights rally in Taipei, one of many, lobbed four large red balloons emblazoned with the Chinese characters for marriage equality into the fenced courtyard of Taiwan’s legislature. At that time, a comfortable majority of Taiwanese supported same-sex marriage; a number of polls in the self-governing island of 23 million indicated as much, with one showing as many as 71 percent in favor. But several initiatives to amend the law to achieve marriage equality, first mooted in 2003, have not been successful. Two years later, three marriage equality bills now sit on legislators’ desks; although international media have been quick to announce that Taiwan stands on the cusp of being the first government in Asia to achieve marriage equality, the island’s public seems deeply divided. In the latest poll on the subject, released on Nov. 29, 46 percent of respondents supported marriage equality, while 45 percent opposed it. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s lawmakers and its civil society have been more cautious than recent headlines in Western media suggest.

2014年10月，在架起拒馬的立法院外，有一大群為了同志權益發聲的群眾，高推著四顆分別寫著「婚」、「姻」、「平」、「權」四字的紅色大球，推往立法院的方向。當時，在有著2,300萬人口的台灣，有絕大多數民眾都支持婚姻平權，幾個民意調查也顯示同樣的結果，其中有個調查的支持度甚至還高達71%。然而，最早於2003年所發動，接續欲修法以達成婚姻平權的數個提案，最後都無疾而終。兩年後，三套版本的婚姻平權法案現正擺在立法委員的案前等待審議。雖然國際媒體迅速下了判斷宣告台灣即將成為亞洲第一個達成婚姻平權的國家，但台灣的民意似乎仍高度分歧。最近一次於今年11月29日公布的一份調查指出，46%的受訪者支持婚姻平權，另有45%的受訪者表示反對。同時，相較於西方國際媒體樂觀的報導走向，台灣的立法委員與公民社會的態度反而較為小心謹慎。

Island-wide marriage equality initiatives have been unsuccessful in spite of growing support over decades. Even without national legislation, many local governments in Taiwan now allow same-sex couples to participate in collective weddings and to record their partnership in household registries across the island, although neither action confers any legal rights.

過去數十年，即便婚姻平權的支持度越來越高，推動婚姻平權的行動卻屢遭挫敗。雖然中央尚未立法保障同志權益，台灣有許多地方政府已開放同性伴侶參與聯合婚禮並開放同性伴侶註記，然無論是聯合婚禮還是同性伴侶註記，皆未能給予同性伴侶法律上的權利。

To many, the election of President Tsai Ing-wen and her Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in January portended a broader, deeper change. Tsai openly made statements that appeared to support marriage equality during and after her campaign. In an October 2015 Facebook video posted to coincide with Taipei’s annual LGBT pride parade, Tsai exclaimed, “Everyone is equal before love.” A year later, she posted a photo on her Facebook page showing a rainbow, adding that her “belief has not changed” post-election. In August, Tsai appointed the first transgender official in government, Audrey Tang, as executive councilor for digital policy, which looked like another step toward acceptance of different gender norms.

對於許多人來說，現任總統蔡英文與其所屬政黨民主進步黨（民進黨）在一月總統大選的勝選，預告了更大幅度、更深程度的改變。無論是在選舉期間或當選後，蔡英文數次公開發表支持婚姻平權的文章。2015年10月，為響應臺北的年度同志大遊行，蔡英文的臉書發表了一支影片，影片中的蔡英文說道：「在愛之前，大家都是平等的。」一年過後，她在臉書上發佈了一則彩虹橫跨天際的照片，補充道：「雖然我的身分變了，但是我相信的價值沒有改變」，強調選後立場沒有改變。今年八月，蔡英文內閣任命首位跨性別官員唐鳳擔任政務委員，督導數位經濟與開放政府。此舉看來又是另一個接納不同性別典範的舉措。

Since Tsai took office this May, pressure has been building on her to deliver.
自蔡英文五月就任後，要求實現承諾的壓力升高

Since Tsai took office this May, pressure has been building on her to deliver. Yet she has never explicitly promised that her administration would push for same-sex marriage legislation, and critics have feared that once in office, she would find herself unable to follow through on her progressive rhetoric. The party that Tsai leads, the DPP, “has neither devoted sufficient resources to communicate the issues of marriage equality nor to reconcile differences within the party,” Victoria Hsu, who heads the nonprofit Taiwan Alliance to Promote Civil Partnership Rights (TAPCPR), told Foreign Policy.

蔡英文自今年五月就任後，要求她實現承諾的壓力不斷升高。然而，蔡英文卻從來沒有公開承諾她的行政團隊會推動婚姻平權的立法，批評者認為，一旦就任，蔡英文就無法堅持實現她過往曾發表過充滿進步性的言論。非營利組織台灣伴侶權益推動聯盟理事長許秀雯向《外交政策》表示，「蔡總統所領導的民進黨一直沒有真正投注夠多的資源在婚姻平權議題之上，或去溝通與化解黨內歧見。」

It was therefore a setback when Justice Minister Chiu Tai-san announced in August that his ministry still intended to introduce its own same-sex partnership bill — but only in 2017, after studying the impact of such a law on Taiwanese society. (In Taiwan, ministries can introduce bills into the legislature.) The effort dates back to the previous, more socially conservative Kuomintang (KMT) administration of Ma Ying-jeou and is an attempt to compromise between supporters of marriage equality and religious groups opposed. Proposing a separate law for same-sex partnership is politically easier, as it leaves the institution of marriage as currently constituted unchanged.

於是，當法務部長邱太三在八月宣布，經過研究相關法律對於台灣社會的影響，法務部仍傾向在2017年推出同性伴侶法時（台灣的行政部門可自行推出法案送進立法院審議），對於同志社群來說是一大挫敗。推行同性伴侶法可溯及較為保守的國民黨馬英九政府當權時期，用意在面對支持婚姻平權的群眾與反對婚姻平權的宗教團體中取得妥協。對於當政者而言，推動同性伴侶專法因未修改現行婚姻制度，在政治上的壓力較小。

In the absence of strong top-down leadership on the issue from Tsai, momentum for the bills currently under consideration has come from the bottom up. Audrey Ko, the chief editor of Womany, an online media outlet focused on gender issues and LGBT rights, says a stigma remains for gays and lesbians in Taiwan, one her company seeks to dispel. Other organizations, such as the Taiwan Tongzhi (LGBT) Hotline Association, perform peer counseling and advocacy work. Even corporations are chipping in; in March, McDonald’s released a commercial in which a son comes out to his father in one of its restaurants. (The father accepts it.)

缺少蔡英文「從上而下」貫徹的領導力，對於三個版本婚姻平權法案的支持聲量多來自「由下而上」的力量。關注性別與同志議題的線上媒體女人迷總編輯柯采岑表示，臺灣的同志族群還是被污名化，而女人迷就是想要破除此種污名；其他的組織例如台灣同志諮詢熱線協會則提供同志諮詢服務與倡議。企業也紛紛響應婚姻平權的議題。今年三月，在麥當勞發表的電視廣告中，有一個兒子在麥當勞向自己的父親出櫃（而父親也接受他了）。

This summer, a number of Taiwanese pop artists organized a benefit concert to raise awareness for marriage equality; tickets sold out in minutes. Pop superstar Jolin Tsai performed a lesbian-themed song for the occasion. In the music video for the song “We’re All Different, Yet the Same,” she makes the case for marriage equality by describing the plight of a woman whose partner of more than 30 years is hospitalized; the woman is unable to sign a consent form for emergency surgery because she is legally not a spouse or family member.

今年夏天，有多個臺灣流行音樂藝人組織了一場為婚姻平權而唱的公益演唱會，演唱會門票一開賣就在幾分鐘內售罄。流行樂天后蔡依林在該場演唱會中也演出以女同志為主題的歌。在她的「不一樣又怎樣」的MV中，描述了一對相守30年的女同志伴侶，其中一位因病住院，然她的伴侶卻無法在她需要進行緊急手術時簽署手術同意書，因為她的伴侶並不具有配偶或是親屬的身份。

A real-life version of this tragedy triggered public outcry and reinvigorated support for marriage equality. On Oct. 16, 67-year-old French professor Jacques Picoux fell to his death from the top of a 10-story building in Taipei, police said. He is thought to have committed suicide after depression caused by the death of his partner due to cancer; Picoux was unable to make medical decisions for his partner in his final days, as Picoux had no legal status. In a response to this outcry, legislators from the DPP and the KMT, as well as the caucus of the New Power Party (NPP), a young activist organization, all introduced similar marriage equality bills.

此種悲劇的真實案例引發了社會上強烈的抗議聲浪，推動婚姻平權運動更進一步。在今年10月16日，據警方表示，67歲的法國籍教授畢安生（Jacques Picoux）從位於台北的10樓住家一躍而下身亡。據悉，他有可能是因長期伴侶因癌症過世所引發的憂鬱症而自殺。當畢安生的伴侶在癌症末期時，因他沒有法律地位而無法替伴侶做醫療決定。為了回應關於婚姻平權的呼聲，民進黨與國民黨的立委以及由年輕的社運組織所組成的時代力量的黨團都推出了類似的婚姻平權法案。

All three proposals would amend the Taiwan Civil Code to open marriage to same-sex couples, but they differ in how to do so. DPP legislator Yu Mei-nu’s proposal introduces a general provision extending to same-sex couples the right to marriage, as well as other family law rights that accompany married status. But it leaves further gendered language across the civil code intact. The proposals of KMT legislator Hsu Yu-ren and the NPP would make references to “husband and wife” and “father and mother” gender-neutral throughout all relevant civil code provisions. These latter two proposals have great symbolic meaning, because they remove a heterosexual presumption from the code, but the legal effect is likely no different than Yu’s proposal.

這三個提案都主張修改民法將婚姻制度對同性伴侶開放，但對於如何開放則各有其詮釋。民進黨尤美女的版本採用一概括條款(註：新增民法971-1條)使同性配偶適用夫妻、父母子女等相關權利義務，但保留了民法中「性別化」的法律用語，未加修改。國民黨立委許毓仁與時代力量黨團的版本則將「夫妻」、「父母」等現行民法中的用語性別中立化。許毓仁與時代力量的版本，將異性戀預設的用語「性別中立化」而具有重大的象徵性意義，但若在法律適用結果而論，三個版本並無太大差異。

There is still a long legislative road to travel before Taiwan can become the first Asian government to legalize same-sex marriage. The bills passed their first reading on Nov. 17, but the DPP caucus whip has said the proposed bills will next be reviewed on Dec. 26. During the review process, any legislator can introduce a competing same-sex partnership act. Even if the bills were to enter a second reading, they could still face a boycott and be removed from the agenda. The bills will only become legislation after passing three readings.

臺灣要成為亞洲第一個將同性婚姻合法化的國家，仍有一大段立法之路要走。婚姻平權三版本的民法修正案都在今年11月17日通過了立法院一讀，而民進黨黨團總召表示，下一次審議的時間為12月26日。在審查過程中，任何一位立法委員都可以提出同性伴侶法作為對案。即便三個版本的婚姻平權法案進入了二讀，也還是有可能面臨杯葛而無法排進立法院的議程中。這三個版本的法案要通過三讀才有可能正式成為法律。

As these bills went through their first reading in the legislature this month, thousands of people protesting against marriage equality, and only several hundred rallying for it, gathered on Taipei’s streets.

當三個版本的法案本月在立法院通過一讀後，上千名反對婚姻平權的民眾走上台北街頭集結，當天支持婚姻平權而上街的民眾僅數百人。

As these bills went through their first reading in the legislature this month, thousands of people protesting against marriage equality, and only several hundred rallying for it, gathered on Taipei’s streets. Opposition to marriage equality in Taiwan largely comes from small but well-organized and vocal conservative religious groups. Four people reportedly even managed to storm into the legislative meeting room, shouting that the “legislators are monsters” and would want to change Taiwan “into an AIDS island.”

這三個版本的法案本月都在立法院通過一讀，為此，上千名反對婚姻平權的民眾走上台北街頭集結，然當天上街支持婚姻平權的民眾卻只有數百人。在台灣，大部分反對婚姻平權的民眾來自規模小但組織嚴密且發言聲量大的保守宗教團體。據報載，甚至有四名反對修法的民眾嘗試要衝進立法院司法及法制委員會的會議室，高喊著：「立委都是怪獸」、台灣要變「愛滋島」。

It is hard to tell whether the legislature will pass a same-sex marriage bill this time, says Hsu of TAPCPR, partly because of internal opposition within the DPP and KMT. (The NPP caucus fully supports its bill but only holds five seats in legislature.) Tsai has reiterated that the bills are “clear evidence” marriage equality has support across all parties. But even Yu, who introduced the DPP bill, says she is only cautiously optimistic about the chances of passing a marriage equality law.

台灣伴侶權益推動聯盟理事長許秀雯表示，現在沒有辦法預知立法院是否會通過婚姻平權法案，情勢走向如何，真的很難說。因為主要政黨國民黨及民進黨的立委雖然都有提出婚姻平權民法修正案，但這兩個黨裡面也都有反對者（時代力量雖然全黨都支持婚姻平權，在立法院內也只有五個席次）。蔡英文總統數度表示，不同版本婚姻平權法案的推出，即為此議題獲得跨黨派支持的「明證」。然而，即便是推出民進黨版本婚姻平權法案的尤美女立委也表示，對於婚姻平權是否能過關成為法律，她仍只抱持審慎樂觀的態度。

Outside lawmakers’ offices, the battle for public support continues. If anything, it seems to be waning precisely at the time when it will be most needed. “More and more people are confessing that they love gays but that they don’t support same-sex marriage,” said Ko, because they believe allowing same-sex partners to get married will harm traditional family values. She is therefore unsure whether Taiwan will manage to pass a bill in the next year. At least, Ko added, “people are talking [about it], and it is not a taboo anymore.”

在立法委員的辦公室外，爭取民意支持的戰爭仍未停歇。若真要說，此時此刻婚姻平權運動最需要的是什麼？大概就是更多的支持。女人迷總編輯柯采岑表示，「有越來越多人坦白表示，他們愛同志但是不支持婚姻平權」，因為他們認為，若同性伴侶可以結婚，將損害傳統家庭價值。」她也說，不確定臺灣能否在明年內通過婚姻平權法案。她補充：「但至少，大家都開始討論（婚姻平權法案）了，這再也不是禁忌了。」