【How Do You Know When To Hire Your Next Startup Team Member?】
One of the struggles that startup would face during early stage is trying to figure out if it’s time to hire a new team member.
The answer to that question is, you know you need to hire the first or next team member when filling a role is the only option to move the startup forward. The reason could be that you may be missing out business opportunities because of your limited availability or you don’t have the required knowledge and expertise.
Nonetheless, having clear hiring goals can effectively accelerate the your startup growth while minimizing hiring risks.
"Project Your Organizational Chart"
Try to picture the company’s organizational chart at the stage your startup has reached growth and has become an established business. This would help you to forecast how your startup team will develop in the next few years, fundamentally on the basis of key activities to be performed in your venture.
Your projected structure and roles are hypotheses and as your startup progresses, you will change, iterate, and pivot your structure. This exercise would help you put your vision on paper and define practical hiring benchmarks.
"Define Hiring Benchmarks"
Your hiring benchmarks will depend on your business model, growth strategy, funding, and market. Your projected organizational chart would help you determine who you need to hire, while building your hiring schedule around your business performance or business goals to be achieved, like the number of customers acquired or markets entered.
"Can You Do It First?"
Once you can understand the requisites, challenges, and timelines of the role, you can form a realistic idea about when to hire more experienced and expert candidates to do the job better so you can focus on what you do best.
"Seek A Mentor’s Perspective"
This is where a mentor's experience can help you identify the most valid hypotheses.
If you are still averse to the risk of hiring, adopt the testing period approach for your hire may help.
Testing and measuring the performance of the new members can also give you an idea as on what works and what doesn’t for your startup. You can hire new members for a pre-defined testing period and closely monitor their impact on your startup.
By Izza Lin,
Recruiting Master
Article source: https://bit.ly/3gAuXXc
Photo source: unsplash
同時也有1部Youtube影片,追蹤數超過71萬的網紅風傳媒 The Storm Media,也在其Youtube影片中提到,On Taiwan Hashtag hosted by Ross Feingold, we discuss the aftermath of recent tragic deaths of UberEats and foodpanda drivers. Are the platform provid...
define once in a while 在 堅離地城:沈旭暉國際生活台 Simon's Glos World Facebook 的精選貼文
【#TheDiplomat: 沈旭暉隨緣家書英文版🇭🇰】很久沒有向國際關係評論網 The Diplomat 供稿,但國際線十分重要,不應放棄。這次他們希望分享23條、國安法、反恐法風雨欲來的「新香港」前瞻,願國際社會能多了解快將出現的危機:
While the world is preoccupied with a fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing has been tightening its political grip on all aspects of Hong Kong’s civil society. Rumor has it that Beijing will push through legislating national security laws under Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law by unconventional means, such as massively disqualifying pro-democratic legislators or even directly applying a national law, widely argued as a major step to destroy the rights and freedom of Hong Kongers, and bring Chinese authoritarianism to Hong Kong.
After the 2019 protests, the administration of Carrie Lam, who theoretically is still leading the special administrative region of China, has little political capital at stake, with its legitimacy reaching rock bottom. The pro-government camp has dwindling prospects for the city’s upcoming Legislative Council election. The government‘s ”nothing to lose“ mentality is apparent from its recent blatant reinterpretation of the Basic Law’s Article 22 (another article that limits the influence of China’s offices in Hong Kong’s internal affairs). The debate is nothing new, but the pressure this time is quite different.
This article highlights the different strategies Beijing could adopt to enact Article 23 insidiously or under disguise to avoid backlash from the international community, while continuing to reap benefits from the city’s globally recognized special status. This seems to be part of Beijing’s brinkmanship to bring Hong Kong protesters and their supporters to their knees and move the city closer to authoritarianism. To counter these moves, Hong Kongers must define the boundaries beyond which Hong Kong falls into authoritarian rule and make a case as to why the city’s downfall is detrimental to the international community‘s interest.
The Long-Term Controversy Over National Security Laws
Back in 2003, the implementation of Article 23 was thwarted by the moderate pro-establishment politician James Tien. In face of overwhelming public disapproval of the law, he withdrew support and votes from his Liberal Party. However, 17 years later, it is hard to imagine Beijing following the old legislative playbook: start with a public consultation, followed by public discourse and political debate, and end with the majority rule. This playbook only works in peaceful societies ruled by a trustworthy government with integrity.
The aftermath of 2003, as well as the 2019 protests, should have taught Beijing and the Hong Kong government a lesson: pushing through national security legislation in a flawed parliament controlled by the minority pro-government camp would inevitably set off another full city-scale protest — and undoubtedly more fierce and focused this time. Given the current government’s numerous displays of dishonesty, it is conceivable that they will embark on a less-traveled path to implement Article 23.
Strategy One: “Anti-Terrorism”
In principle, one possible strategy could be to directly enact Chinese national law across Hong Kong, which can be achieved by declaring a state of emergency in the city. However, this is risky business as it would tarnish the integrity of “one country two systems” and subsequently Hong Kong’s international standing. Beijing, a risk-averse regime, is also unwilling to see Hong Kong’s status as a middleman for laundering money disappear into thin air.
Instead, Beijing could be concocting a narrative that would see Chinese national law applied to Hong Kong while not damaging Hong Kong’s international standing and Beijing’s own interests. The key word in this script is “anti-terrorism.” As early as 2014, pro-Beijing scholars have been claiming the emergence of “local terrorist ideology” on Hong Kong soil. Since the anti-extradition bill protests last year, government rhetoric frequently described the protests, which caused no deaths at all in the entire year, with phrases like “inclination to terrorist ideology.” That was a signal to the world that Hong Kong’s internal conflicts had ballooned into a national security issue. This gives the government the legitimacy to justify the implementation of Chinese national laws across the highly autonomous region to counter terrorism. The Chinese government knows that if it can persuade the world that terrorism exists in Hong Kong, and that it is as severe as the terror threat facing many other nations today, the international community will be less critical of Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong. Enacting Chinese laws directly is a convenient path that will save Beijing from having to tackle Hong Kong’s internal conflicts, basically turning the Hong Kong issue into a nonissue.
Strategy Two: Stacking the Legislature by Disqualifying Candidates
An even bolder strategy was probably foretold by a recent incident where the Hong Kong government and Beijing’s agencies for Hong Kong affairs (HKMAO and the Liaison Office) jointly criticized lawmaker Dennis Kwok for filibustering, framing it as “misconduct in public office” and “violating his oath.” It is incomprehensible to claim that filibustering goes against a lawmaker’s main duty; rather, it is common understanding that legislative work includes debating the law and representing public opinion against unreasonable laws. In a parliament controlled by the minority, pro-democratic members representing the majority of Hong Kongers are forced to express their objections using means like filibustering. Wouldn’t a lack of different political opinions turn the legislative branch into a rubber-stamp institution?
The above allegation has set a dangerous precedent for twisting the logic behind a certain provision in the Basic Law to target opposing lawmakers. In other words, to fulfill Beijing’s interpretation of the principal requirement for holding public office in Hong Kong, one could be required to take a meticulously legalistic approach to uphold the Basic Law down to its every single wording. A public official, by this new definition, not only needs to support “one country, two systems” or object Hong Kong independence, but also must abide by every single provision in the Basic Law. Worst of all, based on the previous cases, whether an official’s words or actions oversteps a provision is up to Beijing’s interpretation of his/her “intent.”
If this approach is applied, in the next election, there might be additional official questions for screening candidates like the following: “The Basic Law states that the enactment of Article 23 is a constitutional duty. Failing to support Article 23 legislation violates the Basic Law. Do you support it?” This question would suffice to disqualify even moderate or even pro-establishment candidates like James Tien. Even if any pro-democratic candidates were elected, once Article 23 re-enters the legislative process, they could risk ouster by raising objections.
Despite the absurdity of this tactic, the Chinese regime may just be tempted enough if such a strategy could resolve two of China’s current nuisances — voices of dissent in the Legislative Council and the previous failure to implement Article 23.
Strategy Three: The “Boiling Frog Effect”
Article 23 is not yet implemented, but the dystopian world that the protesters pictured in 2003 is already becoming reality. Regular citizens have been persecuted for “sedition” for sharing their views on social media or participating in legal protests; workers face retaliation for taking part in strikes; corporations are pressured to publicly side with the government’s stance; employees who have the “wrong” political views are fired; schools have been closely monitored for teaching material; protest-supporting fundraisers were framed for money laundering; a retweet or like may lead to persecution, under a colonial-era law. Only now have Hong Kongers woken up to their new reality — although the Basic Law technically protects citizens’ rights to speak, rally, march, demonstrate, and go on strike, the government could enfeeble civil rights by bending antiquated laws and legal provisions. The frequent abuse of law enforcement power on a small scale, such as improper arrests and police violence, is desensitizing the public and the international community. In a few years, Hong Kong will become unrecognizable. This is indeed a clever play on Beijing’s part to slowly strip away Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedom, without causing much international attention.
Counter-Strategies Against Beijing’s Brinkmanship
Beijing’s overarching goal is to hollow out Hong Kong but, at the same time, avoid major backlash from the international community, which could spell the end of the privileged global status of Hong Kong not granted to other Chinese cities. Beijing also aims at preventing single incidents that could cascade down into mass protests as seen in 2003, 2014, and 2019; and eliminating any resistance forces from within Hong Kong’s legislature. The tactics outlined above are typical in a game of brinkmanship.
In response, Hong Kongers in Hong Kong and on the so-called “international frontline” must know their strengths and bargaining chips on this negotiating table with Beijing.
Unlike Xinjiang and Tibet, Hong Kong is a city with transparency and free flow of information. Hong Kongers need to make a case to the world that the protests are not acts of terrorism. Some suggestions include comparing the Hong Kong protests to similar struggles in 20 or so other counties in the world at the present time, none of which were classified as terrorism; collecting a large amount of concrete evidence of the disproportionate use of force by the Hong Kong police; and showing how enacting Chinese national laws in Hong Kong will end the city’s autonomy and spell disaster for international community‘s interests.
The Legislative Council is the institution that can counteract Beijing’s “boiling frog” strategy and to keep Hong Kongers’ hope alive in the system. Those who plan to run for legislative office must be prepared to be disqualified from running. If only individuals are banned, there need to be alternative candidates as back-up plans. However, if and when the disqualification process is applied broadly to entire camps of candidates (for example, all who object to Article 23), the pro-democracy camp must make a strong case to the Hong Kong and global public that this is the endgame for Hong Kong democracy. Then the incumbent popularly elected legislators will hold the internationally recognized mandate from the public and serve as the last resistance.
These recommendations delineates how the slogan “if we burn, you burn with us,” often seen in the protests, may play out in the game of international relations. If the national security laws are “passed” by a legislature that is jury-rigged in this manner, or if related national laws are directly implemented in Hong Kong, Hong Kongers should signal clearly to the world that it goes way beyond the promised “one country, two systems.” Crossing this red line by Beijing should be seen by the world as a blunt violation of its promised autonomy to Hong Kongers. At that time, if the international community led by the United States and the United Kingdom decided to revoke the “non-sovereignty entity” status of Hong Kong and regard the SAR as an ordinary Chinese city, it shouldn’t come as a surprise.
Dr. Simon Shen is the Founding Chairman of GLOs (Glocal Learning Offices), an international relations start-up company. He also serves as an adjunct associate professor in the University of Hong Kong, Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and associate director of the Master of Global Political Economy Programme of the CUHK. The author acknowledges Jean Lin, Coco Ho, Chris Wong, Michelle King, and Alex Yap for their assistance in this piece.
▶️ 高度自治 vs 全面管治
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pwt8wZl8jHQ
define once in a while 在 Dek Thai Klai Baan เด็กไทยไกลบ้าน Facebook 的精選貼文
Kim Ji-Young, Born 1982 คือเรื่องราวของคิม จียอง หญิงสาวที่ต้องลาออกจากงานเพื่อมาเลี้ยงดูลูก ในขณะที่สามีออกไปทำงานเพื่อหาเลี้ยงครอบครัว อยู่มาวันหนึ่ง เธอก็เริ่มทนสภาพชีวิตที่เต็มไปด้วยข้อจำกัดไม่ไหวและเริ่มมีท่าทีแปลกๆ กับคนรอบข้าง ซึ่งทำให้สามีของเธอเริ่มกังวลว่าเธออาจจะป่วยด้วยอาการทางจิต
หนังเรื่องนี้ถูกสร้างมาจากนิยายขายดีที่นำไปสู่การวิพากษ์วิจารณ์กันในวงกว้าง เพราะมันคือนิยายที่พูดถึงความไม่เป็นธรรมของสังคมแบบชายเป็นใหญ่ในเกาหลีอย่างตรงไปตรงมาที่สุด
คิม จียอง คือตัวแทนของผู้หญิงธรรมดาๆ คนหนึ่งที่ต้องทำหน้าที่ของการเป็น ‘แม่’ และ ‘เมีย’ ที่ดีตามความคาดหวังของสังคมจนไม่เหลือพื้นที่สำหรับความฝันและความต้องการของตัวเอง และความรู้สึกหมดคุณค่าในตัวเองก็คือจุดแตกหักที่ทำให้เธอเข้าสู่สภาวะซึมเศร้าอย่างหลีกเลี่ยงไม่ได้
ครั้งหนึ่ง คิมจียองนั้นเคยถูกนินทาว่าแม่บ้านอย่างเธอนั้นไม่ต่างอะไรกับ ‘ปลิง’ ที่เกาะสามีกินไปวันๆ ทั้งที่จริงๆ แล้ว เธอเองคือคนที่ต้องทิ้งงานที่เธอรักเพื่ออุทิศชีวิตให้กับการเลี้ยงลูก และการเป็นแม่มันก็ไม่ใช่เรื่องง่ายๆ อย่างที่ผู้ชายหลายคนคิดเลย
สิ่งหนึ่งที่หนังเรื่องนี้บอกกับเราก็คือ บางครั้งมันก็เป็นเรื่องยากที่จะหลีกเลี่ยงการถูกตัดสินจากคนอื่น โดยเฉพาะคนที่ไม่ได้รู้จักเราดีพอ แต่คำพูดเหล่านั้นก็เป็นแค่เพียงลมปากที่ไม่ได้กำหนดคุณค่าที่แท้จริงของเรา ที่จริงแล้ว มันกลับเป็นสิ่งที่สะท้อนให้เห็นความคิดอันคับแคบของคนที่พูดมากกว่า
สุดท้ายแล้ว คุณค่าของเรามันก็ไม่ได้ขึ้นอยู่ที่การตัดสินของใคร มันมีแค่ตัวเราเองเท่านั้นที่จะเข้าใจถึงคุณค่าของตัวเองได้ดีที่สุด และคุณค่าของเราก็ไม่เคยลดน้อยลงไป แค่เพียงเพราะว่าใครบางคนมองไม่เห็นมัน
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Kim Ji-Young, Born 1982
คิมจียองเกิดปี ’82
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=are7ETmV8C0
เข้าฉายแล้ววันนี้ในโรงภาพยนตร์
Kim Ji-Young, Born 1982 is the story of Kim Ji-young, a woman who has to quit her job to raise her kid while her husband is out to work for family. One day she begins to endure a life full of limitations and begins to take a step. Strangely with someone around her husband, who makes her husband start to worry that she might be sick with a mental breakdown.
This movie was made from a best-selling novel that led to a wide range of criticism because it's a fiction that talks about the unfairness of a large-male society in Korea.
Kim Ji-yong is a representative of an ordinary woman who takes the duty of being a ' mother ' and a good ' wife ' as expected of society. There is no space left for their own dreams and desires and feelings of their own worth is a breaking point. Inevitably put her into depression.
Kim Ji-Yong once was told that her housewife is no different than a ' leech ' on her husband's island. She is actually the one who needs to leave a job she loves to dedicate her life to parenting and parenting. Being a mother is not easy as many men think.
One thing this movie tells us is sometimes it's difficult to avoid being judged by others, especially those who don't know us well. Those words are just words that don't define our true value. In fact, it's actually something. Reflecting on the tightest thoughts of those who speak more.
In the end, our value is not up to anyone's judgement. It's only ourselves who understands our values and our values never decreases just because someone can't see it.
=======================
Kim Ji-Young, Born 1982
Kim Ji-yeong was born in ' 82
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=are7ETmV8C0
In theaters today in cinemaTranslated
define once in a while 在 風傳媒 The Storm Media Youtube 的最讚貼文
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recent tragic deaths of UberEats and foodpanda drivers. Are the platform
providers partners permanent hires, contract hires or independent
contracts? Apparently even government agencies are unsure but due to
media pressure there is a rush to define drivers’ legal status for
purposes of insurance normally mandatory for permanent hires. Is it a
rush to judgment? Will it make the operating environment more
challenging for sharing economy companies notwithstanding government
programs to encourage start-ups and innovation? Is a repeat of the
challenges Uber’s ride hailing app has had in Taiwan that forced Uber to
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