[啲中文幾好喎!]我是秦始皇。我沒有死,我吃了長生不老藥。我在陝西有3000噸黃金和300萬秦兵被封印,現在只需要198元就能解封。只要你打錢給我,待我解封之日,我就收你當乾兒子,立你為太子!
TLDR:關維鵬都叫Teddy Robin啦!可能我係 陳大文 David Webb TM Chan 呢?唔得咩?
============================
告個急先:Ivan已被炒,已成失業人士。未訂嘅記得訂Patreon,積小成多呀。訂咗嘅可以考慮加碼(https://bityl.co/4Y0h)。 一星期至少出返六篇文.月頭訂最抵!月費80
==============
1. David Webb啲中文幾好喎.牛頓隔離在家發明(其實係發現)咗微積分,萬有引力定律,三大力學定律,仲有光學理論。David Webb都唔差,啲中文學到咁好!
2. 正經,除咗微信女,亦有冒啲咩股壇名嘴。我唔少朋友都有畀人冒(我就冇,證明真係冇人識,不過焉知非福)。但佢地又好醒架喎,例如佢會放張(舉例)胡孟青嘅相,然後只稱自己係「青姐」。
3. 咁,可能我真係叫「David Webb」呢,有乜唔得?Jason Bourne真名都叫David Webb 啦(我是鐵粉)!可能我係 陳大文 David Webb TM Chan 呢?唔得咩?關維鵬都叫Teddy Robin啦,周鵬都叫薩頂頂啦,型英師靚正,網名嚟之嘛。你見啲非洲球員,又莫扎特又波歷克(*)又柏天尼又查斯古特都係咁
4. 咁本身,有冇問題呢?我…….都唔知。我有冇impersonate other?冇喎又好似。咁我改自己個別名做胡孟青 畢菲特都唔得?況且,我都冇話自己係 胡孟青 畢菲特,我話我係「青姐」,「畢翁」之嘛。「個名你註冊咗咩?」
5. 至於相,一樣之嘛,我貼張相咋喎,我冇話嗰個係我喎。我見好多網友啲頭像都係侵侵啦,唔見有人拉喎。
6. 認真,雖然好似話唔應該Blame the victim(**)。但即係,咁都信嘅,照計十居其九嘅人心中都覺得抵撚死。雖然未必敢講出嚟,陣間又畀人話Blame the victim,虛偽嘅社會。
7. 但當然另一問題係:你心諗,咁白痴都有人信?就真係有的。況且成本唔係好高(***)。正如尼日利亞啲 email 某某將軍有幾億但就係爭幾百蚊解封唔到咁,有咁白痴得咁白痴。係特別的,都有人解過:就係確保釣到啲最白痴嘅人。因你有啲白痴唔晒,未閹乾淨未變晒喪屍嘅,陣間覆咗佢,問得幾問你又唔落搭,佢就浪費時間。
8. 所以重覆一次:個策略一定係有咁白痴整到咁白痴,確保稍為正常嘅人都唔會信。因為啲False Positive (未計啲玩嘢嘅人)都好花時間的。
(*)擺明off topic,絶對主觀,但在我心中,波歷克係近廿年甚至半世紀最有個人能力亦最有影響力嘅德國球員。你見岡比亞都有個波歷克(!),佛得角有兩個波歷克(!!),總唔見有個塞拉利昂拿姆或者茅利塔利亞馬圖斯(不過,魯爾/萊奧/話烏 個仔就叫Mateo,就真係name after 馬圖斯)
(**)你可以留意下講呢句嘢嘅人係照樣做的,佢地嘅意思係:唔好Blame啲佢覺得唔應該Blame 嘅victim
(***)不過而家啲微信女群組都幾落本,佢平時都好多嘢寫,又要寫下CoinBase呀,美國通脹呀,字節跳動呀。得閒又要醒兩隻真係升嘅畀你(雖然可能係騰訊之類)。都要啲時間同知識的。搵食唔易。
==============
2021比別人知得多。subscribe now。Ivan Patreon,港美市場評點,專題號外,每日一圖,好文推介。每星期6篇,月費80,半年已1400人訂!(https://bityl.co/4Y0h)。 年費仲有85折
==============
同時也有10000部Youtube影片,追蹤數超過2,910的網紅コバにゃんチャンネル,也在其Youtube影片中提到,...
false positive中文 在 黃之鋒 Joshua Wong Facebook 的最佳貼文
【After Winning Majority in LegCo: Beijing's Crackdown May Trigger International Intervention】
***感謝Hong Kong Columns - Translated,將我早前撰寫『議會過半想像:以「#國際攬炒」反制「臨立會2.0」』長文(https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.313299448762570/2887650867994069/)翻譯成英文,鼓勵國際社會關注立會選舉一旦過半的沙盤推演,在最惡劣形勢下的制衡策略。***
中文精簡版本:https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.564294826996363/2888641404561682/
Hongkongers have experienced our revolution for over half a year. They no longer take a consequentialist view to the effectiveness of their movement as they did years ago, or waste time second-guessing the intentions and background of fellow activists. Following the defensive battles at CUHK and PolyU, November’s District Council election saw a great victory of unity. More marvellous is the union between peaceful and “valiant” protesters.
In the process of resisting tyranny, the people have realised that one cannot prioritize one strategy over another. This is also how the common goal of “35+” came into being—the hope that we will win over half of the seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo) this September, such that the political spectrum that represents the majority of Hongkongers is able to gain control of legislative decisions. The political clout of Hongkongers will increase if 35 or more seats are successfully secured on our side. It is certainly one vital step to achieve the five demands within the system.
The possibility of realizing legislative majority
Technically it is not unrealistic to win a majority even under the current undemocratic system. Back in the 2016 LegCo election, we already won 30 seats. In addition to the District Council (First) functional constituency seat that is already in the pocket of the pan-democrats, as long as the candidates in Kowloon East and New Territories West do not start infighting again, we could safely secure 33 seats based on the number of pan-dem votes in 2016.
The other 3 seats required to achieve a majority depend on democrats’ breakthrough among the functional constituencies by dispersing the resources of the Liaison Office. They also count on whether the turnout this September could exceed 71.2% — that of last year’s District Council elections. Some of the factors that could affect the turnout include: will the epidemic persist into the summer? Will there be potential violent repression of protests in the 2 weeks preceding the election? Will Hong Kong-US relations be affected by the downturn of the global economy?
Therefore, the ambition of “35+” is to be prioritised by the resistance as both a means and an end. I have already expressed my support for an intra-party primary at the coordination meeting. In the meantime, it is pleasing to see the ongoing debates reaching a consensus of maximising the seats among geographical constituencies in the upcoming election.
Whilst enthusiastic coordination, we should also assess the post-election landscape and gauge Beijing’s reactions: if we do not reach 35 seats, Hong Kong will be subject to tighter control and more severe repression by China; but if the democratic parties successfully form a majority in LegCo, CCP’s fears of a “constitutional crisis” would become imminent. Hence, the key questions are how the Pan-Democrats should deal with the volatile political situation in Hong Kong and how they are going to meet Beijing’s charge head-on.
Watching out for Beijing’s dismissal of LegCo after reaching majority
To take back control of LegCo such that it faithfully reflects the majority’s principles and needs is the definition of a healthy democracy. Recently, however, DAB’s Tam Yiu-chung has warned that the plan of the Pan-Dems to “usurp power” in the LegCo would only lead to Beijing’s forceful disqualification of certain members or the interpretation of the Basic Law. This proves that winning a majority in LegCo is not only a popular conception but also a realistic challenge that would get on the nerves of Beijing. Could Beijing accept a President James To in LegCo? These unknown variables must be addressed upon achieving a majority.
While there is no telltale sign as to Beijing’s exact strategy, we are already familiar with the way CCP manipulated the Basic Law in the past 4 years. Having experienced three waves of disqualifications in LegCo, twice kicked out of LegCo with my team, and thrice locked up in jail, I have no false hopes of an easy compromise from Beijing: they would not let Pan-Dems control LegCo for half a year and wait (as is the proper procedure) until after having negatived the Budget to dissolve the legislature, and thereby giving them an easy victory in the re-elections. The greater the Pan-Dems threaten Beijing’s rule in Hong Kong, the more likely that it will trigger Beijing’s repression.
Since the disqualification and arrest of lawmakers have already become “normalised”, one can even imagine the police stepping into the LegCo building to force Pan-Dems into voting. Neither is it beyond our imagination to expect the CCP to kick out all 70 lawmakers in a fit of rage and replace them with a provisional LegCo “2.0” [HKCT note: The first was from 25 Jan 1997 to 30 Jun 1998]. To depend on a majority that could lead to a chapter of a “new testament” for One Country, Two Systems is perhaps what many elites long for, but they are overly optimistic:for a ticket to the promised land will not be available at the Chief Executive election campaign a year and a half later.
Admittedly, the Pan-Dems cannot unilaterally initiate “Laam-chaau” [HKCT note: mostly translated into “scorched-earth” mentality or “mutual destruction”; some even translated into “If I burn, you burn with us”]. The most they can do is to force a standstill of the government, and not for long the LegCo will have been eliminated from the equation to make the wheels turn again. It all leaves the plan of “Negativing the motion → Dissolving LegCo → Re-election after re-election → the stepping down of Carrie Lam” merely as overly positive speculation, probably resulting from their overestimate of CCP's capacity for rational calculation. The Pan-Dems must guard their frontlines and recognise what the biggest threat from Hong Kong to China could be. In this case, should LegCo sessions be disrupted or suspended, the Pan-Dems would have to be well prepared to surmount the expected obstacles and prevent the disqualification crisis 4 years ago—a Catch-22 indeed.
Productive tension from global intervention: Using Laam-chaau against the CCP
What aggravates the CCP the most is the potential threat to Hong Kong’s unique status as the one and only “separate customs territory”. Any miscalculation will compromise its role as the Chinese economy’s “white gloves”. Imagine if CCP were to disqualify all 70 elected lawmakers and convene a meeting north of the Shenzhen River to pass a resolution to Hong Kong’s affairs (much like the Provisional Legislative Council “1.0" in 1997), how great will the shock be in a world with an effective Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act? However hard it is to predict the future one thing is certain: With the US presidential election just around the corner, blows to the separation of powers would not be tolerated, and the West would necessarily effect countermeasures against the Hong Kong government.
Beijing has been relying upon Hong Kong to navigate the international community for decades. While clamping down on the political freedom of the cosmopolitan city, Beijing desires to maintain the financial centre’s economic freedom. Hence, we started lobbying for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act four years ago, and today we are determined to promote “Laam-chaau” on an international scale.
The will of the voters must be reflected in an election. If a “35+” legislature were to be dismissed and replaced, such flagrant violation of democracy would assuredly cause a greater backlash than the infamous extradition bill. Knowing what the reality ahead of us could be, we have to combine our election and international strategies to oppose the placement of a 35+ LegCo with an “Emergency Legislative Council 2.0”, to advance an international “Laam-chaau” to Hong Kong’s status as “separate customs territory”. Only then will we stand a chance to resist the regime and to realise the five demands.
Adjusting our mindset: Overcoming the “constitutional crisis” to reach a resolution
Upon the realization of the “35+” LegCo, it is expected that the CCP will launch a devastating counterattack. The Pan-Dems should not expect LegCo to run normally; neither can the lawmakers realise their governing blueprints they have for Hong Kong. Rather, candidates will be able to compete against one another with visions of a liberated Hong Kong through popular vote. Bringing this point up has nothing to do with undermining the common goal of reaching a majority in LegCo, but rather channels the battle of LegCo to positive use upon the rule of law’s death and a “constitutional crisis” ahead. Knowing that Hongkongers have nothing to fall back on, all Pan-Dems should not miss the only way to the realization of “35+”.
Thus, be they partisans, nonpartisans, incumbent politicians, amateur politicians, or the civil society as a whole – if we stay in the political discourse of 2016 and continue to perpetuate old stereotypes, that is to deal with the divisions on the pan-democratic camp by favouring the most “local” faction; to consider only resource allocation and self-aggrandizement as the purpose of a LegCo campaign; to ignore how potential lawmakers are fitted to what specific roles; to turn a blind eye to the journey of resistance since last summer (extending indefinitely into the future)—They would lead as astray and cost us lose a precious opportunity for change by winning a 35+ majority.
The extent to which the pan-democrats can stay united in light of the political atmosphere since last summer is another problem that our side must to address. Before the watershed moment of 12th June 2019, many democratic delegates were trapped in the mentality of needing to “preserve people’s livelihood”, “be content of what we have accomplished”, and other strategies that favours stability. As the government refuses to heed to the five demands, whether the democrats, especially those in the functional constituencies, have the political will to go all-in is the real difficult question that confronts us in the upcoming LegCo election.
All in all, if “35+” cannot be realised, it is unsurprising to see LegCo being more heavily suppressed in the next 4 years; even if "35+" is achieved, it is questionable whether the pan-democrats are able to weather multiple attacks, verbal or physical, from the regime (judging from its power in the last four years) and utilise the international Laam-chaau strategy against the displacement of LegCo. Adhering to the motto of “we fight on, each in his own way”, I can only hope that Hongkongers in elections, street confrontations and international front can reconcile with each other, so that we may collectively compel the government to yield to our demands in the next six months. It is only by reaching a resolution before a real constitutional crisis that we can combat the institutional violence of the regime and not be devoured by it.
https://hkcolumn.blogspot.com/2020/04/joshua-wong-after-winning-majority-in.html?fbclid=IwAR216gf53pG_j9JOpDfr2GItvjLfrFSekKTPzoEs3-s9KBqvPEwz865P8vw
false positive中文 在 國家衛生研究院-論壇 Facebook 的精選貼文
➥新加坡有兩名個案,一開始登革熱IgM快篩陽性,但隨後RT-PCR檢驗證實感染新冠肺炎。
這兩名個案在發病早期因為登革熱快篩陽性而未被考慮感染武漢肺炎,因此未做適當的隔離與防護,不僅對病患本身,也對公共衛生造成威脅。
這兩名個案顯示新冠肺炎患者血液初期呈現登革熱偽陽性。強調迫切需要針對SARS-CoV-2快速且準確的診斷試劑。
-->最後這一句確實是原文所強調的,但是原文下這個結論比較奇怪。因為新加坡該二名病患不是因為缺乏好的、快速的診斷新冠肺炎的工具以致延誤處置。主要關鍵在於臨床醫師診斷時除了登革熱之外也應當考慮新冠肺炎感染的可能性,並進一步安排檢驗。
雖然登革熱與新冠肺炎某些臨床表現會很相近,例如:發燒、痠痛、血小板低下、淋巴球減少等,使得疾病初期有時不易單靠臨床表現來鑑別。但是仍有二者之間可以稍加區分的症狀,包括:登革熱大多會起皮膚疹(這二名病患都沒有出疹)、新冠肺炎常有呼吸道症狀(二名病患都有明顯的呼吸道症狀)。此外,病患的TOCC資訊也是相當重要。
因此,當全球壟罩在新冠肺炎疫情下,對於登革熱流行地區,醫護人員應時刻留意該地流行病學情形。
★必須強調,所有的檢驗都有其極限和靈敏度的問題,仔細綜合疫情資料、病患TOCC訊息、臨床表現、檢驗結果,才能釐清感染的真相,降低公共衛生的威脅。(中文摘要轉譯:「財團法人國家衛生研究院」莊淑鈞博士、齊嘉鈺醫師整理)
📋Covert COVID-19 and False-Positive Dengue Serology in Singapore (2020/03/04)+中文摘要轉譯
➥Author:Gabriel Yan, Chun Kiat Lee, Lawrence T M Lam, et al.
➥Link: (The Lancet)
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1473309920301584?via%3Dihub
#2019COVID19Academic
衛生福利部
疾病管制署 - 1922防疫達人
疾病管制署
國家衛生研究院-論壇
false positive中文 在 コバにゃんチャンネル Youtube 的最讚貼文
false positive中文 在 大象中醫 Youtube 的最佳貼文
false positive中文 在 大象中醫 Youtube 的精選貼文
false positive中文 在 false positive中文(繁體)翻譯:劍橋詞典 的相關結果
false positive 翻譯:偽陽性反應。了解更多。 ... <看更多>
false positive中文 在 false positive - 英中– Linguee词典 的相關結果
英语-中文正在建设中. false positive 名词—. 误报 名 ... ... <看更多>
false positive中文 在 偽陽性和偽陰性- 維基百科,自由的百科全書 的相關結果
偽陽性、假陽性(英語:false positive)是指測試結果呈陽性的反應,但事實上卻是沒有;相反,偽陰性、假陰性(英語:false negative)是指測試結果呈陰性的反應,但 ... ... <看更多>