【 黎安友專文 l 中國如何看待香港危機 】
美國哥倫比亞大學的資深中國通黎安友(Andrew Nathan)教授最近在《外交事務》(Foreign Affairs)雜誌的專文,值得一看。
黎安友是台灣許多中國研究學者的前輩級老師,小英總統去哥大演講時,正是他積極促成。小英在美國的僑宴,黎安友也是座上賓。
這篇文章的標題是:「中國如何看待香港危機:北京自我克制背後的真正原因」。
文章很長,而且用英文寫,需要花點時間閱讀。大家有空可以看看。
Andrew這篇文章的立論基礎,是來自北京核心圈的匿名說法。以他在學術界的地位,我相信他對消息來源已經做了足夠的事實查核或確認。
這篇文章,是在回答一個疑問:中共為何在香港事件如此自制?有人說是怕西方譴責,有人說是怕損害香港的金融地位。
都不是。這篇文章認為,上述兩者都不是中共的真實顧慮。
無論你多痛恨中共,你都必須真實面對你的敵人。
中共是搞經濟階級鬥爭起家的,當年用階級鬥爭打敗國民黨。而現在,中共正用這樣的思維處理香港議題。
文章有一句話:“China’s response has been rooted not in anxiety but in confidence.” 這句話道盡階級鬥爭的精髓。
中共一點都不焦慮。相反地,中共很有自信,香港的菁英階級及既得利益的收編群體,到最後會支持中共。
這個分化的心理基礎,來自經濟上的利益。
文中還提到,鄧小平當年給香港五十年的一國兩制,就是為了「給香港足夠的時間適應中共的政治系統」。
1997年,香港的GDP佔中國的18%。2018年,這個比例降到2.8%。
今日的香港經濟,在中共的評估,是香港需要中國,而不是中國需要香港。
中共正在在意的,是香港的高房價問題。香港的房價,在過去十年內三倍翻漲。
文章是這樣描述:
“Housing prices have tripled over the past decade; today, the median price of a house is more than 20 times the median gross annual household income. The median rent has increased by nearly 25 percent in the past six years. As many as 250,000 people are waiting for public housing. At the same time, income growth for many Hong Kong residents has fallen below the overall increase in cost of living.”
無論你同不同意這些說法,都請你試圖客觀地看看這篇文章。
有趣的是,黎安友在文章中部分論點引述了他的消息來源(但他並沒有加上個人評論),部分是他自己的觀察。
#護台胖犬劉仕傑
Instagram: old_dog_chasing_ball
新書:《 我在外交部工作 》
**
黎安友原文:
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-09-30/how-china-sees-hong-kong-crisis?fbclid=IwAR2PwHns5gWrw0fT0sa5LuO8zgv4PhLmkYfegtBgoOMCD3WJFI3w5NTe0S4
How China Sees the Hong Kong Crisis
The Real Reasons Behind Beijing’s Restraint
By Andrew J. Nathan September 30, 2019
Massive and sometimes violent protests have rocked Hong Kong for over 100 days. Demonstrators have put forward five demands, of which the most radical is a call for free, direct elections of Hong Kong’s chief executive and all members of the territory’s legislature: in other words, a fully democratic system of local rule, one not controlled by Beijing. As this brazen challenge to Chinese sovereignty has played out, Beijing has made a show of amassing paramilitary forces just across the border in Shenzhen. So far, however, China has not deployed force to quell the unrest and top Chinese leaders have refrained from making public threats to do so.
Western observers who remember the violent crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square 30 years ago have been puzzled by Beijing’s forbearance. Some have attributed Beijing’s restraint to a fear of Western condemnation if China uses force. Others have pointed to Beijing’s concern that a crackdown would damage Hong Kong’s role as a financial center for China.
But according to two Chinese scholars who have connections to regime insiders and who requested anonymity to discuss the thinking of policymakers in Beijing, China’s response has been rooted not in anxiety but in confidence. Beijing is convinced that Hong Kong’s elites and a substantial part of the public do not support the demonstrators and that what truly ails the territory are economic problems rather than political ones—in particular, a combination of stagnant incomes and rising rents. Beijing also believes that, despite the appearance of disorder, its grip on Hong Kong society remains firm. The Chinese Communist Party has long cultivated the territory’s business elites (the so-called tycoons) by offering them favorable economic access to the mainland. The party also maintains a long-standing loyal cadre of underground members in the territory. And China has forged ties with the Hong Kong labor movement and some sections of its criminal underground. Finally, Beijing believes that many ordinary citizens are fearful of change and tired of the disruption caused by the demonstrations.
Beijing therefore thinks that its local allies will stand firm and that the demonstrations will gradually lose public support and eventually die out. As the demonstrations shrink, some frustrated activists will engage in further violence, and that in turn will accelerate the movement’s decline. Meanwhile, Beijing is turning its attention to economic development projects that it believes will address some of the underlying grievances that led many people to take to the streets in the first place.
This view of the situation is held by those at the very top of the regime in Beijing, as evidenced by recent remarks made by Chinese President Xi Jinping, some of which have not been previously reported. In a speech Xi delivered in early September to a new class of rising political stars at the Central Party School in Beijing, he rejected the suggestion of some officials that China should declare a state of emergency in Hong Kong and send in the People’s Liberation Army. “That would be going down a political road of no return,” Xi said. “The central government will exercise the most patience and restraint and allow the [regional government] and the local police force to resolve the crisis.” In separate remarks that Xi made around the same time, he spelled out what he sees as the proper way to proceed: “Economic development is the only golden key to resolving all sorts of problems facing Hong Kong today.”
ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS, MANY QUESTIONS
Chinese decision-makers are hardly surprised that Hong Kong is chafing under their rule. Beijing believes it has treated Hong Kong with a light hand and has supported the territory’s economy in many ways, especially by granting it special access to the mainland’s stocks and currency markets, exempting it from the taxes and fees that other Chinese provinces and municipalities pay the central government, and guaranteeing a reliable supply of water, electricity, gas, and food. Even so, Beijing considers disaffection among Hong Kong’s residents a natural outgrowth of the territory’s colonial British past and also a result of the continuing influence of Western values. Indeed, during the 1984 negotiations between China and the United Kingdom over Hong Kong’s future, the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping suggested following the approach of “one country, two systems” for 50 years precisely to give people in Hong Kong plenty of time to get used to the Chinese political system.
But “one country, two systems” was never intended to result in Hong Kong spinning out of China’s control. Under the Basic Law that China crafted as Hong Kong’s “mini-constitution,” Beijing retained the right to prevent any challenge to what it considered its core security interests. The law empowered Beijing to determine if and when Hong Kongers could directly elect the territory’s leadership, allowed Beijing to veto laws passed by the Hong Kong Legislative Council, and granted China the right to make final interpretations of the Basic Law. And there would be no question about who had a monopoly of force. During the negotiations with the United Kingdom, Deng publicly rebuked a top Chinese defense official—General Geng Biao, who at the time was a patron of a rising young official named Xi Jinping—for suggesting that there might not be any need to put troops in Hong Kong. Deng insisted that a Chinese garrison was necessary to symbolize Chinese sovereignty.
Statements made by U.S. politicians in support of the recent demonstrations only confirm Beijing’s belief that Washington seeks to inflame radical sentiments in Hong Kong.
At first, Hong Kongers seemed to accept their new role as citizens of a rising China. In 1997, in a tracking poll of Hong Kong residents regularly conducted by researchers at the University of Hong Kong, 47 percent of respondents identified themselves as “proud” citizens of China. But things went downhill from there. In 2012, the Hong Kong government tried to introduce “patriotic education” in elementary and middle schools, but the proposed curriculum ran into a storm of local opposition and had to be withdrawn. In 2014, the 79-day Umbrella Movement brought hundreds of thousands of citizens into the streets to protest Beijing’s refusal to allow direct elections for the chief executive. And as authoritarianism has intensified under Xi’s rule, events such as the 2015 kidnapping of five Hong Kong–based publishers to stand trial in the mainland further soured Hong Kong opinion. By this past June, only 27 percent of respondents to the tracking poll described themselves as “proud” to be citizens of China. This year’s demonstrations started as a protest against a proposed law that would have allowed Hong Kongers suspected of criminal wrongdoing to be extradited to the mainland but then developed into a broad-based expression of discontent over the lack of democratic accountability, police brutality, and, most fundamentally, what was perceived as a mainland assault on Hong Kong’s unique identity.
Still, Chinese leaders do not blame themselves for these shifts in public opinion. Rather, they believe that Western powers, especially the United States, have sought to drive a wedge between Hong Kong and the mainland. Statements made by U.S. politicians in support of the recent demonstrations only confirm Beijing’s belief that Washington seeks to inflame radical sentiments in Hong Kong. As Xi explained in his speech in September:
As extreme elements in Hong Kong turn more and more violent, Western forces, especially the United States, have been increasingly open in their involvement. Some extreme anti-China forces in the United States are trying to turn Hong Kong into the battleground for U.S.-Chinese rivalry…. They want to turn Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy into de facto independence, with the ultimate objective to contain China's rise and prevent the revival of the great Chinese nation.
Chinese leaders do not fear that a crackdown on Hong Kong would inspire Western antagonism. Rather, they take such antagonism as a preexisting reality—one that goes a long way toward explaining why the disorder in Hong Kong broke out in the first place. In Beijing’s eyes, Western hostility is rooted in the mere fact of China’s rise, and thus there is no use in tailoring China’s Hong Kong strategy to influence how Western powers would respond.
IT’S NOT ABOUT THE BENJAMINS
The view that Xi has not deployed troops because of Hong Kong’s economic importance to the mainland is also misguided, and relies on an outdated view of the balance of economic power. In 1997, Hong Kong’s GDP was equivalent to 18 percent of the mainland’s. Most of China’s foreign trade was conducted through Hong Kong, providing China with badly needed hard currencies. Chinese companies raised most of their capital on the Hong Kong stock exchange. Today, things are vastly different. In 2018, Hong Kong’s GDP was equal to only 2.7 percent of the mainland’s. Shenzhen alone has overtaken Hong Kong in terms of GDP. Less than 12 percent of China’s exports now flow through Hong Kong. The combined market value of China’s domestic stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen far surpasses that of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and Chinese companies can also list in Frankfurt, London, New York, and elsewhere.
Although Hong Kong remains the largest offshore clearing center for renminbi, that role could easily be filled by London or Singapore, if Chinese leaders so desired.
Investment flowing into and out of China still tends to pass through financial holding vehicles set up in Hong Kong, in order to benefit from the region’s legal protections. But China’s new foreign investment law (which will take effect on January 1, 2020) and other recent policy changes mean that such investment will soon be able to bypass Hong Kong. And although Hong Kong remains the largest offshore clearing center for renminbi, that role could easily be filled by London or Singapore, if Chinese leaders so desired.
Wrecking Hong Kong’s economy by using military force to impose emergency rule would not be a good thing for China. But the negative effect on the mainland’s prosperity would not be strong enough to prevent Beijing from doing whatever it believes is necessary to maintain control over the territory.
CAN’T BUY ME LOVE?
As it waits out the current crisis, Beijing has already started tackling the economic problems that it believes are the source of much of the anger among Hong Kongers. Housing prices have tripled over the past decade; today, the median price of a house is more than 20 times the median gross annual household income. The median rent has increased by nearly 25 percent in the past six years. As many as 250,000 people are waiting for public housing. At the same time, income growth for many Hong Kong residents has fallen below the overall increase in cost of living.
同時也有1部Youtube影片,追蹤數超過83萬的網紅serpentza,也在其Youtube影片中提到,The political environment is complicated by the potential for military conflict should Taiwan make overt actions toward de jure independence; it is th...
food policy council 在 潮媽與溱溱 ๑OㅂO๑ Facebook 的最讚貼文
這些才是真正的香港人💪🏻 ❤️
加油啊!💪🏻💪🏻💪🏻💪🏻💪🏻
😭好感動🙏🏻🙏🏻🙏🏻🙏🏻
「雲海突發消息」
繼琴晚有三百幾個公務員EO向政府公開聲明之後,簡直陸續有嚟!今朝到我出手啦!話說琴晚深夜有在職公務員主動聯絡我,表示佢哋聯繫左超過44個部門同事、超過230位公務員、不單只EO而是跨職級,由文書助理到行政主任AO等等,向現在香港政府及林鄭特首發出嚴厲聲明,不滿現在特區政府處理事件手法及態度,強烈要求特首回應市民!佢哋希望我代表佢哋發放呢封信件以及向香港外國傳媒發放呢個信件!我當然應承啦!因為我覺得整件事好有「象徵意義 」,非常symbolic!一個過去20幾年專門對付政府專門投訴政府部門嘅投訴達人,今時今日竟然我哋係企埋同一陣線,由我代佢哋轉達及公開發放呢封信件!簡直就係香港歷史破天荒!以下係其中相關資料:
「聯署經核實為44個決策局/部門/單位, 共235位政府人員職員身份證明」
以下係這封235位公務員嘅聯署中英文聲明信:
「致特別行政區首長林鄭月娥女士公開信
致香港特別行政區首長林鄭月娥女士、行政會議成員、各位司長、局長及立法會議員
作為香港公務員的一份子,我們一直默默耕耘,為社會及香港市民提供優質服務,並堅守一貫的中立態 度,支持著政府各部門的良好運作,這是我們一直引以自豪的工作,亦是身為香港人的一份驕傲。 過 去的兩個月,香港人參與了一連串反對修例的遊行集會,數以百萬計的市民站出來表達訴求,守護香 港,體現對香港的愛護和關心。可惜,政府一直依然故我,拒絕耹聽大眾的聲音,違背服務市民的承 諾。
7月21日晚上在元朗有大批白衣暴徒襲擊市民,以武器攻擊路經群眾甚至記者,令無辜市民受傷,令人 髮指。雖然當晚有大批市民報警求助,但警方未有及時派員到場保護市民及捉拿暴徒,令人對警方執法 能力存疑,有負市民期望。其做法令人懷疑政黑勾結,除了令市民對警隊信心盡失外,亦令公務員質疑 政府機構並非為民服務,更甚者令公務員成為社會撕裂的幫兇。
當社會上大多數人認為政府決策出現問題,我們身為公僕理應適切回應人民訴求。我們今天決定打破沉 默,站出來強烈要求政府直接面對民意。
我們強烈要求政府回應民間的五大訴求,即(一)完全撤回逃犯條例修訂、(二)追究警察開槍鎮壓、 (三)不檢控和釋放反對逃犯條例修訂的示威者、(四)撤銷定性6月12日集會為暴動、(五)促請林 鄭月娥、鄭若驊、李家超及盧偉聰等官員問責下台,並要求成立由大法官主持,有廣泛公信力的獨立調 查委員會,調查警方處理自6月9日以來的衝突手法及盡快履行基本法所賦予香港市民的雙普選權利,使 香港成為一個真正自由、民主的社會。
我們以七月二十四日拍攝的職員證明文件為憑, 收集了覆蓋政府大部分不同部門的員工強而有力的控 訴, 強烈要求當權者直接面對民意。
如政府繼續漠視民意,我們將籌備具體工業行動,謙卑地與廣大香港的市民同行,克盡我們服務市民的 「公僕」身份。
一群來自以下不同部門的公務員敬上
漁農自然護理署
建築署
屋宇署
民眾安全服務隊
民航處
公司註冊處
香港海關
衛生署
律政司
渠務署
教育局
機電工程署
環境保護署
香港消防處
食物及環境衛生署
食物及衛生局 香港司機職工總會 政府產業署 路政署 民政事務局 民政事務處 香港房屋委員會 警務處(文職) 香港郵政 入境事務處 稅務局 創新科技署 知識產權署 司法機構
勞工處
土地註冊處
地政總署 康樂及文化事務署 通訊事務管理局辦公室 政府資訊科技總監辦公室 公共衛生檢測中心 (衛生署) 香港電台
差餉物業估價署
選舉事務處
社會福利署
工業貿易署
庫務署
水務署
在職家庭及學生資助事務處
(共44個決策局/部門/單位, 共235位政府人員職員身份證明) (鳴謝 BeWater HK, 翻譯組)
25/07/2019 ####### (English version)
Dear Chief Executive of the HKSAR Mrs Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor, members of the Executive Committee, Secretaries of Departments and Bureaux and Members of Legislative Council,
As members of the civil servants of Hong Kong, we have been working incessantly over the years to offer our citizens with quality service and take a neutral stance that supports the government departments for their smooth operations. We are always proud of our jobs and being citizens of Hong Kong.
For the past two months, Hong Kong people have participated in a series of marches and rallies. Millions of citizens have expressed their demands, showed their concern and caring for protecting their beloved Hong Kong. Unfortunately, the Government has refused to listen to the public and remained its own way of act, violating its compromise to serve the citizens.
In the evening of 21 of July, there was a large group of rioters in white shirt attacking citizens in Yuen Long; they used weapons to attack protestors returning home, journalists, and even bystanders, causing innocent citizens injured, making one's hair stand up in anger. Although many calls were made to the police, they had not sent force in time to protect those citizens and arrested the rioters in time, which made people have doubts whether the police had the ability to enforce the law. Their failure in enforcing the law had disappointed citizens and people worldwide. The police’s lack of response
on July 21 had made people suspect the government colluding with triads. This had not only caused citizens to lose confidence in the police, but also made civil servants suspect that the government departments are not aimed to serve citizens faithfully and are making civil servants accomplices tearing apart the society.
When the majority in the society disagrees with the policy made by our government, being civil servants, we should respond to public’s demands reasonably. Today we decided to break our silence, to strongly urge the government to respond to those demands.
We strongly demand the Government to respond to the five major appeals of the society, i.e., (1) withdraw completely the Extradition Law Amendment Bill, (2) pursue the responsibility of the Police Force for firing armaments and their suppression, (3) stop all prosecutions and release the protestors, (4) retract the characterization of the assembly on 12 June as a riot, (5) step down and fulfill the pledge of accountability by government officials including Chief Executive Carrie Lam, Secretary of Justice Teresa Cheng, Secretary of Security John Lee, Commissioner of Police Stephen Lo. Furthermore, we demand the establishment of highly credible Independent Probe held by chief judges, to investigate into the way the police dealt with the clashes with protestors since 9 of June and to honour the commitment of the Basic Law to grant all citizens of Hong Kong the right to dual universal suffrage, so to make Hong Kong become truly free and democratic society.
The evidence we shown here are photos taken on 24/7. They show different staff ID cards collected from most of the departments under the Hong Kong government, representing their request to the potentate: "Response to the will of the people directly”.
If the Government continues to ignore public opinion, we will organise concrete industrial actions, so that we could humbly join hands with the community at large and fulfill our responsibility as servants of our fellow citizens.
Yours truly,
A group of civil servants from the following departments and bureaux:
Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department Architectural Services Department
Buildings Department
Civil Aid Service
Civil Aviation Department Companies Registry
Customs and Excise Department Department of Health Department of Justice Drainage Service Department Education Bureau
Electrical and Mechanical Service Department Environmental Protection Department
Fire Service Department
Food and Environmental Hygiene Department Food and Health Bureau
Government Drivers Union Government Property Agency Highways Department
Home Affairs Bureau
Home Affairs Department
Hong Kong Housing Authority
Hong Kong Police Force (Civilian Staff)
Hongkong Post
Immigration Department
Inland Revenue Department
Innovation and Technology Commission
Intellectual Property Department
Judiciary
Labour Department
Land Registry
Lands Department
Leisure and Cultural Services Department
Office of the Communications Authority
Office of the Government Chief Information Officer
Public Health Laboratory Centre (Department of Health) Radio Television Hong Kong
Rating and Valuation Department
Registration and Electoral Office
Social Welfare Department
Trade and Industry Department
Treasury
Water Supplies Department
Working Family and Student Financial Assistance Agency
25/7/2019
(Totally 44 Bureau/Departments/Units,235 numbers of proof of identity as Government staff) (Credits to BeWater HK, Translation Unit)
Last modified: 9:05 am」
Ps若果有網媒想轉述,無任歡迎!想搵呢次聲明信件相關公務員訪問可私底下聯絡我!
公務員加油!we connect this time!
food policy council 在 無神論者的巴別塔 Facebook 的最讚貼文
話乜尻野禁止同性戀性行為人士永久捐血有科學根據既垃圾,睇下下面呢兩段野再獻醜啦唔該
In April 2010, the New York City Council passed a resolution calling on the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to eliminate the ban stating "This ban was based on prejudice, a knee-jerk reaction, and misunderstandings about the HIV/AIDS disease. Given the constant need for blood, it does not make common sense to prohibit donations from an entire population."[36]
On June 1, 2010, the Washington, DC City Council passed a resolution calling on the FDA to "reverse the lifetime deferment of blood donations by men who have had sex with men since 1977 in favor of a policy that protects the safety and integrity of the blood supply that is based on an up-to-date scientific criteria.[37]
food policy council 在 serpentza Youtube 的最佳貼文
The political environment is complicated by the potential for military conflict should Taiwan make overt actions toward de jure independence; it is the official PRC policy to use force to ensure reunification if peaceful reunification is no longer possible, as stated in its anti-secession law, and for this reason there are substantial military installations on the Fujian coast. However, in recent years, the PRC has moved towards promoting peaceful relations, including stronger economic ties, with the current ROC government aimed at unification through the one country, two systems formula or maintaining the status quo under the 1992 Consensus.
On 29 April 2005, Kuomintang Chairman Lien Chan travelled to Beijing and met with Communist Party of China (CPC) Secretary-General Hu Jintao, the first meeting between the leaders of the two parties since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. On 11 February 2014, Mainland Affairs Council Head Wang Yu-chi travelled to Nanjing and met with Taiwan Affairs Office Head Zhang Zhijun, the first meeting between high-ranking officials from either side. Zhang paid a reciprocal visit to Taiwan and met Wang on 25 June 2014, making Zhang the first minister-level PRC official to ever visit Taiwan. On 7 November 2015, Ma Ying-jeou (in his capacity as Leader of Taiwan) and Xi Jinping (in his capacity as Leader of Mainland China) travelled to Singapore and met up, marking the highest-level exchange between the two sides since 1949.
The PRC supports a version of the One-China policy, which states that Taiwan and mainland China are both part of China, and that the PRC is the only legitimate government of China. It uses this policy to prevent the international recognition of the ROC as an independent sovereign state, meaning that Taiwan participates in international forums under the name "Chinese Taipei". With the emergence of the Taiwanese independence movement, the name "Taiwan" has been employed increasingly often on the island.
What is the difference between Mainland China and Taiwan? Come find out and make a choice as to where you'd like to travel or live...
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Music used: VHS Dreams - Ocean Heights
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