關於 hard case中文 ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

平反元朗黑夜 （第一版）
Debunking Yuen Long Nightmare 721 （Version 1）
Youtube: https://youtu.be/98JZlfcINoA

本視頻會不斷被修正更新。中文字幕版本會在本週稍候發佈。
本視頻提供了大量證明721只是一個派別爭鬥的證據。同為偏頗媒體針對警方的抹黑手法進行了闢謠。萬一被屏蔽，可在下列網頁中找回：
https://truth-hk.com/721

This video will be continuously updated and corrected. Provide hard video evidence that proves that 721 was just a conflict between two fractions, and debunk the false accusation biased media have made to smear HKPF. In case we are blocked, you can always find the video back in our website:
https://truth-hk.com/721

00:34 – 偏頗媒體的721版本
01:55 – 721早有約定
02:50 – 黑衣如何主動挑起暴力
04:49 – 警方反應為何合理
05:48 – 警方為何需要撤退
07:18 – 元朗站外非法集結警方反應合理
08:00 – 元朗廚師被襲時間警方沒有區別對待白衣人
08:56 – 元朗721白衣人拘捕人數為何符合比例
10:37 – 為什麼721凌晨後只是單純的派別毆鬥
15:54 – 為什麼警察在村口拍白衣人的肩膀
16:59 – 為什麼警察在村口說沒有看見持有武器的人
18:09 – 更多721元朗站中不是無差別襲擊的證據
22:56 – 到底偏頗媒體有多偏頗

我們不是PR公司，請不要低估願意默默為香港恢復和平而付出的人們。
We are not a PR company. Please do not underestimate the amount of people who are willing to contribute to resolve conflict.

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特別感謝
Special thanks to:

所有曾經為本事件進行過闢謠的人們
Everyone content creator who worked on this topic before.

致敬所有真正呈完整事實的新聞工作者
Every jounarist who tried to cover this incident as roundedly as possible.

Hong kong truth 香港真相 3.0
https://www.facebook.com/HongKongTruth3.0

天地港文宣
https://www.facebook.com/VOHKpeace

And eveyone who have helped and contributed to the creation of this video.

你沒看錯，這個英文相關的粉專在推薦中文影集
〈誰是被害者〉真心好看，推！
而且 #作息破壞者 我還是要教英文，放心無雷

光是英文片名就很有學問
The Victims' Game
用的是被害者的複數所有格
代表不只一位受害者
而整個案件是屬於他們的一場遊戲......

聽過我演講的人都知道
〈李屍朝鮮〉（後來改名字了但我不管）
秉持著反正不懂韓文而且英文品質不錯的原則
我看的是英文配音和英文字幕版
享受故事和驚悚，更學了很多英文

而這部繼〈我們與惡的距離〉之後最熱門的話題強片
不是只有卡司和演技強，劇本的深度和拍攝強
特殊化妝和美術也強
（警告，有很多屍體，懼怕者慎入）

可惜沒有英文配音，但是有很棒的英文字幕
於是我把八集配著英文字幕完食了

反正本來就聽得懂中文
看英文字幕還可以多學到好多
比如第一集開場，老師的話，就為連環懸疑埋下了伏筆

鑑識是了解人類行為模式的科學
Forensic science is designed to understand the pattern of human behavior.

我們透過遺留下來的跡證 ‎去了解人怎麼做跟為什麼做
Through evidence, we can understand how and why people do things.

但諷刺的是 ‎這些死者在生前 ‎並沒有人在意他們是誰
Ironically, nobody cares about who the deceased were when they were alive.

而死了之後
After they pass away,

我們才透過他們遺物 ‎拼命想要去了解他們生前的樣子
we try so hard to understand what they were like by studying their remains.

是不是學到很多？
就跟你們說學英文是一種終身學習的 lifestyle
做很多事都可以學英文的
就是不要等到進教室才學英文

幫大家整理一些關鍵字

Asperger syndrome 亞斯伯格症狀
life sentence 無期徒刑
signs of fighting 打鬥痕跡
dissolve the body 溶屍
accuse 指控
convict 定罪
autopsy 驗屍
fingerprint identification 指紋化驗比對
toxicology test 藥毒檢驗報告
high dose of anesthetic 高劑量麻醉劑

喜歡的高明翻譯：
封口費 paid to keep their mouth shut
撤告 withdraw from the case
酒店 hostess club（文化詞很難翻，台灣的酒店不是飯店，而是坐陪酒吧）
花名 stage name
一個抵十個 he can do ten guys' jobs

除了台灣熱門
IMDb 也一片國際英文好評
看完喜歡，可以驕傲分享給外國朋友

#只有第一集和第六集最後有顯示英譯者名字
#兩位不同譯者
#respect我覺得很不容易辛苦了

#張孝全 #許瑋甯 #王識賢 #黃河 #李沐 #丁寧 #林心如 超強大
Netflix 獨家播映中

有誰也在追？
歡迎分享！

浩爾
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如果喜歡看我們解析影視作品學英文
歡迎加入 #最好玩的電影英文課
五大類共二十部英文電影，還有電影專門詞彙解析
https://bit.ly/2V2dwHp

【After Winning Majority in LegCo: Beijing's Crackdown May Trigger International Intervention】

***感謝Hong Kong Columns - Translated，將我早前撰寫『議會過半想像：以「#國際攬炒」反制「臨立會2.0」』長文（https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.313299448762570/2887650867994069/）翻譯成英文，鼓勵國際社會關注立會選舉一旦過半的沙盤推演，在最惡劣形勢下的制衡策略。***

中文精簡版本：https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.564294826996363/2888641404561682/

Hongkongers have experienced our revolution for over half a year. They no longer take a consequentialist view to the effectiveness of their movement as they did years ago, or waste time second-guessing the intentions and background of fellow activists. Following the defensive battles at CUHK and PolyU, November’s District Council election saw a great victory of unity. More marvellous is the union between peaceful and “valiant” protesters.

In the process of resisting tyranny, the people have realised that one cannot prioritize one strategy over another. This is also how the common goal of “35+” came into being—the hope that we will win over half of the seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo) this September, such that the political spectrum that represents the majority of Hongkongers is able to gain control of legislative decisions. The political clout of Hongkongers will increase if 35 or more seats are successfully secured on our side. It is certainly one vital step to achieve the five demands within the system.

The possibility of realizing legislative majority

Technically it is not unrealistic to win a majority even under the current undemocratic system. Back in the 2016 LegCo election, we already won 30 seats. In addition to the District Council (First) functional constituency seat that is already in the pocket of the pan-democrats, as long as the candidates in Kowloon East and New Territories West do not start infighting again, we could safely secure 33 seats based on the number of pan-dem votes in 2016.

The other 3 seats required to achieve a majority depend on democrats’ breakthrough among the functional constituencies by dispersing the resources of the Liaison Office. They also count on whether the turnout this September could exceed 71.2% — that of last year’s District Council elections. Some of the factors that could affect the turnout include: will the epidemic persist into the summer? Will there be potential violent repression of protests in the 2 weeks preceding the election? Will Hong Kong-US relations be affected by the downturn of the global economy?

Therefore, the ambition of “35+” is to be prioritised by the resistance as both a means and an end. I have already expressed my support for an intra-party primary at the coordination meeting. In the meantime, it is pleasing to see the ongoing debates reaching a consensus of maximising the seats among geographical constituencies in the upcoming election.

Whilst enthusiastic coordination, we should also assess the post-election landscape and gauge Beijing’s reactions: if we do not reach 35 seats, Hong Kong will be subject to tighter control and more severe repression by China; but if the democratic parties successfully form a majority in LegCo, CCP’s fears of a “constitutional crisis” would become imminent. Hence, the key questions are how the Pan-Democrats should deal with the volatile political situation in Hong Kong and how they are going to meet Beijing’s charge head-on.

Watching out for Beijing’s dismissal of LegCo after reaching majority

To take back control of LegCo such that it faithfully reflects the majority’s principles and needs is the definition of a healthy democracy. Recently, however, DAB’s Tam Yiu-chung has warned that the plan of the Pan-Dems to “usurp power” in the LegCo would only lead to Beijing’s forceful disqualification of certain members or the interpretation of the Basic Law. This proves that winning a majority in LegCo is not only a popular conception but also a realistic challenge that would get on the nerves of Beijing. Could Beijing accept a President James To in LegCo? These unknown variables must be addressed upon achieving a majority.

While there is no telltale sign as to Beijing’s exact strategy, we are already familiar with the way CCP manipulated the Basic Law in the past 4 years. Having experienced three waves of disqualifications in LegCo, twice kicked out of LegCo with my team, and thrice locked up in jail, I have no false hopes of an easy compromise from Beijing: they would not let Pan-Dems control LegCo for half a year and wait (as is the proper procedure) until after having negatived the Budget to dissolve the legislature, and thereby giving them an easy victory in the re-elections. The greater the Pan-Dems threaten Beijing’s rule in Hong Kong, the more likely that it will trigger Beijing’s repression.

Since the disqualification and arrest of lawmakers have already become “normalised”, one can even imagine the police stepping into the LegCo building to force Pan-Dems into voting. Neither is it beyond our imagination to expect the CCP to kick out all 70 lawmakers in a fit of rage and replace them with a provisional LegCo “2.0” [HKCT note: The first was from 25 Jan 1997 to 30 Jun 1998]. To depend on a majority that could lead to a chapter of a “new testament” for One Country, Two Systems is perhaps what many elites long for, but they are overly optimistic:for a ticket to the promised land will not be available at the Chief Executive election campaign a year and a half later.

Admittedly, the Pan-Dems cannot unilaterally initiate “Laam-chaau” [HKCT note: mostly translated into “scorched-earth” mentality or “mutual destruction”; some even translated into “If I burn, you burn with us”]. The most they can do is to force a standstill of the government, and not for long the LegCo will have been eliminated from the equation to make the wheels turn again. It all leaves the plan of “Negativing the motion → Dissolving LegCo → Re-election after re-election → the stepping down of Carrie Lam” merely as overly positive speculation, probably resulting from their overestimate of CCP's capacity for rational calculation. The Pan-Dems must guard their frontlines and recognise what the biggest threat from Hong Kong to China could be. In this case, should LegCo sessions be disrupted or suspended, the Pan-Dems would have to be well prepared to surmount the expected obstacles and prevent the disqualification crisis 4 years ago—a Catch-22 indeed.

Productive tension from global intervention: Using Laam-chaau against the CCP

What aggravates the CCP the most is the potential threat to Hong Kong’s unique status as the one and only “separate customs territory”. Any miscalculation will compromise its role as the Chinese economy’s “white gloves”. Imagine if CCP were to disqualify all 70 elected lawmakers and convene a meeting north of the Shenzhen River to pass a resolution to Hong Kong’s affairs (much like the Provisional Legislative Council “1.0" in 1997), how great will the shock be in a world with an effective Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act? However hard it is to predict the future one thing is certain: With the US presidential election just around the corner, blows to the separation of powers would not be tolerated, and the West would necessarily effect countermeasures against the Hong Kong government.

Beijing has been relying upon Hong Kong to navigate the international community for decades. While clamping down on the political freedom of the cosmopolitan city, Beijing desires to maintain the financial centre’s economic freedom. Hence, we started lobbying for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act four years ago, and today we are determined to promote “Laam-chaau” on an international scale.

The will of the voters must be reflected in an election. If a “35+” legislature were to be dismissed and replaced, such flagrant violation of democracy would assuredly cause a greater backlash than the infamous extradition bill. Knowing what the reality ahead of us could be, we have to combine our election and international strategies to oppose the placement of a 35+ LegCo with an “Emergency Legislative Council 2.0”, to advance an international “Laam-chaau” to Hong Kong’s status as “separate customs territory”. Only then will we stand a chance to resist the regime and to realise the five demands.

Adjusting our mindset: Overcoming the “constitutional crisis” to reach a resolution

Upon the realization of the “35+” LegCo, it is expected that the CCP will launch a devastating counterattack. The Pan-Dems should not expect LegCo to run normally; neither can the lawmakers realise their governing blueprints they have for Hong Kong. Rather, candidates will be able to compete against one another with visions of a liberated Hong Kong through popular vote. Bringing this point up has nothing to do with undermining the common goal of reaching a majority in LegCo, but rather channels the battle of LegCo to positive use upon the rule of law’s death and a “constitutional crisis” ahead. Knowing that Hongkongers have nothing to fall back on, all Pan-Dems should not miss the only way to the realization of “35+”.

Thus, be they partisans, nonpartisans, incumbent politicians, amateur politicians, or the civil society as a whole – if we stay in the political discourse of 2016 and continue to perpetuate old stereotypes, that is to deal with the divisions on the pan-democratic camp by favouring the most “local” faction; to consider only resource allocation and self-aggrandizement as the purpose of a LegCo campaign; to ignore how potential lawmakers are fitted to what specific roles; to turn a blind eye to the journey of resistance since last summer (extending indefinitely into the future)—They would lead as astray and cost us lose a precious opportunity for change by winning a 35+ majority.

The extent to which the pan-democrats can stay united in light of the political atmosphere since last summer is another problem that our side must to address. Before the watershed moment of 12th June 2019, many democratic delegates were trapped in the mentality of needing to “preserve people’s livelihood”, “be content of what we have accomplished”, and other strategies that favours stability. As the government refuses to heed to the five demands, whether the democrats, especially those in the functional constituencies, have the political will to go all-in is the real difficult question that confronts us in the upcoming LegCo election.

All in all, if “35+” cannot be realised, it is unsurprising to see LegCo being more heavily suppressed in the next 4 years; even if "35+" is achieved, it is questionable whether the pan-democrats are able to weather multiple attacks, verbal or physical, from the regime (judging from its power in the last four years) and utilise the international Laam-chaau strategy against the displacement of LegCo. Adhering to the motto of “we fight on, each in his own way”, I can only hope that Hongkongers in elections, street confrontations and international front can reconcile with each other, so that we may collectively compel the government to yield to our demands in the next six months. It is only by reaching a resolution before a real constitutional crisis that we can combat the institutional violence of the regime and not be devoured by it.

https://hkcolumn.blogspot.com/2020/04/joshua-wong-after-winning-majority-in.html?fbclid=IwAR216gf53pG_j9JOpDfr2GItvjLfrFSekKTPzoEs3-s9KBqvPEwz865P8vw