《The New Times》開咗個問題,點解地球兩邊嘅示威者嘅抗爭方法好似網絡Meme咁傳得咁快?
首先見到Portland用兩傘、滅煙嘅雪糕筒、噴煙機、用木版做盾陣、睇到用手機燈照亮黑嘅集會,個人就感觸起黎。
什麼網絡世代互相參考原來唔係重點,而係香港人嘅堅持、創意、紀律同組織力,令其它國家嘅示威者覺得凡事都有可能。
“More than anything the discipline, organization and persistence of these folks has been awe inspiring....people of Hong Kong are showing us what is possible.”
#想流淚
原文:
《The New York Times》
Why Protest Tactics Spread Like Memes
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/31/style/viral-protest-videos.html
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同時也有1部Youtube影片,追蹤數超過75萬的網紅志祺七七 X 圖文不符,也在其Youtube影片中提到,#吸菸有害健康 #拒絕私菸 #打擊非法私菸 #菸品健康福利捐 請勿購買來歷不明、標示不清、走私、或價格明顯太低的菸品,一起為國家財政、國人健康把關! 想了解更多資訊,可上「中區國稅局 稅務e吉棒」臉書粉絲專頁查詢:https://bit.ly/2RXbcie ✔︎ 成為七七會員(幫助我們繼續...
「hong kong protest tactics」的推薦目錄:
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hong kong protest tactics 在 堅離地城:沈旭暉國際生活台 Simon's Glos World Facebook 的最佳貼文
【#TheDiplomat: 沈旭暉隨緣家書英文版🇭🇰】很久沒有向國際關係評論網 The Diplomat 供稿,但國際線十分重要,不應放棄。這次他們希望分享23條、國安法、反恐法風雨欲來的「新香港」前瞻,願國際社會能多了解快將出現的危機:
While the world is preoccupied with a fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing has been tightening its political grip on all aspects of Hong Kong’s civil society. Rumor has it that Beijing will push through legislating national security laws under Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law by unconventional means, such as massively disqualifying pro-democratic legislators or even directly applying a national law, widely argued as a major step to destroy the rights and freedom of Hong Kongers, and bring Chinese authoritarianism to Hong Kong.
After the 2019 protests, the administration of Carrie Lam, who theoretically is still leading the special administrative region of China, has little political capital at stake, with its legitimacy reaching rock bottom. The pro-government camp has dwindling prospects for the city’s upcoming Legislative Council election. The government‘s ”nothing to lose“ mentality is apparent from its recent blatant reinterpretation of the Basic Law’s Article 22 (another article that limits the influence of China’s offices in Hong Kong’s internal affairs). The debate is nothing new, but the pressure this time is quite different.
This article highlights the different strategies Beijing could adopt to enact Article 23 insidiously or under disguise to avoid backlash from the international community, while continuing to reap benefits from the city’s globally recognized special status. This seems to be part of Beijing’s brinkmanship to bring Hong Kong protesters and their supporters to their knees and move the city closer to authoritarianism. To counter these moves, Hong Kongers must define the boundaries beyond which Hong Kong falls into authoritarian rule and make a case as to why the city’s downfall is detrimental to the international community‘s interest.
The Long-Term Controversy Over National Security Laws
Back in 2003, the implementation of Article 23 was thwarted by the moderate pro-establishment politician James Tien. In face of overwhelming public disapproval of the law, he withdrew support and votes from his Liberal Party. However, 17 years later, it is hard to imagine Beijing following the old legislative playbook: start with a public consultation, followed by public discourse and political debate, and end with the majority rule. This playbook only works in peaceful societies ruled by a trustworthy government with integrity.
The aftermath of 2003, as well as the 2019 protests, should have taught Beijing and the Hong Kong government a lesson: pushing through national security legislation in a flawed parliament controlled by the minority pro-government camp would inevitably set off another full city-scale protest — and undoubtedly more fierce and focused this time. Given the current government’s numerous displays of dishonesty, it is conceivable that they will embark on a less-traveled path to implement Article 23.
Strategy One: “Anti-Terrorism”
In principle, one possible strategy could be to directly enact Chinese national law across Hong Kong, which can be achieved by declaring a state of emergency in the city. However, this is risky business as it would tarnish the integrity of “one country two systems” and subsequently Hong Kong’s international standing. Beijing, a risk-averse regime, is also unwilling to see Hong Kong’s status as a middleman for laundering money disappear into thin air.
Instead, Beijing could be concocting a narrative that would see Chinese national law applied to Hong Kong while not damaging Hong Kong’s international standing and Beijing’s own interests. The key word in this script is “anti-terrorism.” As early as 2014, pro-Beijing scholars have been claiming the emergence of “local terrorist ideology” on Hong Kong soil. Since the anti-extradition bill protests last year, government rhetoric frequently described the protests, which caused no deaths at all in the entire year, with phrases like “inclination to terrorist ideology.” That was a signal to the world that Hong Kong’s internal conflicts had ballooned into a national security issue. This gives the government the legitimacy to justify the implementation of Chinese national laws across the highly autonomous region to counter terrorism. The Chinese government knows that if it can persuade the world that terrorism exists in Hong Kong, and that it is as severe as the terror threat facing many other nations today, the international community will be less critical of Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong. Enacting Chinese laws directly is a convenient path that will save Beijing from having to tackle Hong Kong’s internal conflicts, basically turning the Hong Kong issue into a nonissue.
Strategy Two: Stacking the Legislature by Disqualifying Candidates
An even bolder strategy was probably foretold by a recent incident where the Hong Kong government and Beijing’s agencies for Hong Kong affairs (HKMAO and the Liaison Office) jointly criticized lawmaker Dennis Kwok for filibustering, framing it as “misconduct in public office” and “violating his oath.” It is incomprehensible to claim that filibustering goes against a lawmaker’s main duty; rather, it is common understanding that legislative work includes debating the law and representing public opinion against unreasonable laws. In a parliament controlled by the minority, pro-democratic members representing the majority of Hong Kongers are forced to express their objections using means like filibustering. Wouldn’t a lack of different political opinions turn the legislative branch into a rubber-stamp institution?
The above allegation has set a dangerous precedent for twisting the logic behind a certain provision in the Basic Law to target opposing lawmakers. In other words, to fulfill Beijing’s interpretation of the principal requirement for holding public office in Hong Kong, one could be required to take a meticulously legalistic approach to uphold the Basic Law down to its every single wording. A public official, by this new definition, not only needs to support “one country, two systems” or object Hong Kong independence, but also must abide by every single provision in the Basic Law. Worst of all, based on the previous cases, whether an official’s words or actions oversteps a provision is up to Beijing’s interpretation of his/her “intent.”
If this approach is applied, in the next election, there might be additional official questions for screening candidates like the following: “The Basic Law states that the enactment of Article 23 is a constitutional duty. Failing to support Article 23 legislation violates the Basic Law. Do you support it?” This question would suffice to disqualify even moderate or even pro-establishment candidates like James Tien. Even if any pro-democratic candidates were elected, once Article 23 re-enters the legislative process, they could risk ouster by raising objections.
Despite the absurdity of this tactic, the Chinese regime may just be tempted enough if such a strategy could resolve two of China’s current nuisances — voices of dissent in the Legislative Council and the previous failure to implement Article 23.
Strategy Three: The “Boiling Frog Effect”
Article 23 is not yet implemented, but the dystopian world that the protesters pictured in 2003 is already becoming reality. Regular citizens have been persecuted for “sedition” for sharing their views on social media or participating in legal protests; workers face retaliation for taking part in strikes; corporations are pressured to publicly side with the government’s stance; employees who have the “wrong” political views are fired; schools have been closely monitored for teaching material; protest-supporting fundraisers were framed for money laundering; a retweet or like may lead to persecution, under a colonial-era law. Only now have Hong Kongers woken up to their new reality — although the Basic Law technically protects citizens’ rights to speak, rally, march, demonstrate, and go on strike, the government could enfeeble civil rights by bending antiquated laws and legal provisions. The frequent abuse of law enforcement power on a small scale, such as improper arrests and police violence, is desensitizing the public and the international community. In a few years, Hong Kong will become unrecognizable. This is indeed a clever play on Beijing’s part to slowly strip away Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedom, without causing much international attention.
Counter-Strategies Against Beijing’s Brinkmanship
Beijing’s overarching goal is to hollow out Hong Kong but, at the same time, avoid major backlash from the international community, which could spell the end of the privileged global status of Hong Kong not granted to other Chinese cities. Beijing also aims at preventing single incidents that could cascade down into mass protests as seen in 2003, 2014, and 2019; and eliminating any resistance forces from within Hong Kong’s legislature. The tactics outlined above are typical in a game of brinkmanship.
In response, Hong Kongers in Hong Kong and on the so-called “international frontline” must know their strengths and bargaining chips on this negotiating table with Beijing.
Unlike Xinjiang and Tibet, Hong Kong is a city with transparency and free flow of information. Hong Kongers need to make a case to the world that the protests are not acts of terrorism. Some suggestions include comparing the Hong Kong protests to similar struggles in 20 or so other counties in the world at the present time, none of which were classified as terrorism; collecting a large amount of concrete evidence of the disproportionate use of force by the Hong Kong police; and showing how enacting Chinese national laws in Hong Kong will end the city’s autonomy and spell disaster for international community‘s interests.
The Legislative Council is the institution that can counteract Beijing’s “boiling frog” strategy and to keep Hong Kongers’ hope alive in the system. Those who plan to run for legislative office must be prepared to be disqualified from running. If only individuals are banned, there need to be alternative candidates as back-up plans. However, if and when the disqualification process is applied broadly to entire camps of candidates (for example, all who object to Article 23), the pro-democracy camp must make a strong case to the Hong Kong and global public that this is the endgame for Hong Kong democracy. Then the incumbent popularly elected legislators will hold the internationally recognized mandate from the public and serve as the last resistance.
These recommendations delineates how the slogan “if we burn, you burn with us,” often seen in the protests, may play out in the game of international relations. If the national security laws are “passed” by a legislature that is jury-rigged in this manner, or if related national laws are directly implemented in Hong Kong, Hong Kongers should signal clearly to the world that it goes way beyond the promised “one country, two systems.” Crossing this red line by Beijing should be seen by the world as a blunt violation of its promised autonomy to Hong Kongers. At that time, if the international community led by the United States and the United Kingdom decided to revoke the “non-sovereignty entity” status of Hong Kong and regard the SAR as an ordinary Chinese city, it shouldn’t come as a surprise.
Dr. Simon Shen is the Founding Chairman of GLOs (Glocal Learning Offices), an international relations start-up company. He also serves as an adjunct associate professor in the University of Hong Kong, Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and associate director of the Master of Global Political Economy Programme of the CUHK. The author acknowledges Jean Lin, Coco Ho, Chris Wong, Michelle King, and Alex Yap for their assistance in this piece.
▶️ 高度自治 vs 全面管治
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pwt8wZl8jHQ
hong kong protest tactics 在 Goodbye HK, Hello UK Facebook 的最佳解答
《Reuters》同《AFP》一齊報導香港:聖誕三日假期都係咁!
英國路透社嘅角度,係訪問:
“I think the purpose for us to come out is to... let people realize that so many front-line protesters sacrificed (things) for them. They should not forget and (simply) celebrate Christmas...We have been fighting for almost seven months now, and the Hong Kong police have done so many bad things.”
(我地出黎嘅原因係令啲人知道太多前線手足為我地犧牲,我地唔可以令人忘記,然後就咁去慶祝聖誕。我地已經抗爭咗七個月,而香港警察做咗太多衰嘢。)
法國法新社嘅睇法係咁樣:
//Protest groups counter that they have been left with little choice but to hit the streets wiht increasingly radical tactics because Beijing and Lam continue to dig their heels in.//
(出黎示威嘅人除咗上街已經無乜選擇,亦唯有採取越黎越激進嘅策略,因為北京同阿林只係繼續執信自己嗰套。)
//Swathes of the population are seething against Beijing's rule and the semi-autonomous city's administration as they push for greater democratic freedoms and police accountability.//
(對於北京同所謂自治嘅政府嘅管治,大部份嘅人已經覺得好奄悶,所以佢地要求更大嘅自由同民主制度,同時要對警察問責。)
作為國際新聞社,緊係會好「中立」咁報導政府講乜嘅。
//On Wednesday, Hong Kong's pro-Beijing leader Carrie Lam said violent protesters had "ruined" Christmas.
(最鐘意外國傳媒咁形容嗰個女人)
On Thursday criticized “unprecedented violence” by some protesters, but said that protecting freedoms and human rights remained a top priority.//
(點解用quote unquote?保障人權同自由係首要?)
#笑佢戇X怕佢嬲
Photo Source:Reuters & AFP
原文:
Reuters
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests/hong-kong-marchers-target-malls-on-third-day-of-christmas-protests-idUSKBN1YU0J0
AFP
https://news.yahoo.com/third-day-christmas-clashes-hong-kong-083851595.html
hong kong protest tactics 在 志祺七七 X 圖文不符 Youtube 的精選貼文
#吸菸有害健康 #拒絕私菸
#打擊非法私菸 #菸品健康福利捐
請勿購買來歷不明、標示不清、走私、或價格明顯太低的菸品,一起為國家財政、國人健康把關!
想了解更多資訊,可上「中區國稅局 稅務e吉棒」臉書粉絲專頁查詢:https://bit.ly/2RXbcie
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各節重點:
00:00 前導
03:02 泰國政壇為何有軍方勢力?
04:32 想要更多權力的新任泰王
05:46 學運抗爭為什麼升級?
07:36 抗爭形式轉變
08:46 政府的回應
10:08 外媒怎麼看
11:01 我們的觀點
12:26 提問
12:45 結尾
【 製作團隊 】
|企劃:宇軒
|腳本:宇軒
|編輯:土龍
|剪輯後製:絲繡
|剪輯助理:珊珊、歆雅
|演出:志祺
——
【 本集參考資料 】
→泰國示威潮 - 中央社新聞專題:https://bit.ly/3m9j2Co
→泰國民主怎麼了? - 故事:https://bit.ly/35nwxYF
→新泰國的舊政治(下):泰皇「君權網絡」不倒,國家不會好? - 轉角國際:https://bit.ly/2HtWhKN
→泰王蒲美蓬登基70周年 仲裁者角色贏得國民敬重 - 風傳媒:https://bit.ly/3dOqiRe
→泰王蒲美蓬為何深受人民愛戴?從這四點足以看出 - 中時新聞網:https://bit.ly/3jnJ6If
→泰王蒲美蓬國葬》拉瑪十世時代 開啟泰國軍政府與王室新關係 - 風傳媒:https://bit.ly/3mdDdiH
→「讓一切在我們這代結束!」掀起泰國學運狂潮的青年解放陣線 - 轉角國際:https://bit.ly/37wS97o
→專訪泰國學運領袖:無懼15年刑罰,為何他們激進喊出「王室改革」? - 報導者 :https://bit.ly/37zb9SI
→泰國反政府示威 逮捕20多人含至少3名抗議領袖 - 中央社:https://bit.ly/3dO68XN
→Thailand’s Protests Shift Tactics, Influenced by Hong Kong - The Wall Street Journal:https://on.wsj.com/35r2qPP
→(10/15) 在鎮壓的最後邊緣:泰國強令「曼谷緊急狀態」,全面禁止人民抗爭 - 轉角國際:https://bit.ly/3jjIh3n
→(10/16) 萬人賭前途的十字路口:無懼鎮壓恫嚇...泰國學運展開「流水之戰」 - 轉角國際:https://bit.ly/3kB4ADb
→(10/16) 下剋上的冤罪?泰國學運「奶茶聯盟」與被陷害的台灣之友 - 轉角國際:https://bit.ly/3meesCZ
→(10/17) 水砲對雨傘:下一招宵禁?泰國沸騰抗爭的「曼谷雨夜之戰」 - 轉角國際:https://bit.ly/34j3YMC
ㄒ(10/19) 泰國學運的關鍵一周:流水抗爭的考驗...國會釋善意?政府緩兵計? - 轉角國際:https://bit.ly/3jmLjE2
→打壓示威 泰封媒體與通訊軟體 - 聯合新聞網 :https://bit.ly/34kcZ82
→Thai protests: How pro-democracy movement gained momentum - BBC:https://bbc.in/3ohvguI
→Thailand protest: Why young activists are embracing Hong Kong's tactics - BBC:https://bbc.in/3dRV23Y
→Thailand Steps Up Response as Antigovernment Protests Escalate - New York Times:https://nyti.ms/2Hql6am
→Thailand Issues Emergency Decree After Protesters Heckle Royal Motorcade - World Street Journal:https://on.wsj.com/3knvPAF
→學運越演越烈,一位泰國青年想對台灣說的話:這不是我們「又在亂」,而是新世代的重要抉擇 - 換日線:https://bit.ly/35udAnf
【 延伸閱讀 】
→泰國學運群像:民主幕後...抗爭關鍵的「廁所大師」 - 轉角國際:https://bit.ly/34mPgUL
→「爸媽為何不懂我?」 泰國香港兩場抗爭 同一種策略、同一道世代難題 - 地球圖輯隊:https://bit.ly/34mPaMT
→泰國學運延燒90天!被捕23歲領袖:呼籲皇室改革,這不是世代差異,是貧富問題 - 商周:https://bit.ly/34mPknt
→新泰國的舊政治(上):玩不贏軍政府的「民主對決」 - 轉角國際:https://bit.ly/37yfdTp
→打臉還是暗渡陳倉:淺析被否決的泰國憲法草案 - Medium:https://bit.ly/2Tkv67u
→馮嘉誠:軍方、民望、分離主義──泰國王儲眼前的荊棘 - 端傳媒:https://bit.ly/3ofDgfM
→年輕世代怒吼王室改革,為何「踩到紅線」?泰國民主的崎嶇路,從數不清的政變談起 - 換日線:https://bit.ly/3mfmBqK
→「穩定」了 5 年,泰國為何又爆發大規模的反政府抗爭? - 換日線:https://bit.ly/35ufzYs
→從不微笑的國王:皇室對現代泰國政治的影響:https://bit.ly/3jnP4ZV
→1973年10月14日:泰王蒲美蓬和學生運動的血腥史 - 關鍵評論網:https://bit.ly/2Tl0McW
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hong kong protest tactics 在 How Hong Kong's Protesters Evade Police and ... - YouTube 的推薦與評價
![影片讀取中](/images/youtube.png)
... is published: https://nyti.ms/3xhj7dE Hong Kong's protesters have employed innovative tactics to stay safe and evade the police. ... <看更多>
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Protesters around the world are taking a page out of Hong Kong's playbook by using technology in new ways to organize anonymously and ... ... <看更多>
hong kong protest tactics 在 Hong Kong protest tactics: occupy, disrupt, disperse, repeat 的推薦與評價
Subscribe to our YouTube channel for free here: https://sc.mp/subscribe-youtube Hong Kong's protesters have developed sophisticated tactics ... ... <看更多>