華爾街日報,把之前美國忽然關休士頓領事館的背景,挖得很完整。
美國不是突然關的,其實他們查很久了,一開始是發現,有些中國學者有軍方身分,而沒有在入境的 VISA 表格中揭露,這個已經犯了聯邦罪。
接著,FBI 發現,奇怪,這些人怎麼跟中國的外交系統持續連繫,而且外交系統為他們做的事情,不像是為一般學者做的,例如,定期聯繫,告知他們 FBI 可能會來查,刪除自己手機電腦裡的資料(尤其微信!),甚至協助護送出境。
於是,美國進一步調查,發現中國的外交體系,主導並協助讓這群具有軍方背景的人,來吸收美國重要的科技知識。
美國目前抓了幾個,有的認罪,有的沒有。令人驚訝的是,一部分的軍方背景學者,以為自己在做的,是中國跟美國正常的學術交流,而中國那邊的長官跟他們說,你就去跟誰誰合作,然後把他們的環境、技術、研究內容,在中國複製一份。
也就是影子實驗室。
而他們合作的美國學者,也有收中國錢但沒有誠實揭露的狀況。
這件事情觸發了美國兩黨的共同憤慨,在五月以前,美國對於限制學術交流的工具很少,中國想跟誰「合作」幾乎買通了就行。但之後,美國對於「國家安全」的定義放寬,對於介入並審查可能危害國家的偷竊行為,採取更嚴格的措施。
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I have recently perused Nicholas Kristof’s NYT piece “China’s Man in Washington, Named Trump”(https://nyti.ms/3h2JXh8). One paragraph in particular caught my attention: “A joke in China suggests that Trump’s Chinese name is Chuan Jianguo, or “Build-the-Country Trump.” That’s because Build-the-Country is a common revolutionary name among Communist patriots, and it’s mockingly suggested that Trump’s misrule of the United States is actually bolstering Xi’s regime.”
Kristoff also avows that since Trump’s ascension to presidency, the American nation became highly polarized. This is reflected in the current administration’s policies on climate change, foreign relations with established U.S. allies, and COVID-19 prevention, all of which are rather ineffective. It also seems like Mr. Trump and his team diverged from the traditional priorities, including promoting free trade, human rights, and other quintessentially American values. As described thoroughly by John Bolton, all these factors contributed to the declining standing of the U.S. in global politics.
What is more, many people fall prey to CCP’s propaganda and its interpretations of Trump’s actions, which only enhances China’s reputation.
But that might not exactly be the case.
The CCP apparently failed to utilize the window of opportunity created by the ineptness of the Trump administration, as China could have grown to the position of a leader by filling in the void left by the U.S.
During the 2016 APEC Ministerial Meeting in Lima, Peru, Xi Jinping and his team actively supported the plans to establish the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific, or FTAAP. In contrast, the United States withdrew its signature from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in early 2017. Coupled with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), this move bolstered China’s capacity to influence global investments and trade, high-tech mergers and acquisitions, and, overall, expand its geostrategic influence on the entire globe.
At the same time, various propaganda films about great power competition, military industry, and science and technology surged all at once, and gained remarkable following around the world.
All this provided a window of opportunity for the CCP to slowly change its course. Around the same time, the distrust for POTUS among U.S. allies’ reached its apex. According to polls conducted by the Pew Research Center, the distrust for the U.S. president in the U.K. reached 75%, 72% in Japan, 70% in Australia, and stunning 86% in France.
Had the C.C.P,. begun to open up at that time, or at least resumed the governance style of the Hu-Wen administration, it could have reaped the benefits of promoting liberalism where the U.S. failed to deliver. It was the time for Beijing to gradually enhance freedom of speech domestically, pursue sustainable infrastructural projects, gradually reform unfair barriers to trade, transform its S.O.E.s, strengthen protections for private ownership, and vitalize its start-ups and enterprises.
Moreover, were China to cease the genocide in East Turkestan and refrain from cracking down on Hong Kong's semi-autonomy, it would have greatly enhanced its global international image. Additionally, if paired with slow but steady reforms, Beijing’s respect for sovereignty of its peoples would have attracted a large amount of foreign investment, which in turn would have continued to buttress the country’s growth.
It is China prerogative to remain idle.
It might still be possible for Chinese “Dream” to come true.
Yet, a historic window of opportunity is now closed.
Xi assumed the tools of proscribing and stalling, which are completely antithetical to the aforementioned window of opportunity.
Today, China is more authoritarian, less flexible, and fully deprived of horizontal accountability. Its reliance on wolf warrior diplomacy backfired: for example, the Swedish parliament sought to expel the Chinese ambassador to Stockholm. Also, Prague, the capital of Czechia, terminated its sister-city agreement with Shanghai and instead signed a new one with Taipei. Last but not least, we ought not to forget about the recent fiasco in the relations with the United States who ordered the shutdown of China’s consulate in Houston. All of this took its toll on China’s reputation.
Its international standing and inability to replace the U.S. as the major global power are not the only issues China is currently facing.
As it experiences multiple domestic and international shocks, China struggles to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and tame the disastrous floods of Yangtze River. The swarm of locusts of biblical proportions is also crippling Beijing’s institutional capacity and may soon lead to food shortages. In fact, the precarity of food supply further diminishes the level of trust for Chinese authorities.
In 2019, the Pew Research Center conducted a public opinion survey to examine the international views of China. In the U.S., Argentina, the U.K., Canada, Germany, and Ukraine, only about 30% of respondents claim a favorable view of China.
As the COVID-19 pandemic rages in the U.S., as many as 73% of U.S. respondents view China unfavorably.
Recently, the C.C.P. is losing its focus by continuously shifting targets. In fact, I believe there is no need for the C.C.P.to rely on nationalistic appeals, since in this new century values, business relations, and fair competition are all far more important than greater than delusive blood ties.
China lies only 130 kilometers away from us. Of course, we welcome dialogue and seek to avoid misjudgments. But we also distinguish between the C.C.P. and China. While we do welcome dialogue, but we will not be coerced to talk under unjust preconditions or in fear.
The only fair prerequisites are those of reciprocity, mutual respect as well as fairness and openness with respect for the rule of law.
Source: Pew Research Center
最近看到紐約時報中文版的一篇文章
<美國的川普,中國的「川建國」>,其中一小段是這樣的
「在中國,人們戲稱川普的中文名字是川建國。那是因為建國是共產黨愛國者中一個普遍的革命人名。它在諷刺地暗示川普對美國的治理不當實際上是在鞏固習近平的政權。」
裡面也提到,川普在任的幾年,國家更分裂,對於氣候變遷,傳統美國盟友,乃至於疫情處理等都相當拙劣,對於美國傳統的自由貿易、人權等價值也基本上都沒有太大興趣。這些方針,導致美國在世界的評價降低,波頓的新書也多有描述。
除此之外,許多不幸相信中共宣傳,又或者是中共圈養的小粉紅,特別故意愛宣傳川普增強中國的威望。
但這不是真的。
中共完全沒有掌握美國做得不夠好的地方,去增強其在世界的領導力。
在2016年時,秘魯的亞太峰會舉行期間,習近平政權爭取(RCEP)及亞太自由貿易區(FTAAP)談判;對比2017年初,美國剛宣布退出TPP,加上中國到「一帶一路」和亞洲基礎設施投資銀行,中國當時在世界全面發揮投資貿易、高科技併購還有其地緣戰略的影響力。
也是那個時候,各種的大國崛起、大國軍工、大國科技的宣傳影片此起彼落,似乎正準備要在世界舞台發光發熱。
這曾經是中共慢慢轉向的一個機會之窗。彼時(2017)美國盟友對美國總統的不信任度達到歷史新高,根據皮尤研究中心的資訊,英國對於美國總統的不信任度達到75%、日本72% 澳洲70% 法國更高達86%
如果那時中共開始有限度的改革,對內放寬言論自由,或者至少維持在胡溫當時的水中,對外追求有責任的基礎建設,逐步緩慢減低不公平的貿易壁壘,對於國有企業改革,增強私營企業、新創企業的活力。
停止對新疆迫害,不干預香港自治,不僅國際形象會大幅改善,哪怕是緩慢但是穩健的改革,也會讓大量吸引外資,讓中國的活力持續前進。
哪怕是什麼都不做也好
那或許有這麽一點可能性,中國「夢」是可以前行的
但是歷史機緣的大門已經關上。
習、禁、停、放棄了這個機會之窗,徹底的走向相反的方向。
更專制、更沒有彈性,更沒有任何制衡的力量。各種戰狼外交,讓瑞典議員提案驅逐中國大使,捷克布拉格市長與台北簽訂姊妹是,就解散上海與該市關係、被美國關閉領事館、各種讓中國形象低下的事情,中共都沒有少做。
中共不但完全沒有辦法取代美國,在多重國內外的衝擊之下,又是瘟疫,又是超大水患,緊接著蝗害,還有進來的糧食不足問題,正在面臨巨大的瓶頸。
而糧食的命脈,卻恰恰又在對他最不信任,對中共價值最反對的國家聯盟
根據皮尤研究中心:Pew Research Center2019調查各國對中國的喜好度,美國、阿根廷、英國、加拿大、德國、烏克蘭等,對於中國的喜好度都在30%上下
而2020疫情後美國對於中國的不信任度,更高達73%。
最近中共在演習,又要玩轉移目標的手段,對於中共,其實不必再有民族主義的同情,因為新的世紀,價值、商業模式、公平競爭的制度大於血緣幻想。
中國離我們只有130公里的距離,我們當然歡迎對話,避免誤判。但我們同時也區分中共與中國,歡迎對話,但不在前提、條件、恐懼之下對話。
如果真的要有前提,那就是對等、尊重,還有公平公開法治的方式會晤。
資料來源:皮尤研究中心:Pew Research Center
(美國著名的民調機構和智庫機構,https://www.pewresearch.org/)
houston consulate china 在 李怡 Facebook 的精選貼文
To Smash a Cracked Pot |Lee Yee
The national security honeymoon, the calm before the storm, is over. The sword of Damocles above our heads comes swinging down.
Against the professional recommendations of the Board of Education, the University of Hong Kong’s (HKU) governing council went with the majority’s decision and fired Benny Tai Yiu-ting, associate professor of the Faculty of Law. Certainly, no one would challenge Benny Tai’s comment that the decision to terminate his appointment was made by “an authority beyond the university through its agents”.
Three males and one female, aged between 16 and 21, were arrested on suspicion of “secession” in violation of the national security law. There was no action, only online speeches. Perhaps the few words by these teenagers are powerful enough to split a country of 1.4 billion people?
I had been pondering whether the Communists and their bootlickers would adopt the disqualification tactic or the postponement tactic in the upcoming Legislative Council election. The answer has been revealed that mass disqualifications would come first, and then a postponement may follow. Some said that the Communists are “braver” than I had predicted; but to borrow a young person’s words, which I find to be more suitable: rationality limits my imagination.
The three-part strike happened within a period of two days, putting an end to the honeymoon where the CCP had once sought dialogue, probed, soothed, and observed the global siege led by the United States. Now the CCP is addressing the US sanctions head-on while flexing its muscles by targeting Hongkongers.
This also illustrates that the attempt by the pan-democrats to navigate within the cavity of the national security law, to try to compromise on the confirmation letter to see a way out through election was an utter, complete failure. They could have followed my suggestion from a month ago, to run in the election with proud and loud opposition against the national security law, to welcome being disqualified and show the civilized world “what the CCP is plotting against Hong Kong”. That would have been more courageous. Yet some pushed their luck, and now they face the same fate of being disqualified.
CCP’s honeymoon period following the implementation of the national security law in Hong Kong was based on the assumption, by the CCP as well as other overseas observers, that Trump’s tough policy toward China was for his election campaign. Since the current projection of the election seems unfavorable to Trump, that there is hope for the Democrats to take over, and the US might change its policy toward China.
When the United States ordered the closure of the Chinese Consulate in Houston, and when the four top officials, especially Pompeo’s declaration of resistance to China, made it clear that the US ultra-cold war strategy towards China is unlikely to be reversible.
Stephen Young, a senior diplomat who had stationed in Beijing, Hong Kong, and Taipei, said that demanding other countries to close their consulates is a very drastic strategy. In the past, if a foreign diplomatic agency had a blunder, actions would usually have been taken against a person. The closures of the consulates suggest that the relationship is close to a break-up.
On July 25, the New York Times published the words of Ryan Hass, the President of the US National Security Council in the Obama era, that said, “They want to reorient the U.S.-China relationship toward an all-encompassing systemic rivalry that cannot be reversed by the outcome of the upcoming U.S. election. They believe this reorientation is needed to put the United States on a competitive footing against its 21st-century geostrategic rival.”
The two bills on Hong Kong, and the one on Xinjiang Uyghurs, were all passed almost unanimously in the US Senate and the House of Representatives. The Speaker of the House and Democrat, Pelosi, was particularly enthusiastic; left-wing media such as the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, though have been critical of Trump, have both affirmed and even encouraged Trump’s anti-China policy.
This has been a 180 from Trump’s previous declaration of “America First” when he did not hesitate to offend the United Kingdom, the European Union, and even Asia-Pacific countries. Pompeo has recently been chummy with Europe and the Asia-Pacific to ally up, and emphasized in his anti-CCP declaration the need for the free world to act together. In fact, Trump’s unilateralism has pivoted, and the allies have returned to their positions one after another, and a global siege towards China has gradually been formed.
Has China been in touch with the US Democratic Party in private to probe whether its China policy will change if it wins the general election? There is no way of knowing. Even if so, the answer is apparent.
The US policy toward China leaves no room for maneuver, and the power-hungry CCP must now hold tight onto the hastily enacted national security law till the end. The longer they hold out, who knows how many more Hong Kong officials or pro-Beijing people would be affected along the lines of Bernard Chan and his sanctioned foreign bank.
What the CCP and its Hong Kong bootlickers are doing could be described with the Chinese idiom “to smash a cracked pot”. The pot is already cracked, then just smash it. It means that there are blemishes, and mistakes that cannot be corrected or will not be correct, then why not send the helve after the hatchet.
Lu Xun said, “When the brave is angered, he draws the sword towards the stronger; when the coward is angered, he draws the sword towards the weaker.” Disqualifications coupled with the postponement, is it “braver”? Or rather, “the coward is angered”.