Question 1

ownership精神偽學術 在Facebook 的評價

Accepted Answer

【認真聽】如何閱讀一本書 | 閱讀教練教你「#閱讀力」 | 細讀與李維斯學派 // 李長潔 feat. R星球頻道的Ryan 📒
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從小到大都一直被推薦一本書，《#如何閱讀一本書》，由Adler與Van Doren在1940年出版，然後不斷再版到現在。今天就與「櫞椛文庫」的負責人Ryan，還有他的節目「R星球頻道」，一起連結，聊聊「閱讀」這件事。聽說Ryan的新業務是「#閱讀教練」，到底甚麼是「閱讀教練」？閱讀可以有那些技巧？你的閱讀姿態又是甚麼呢？甚至在當代，這個「不太看文字」的新媒介時代，閱讀力為何必須要培養？進來聽就對了~
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📌 #今天的內容有
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▶我們的書爆炸多，我們都看哪些書呢
▶抓起你手邊的一本書
▶用最喜歡的閱讀姿態看書
▶書作為一種文明的傳播與積累
▶文化研究中的李維斯學派
▶如何閱讀一本書
▶細讀的理論意義與技巧
▶做一位閱讀教練
▶鍛鍊你的閱讀力
▶規畫你的知識領域與自我成長
▶數位時代的閱讀素養
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📣#firstory 聽這裡：https://open.firstory.me/story/ckriojdlu6cym08502wbnk637
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📣#kkbox 聽這裡：https://podcast.kkbox.com/episode/GocHVpv-Xvn8KSHZMm
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📣#spotify 聽這裡：https://open.spotify.com/episode/0h5wo08gWvxnDDt4O0LgsZ?si=uwL423O2Seam7nM8NWXPSg&utm_source=copy-link&dl_branch=1
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📣#apple 聽這裡：https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/ep-51-%E5%A6%82%E4%BD%95%E9%96%B1%E8%AE%80%E4%B8%80%E6%9C%AC%E6%9B%B8-%E9%96%B1%E8%AE%80%E6%95%99%E7%B7%B4%E6%95%99%E4%BD%A0-%E9%96%B1%E8%AE%80%E5%8A%9B-%E7%B4%B0%E8%AE%80%E8%88%87%E6%9D%8E%E7%B6%AD%E6%96%AF%E5%AD%B8%E6%B4%BE-%E6%9D%8E%E9%95%B7%E6%BD%94-feat-r%E6%98%9F%E7%90%83%E9%A0%BB%E9%81%93-%E7%9A%84ryan/id1516956557?i=1000529932445
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📲#facebook 完整論述：https://www.facebook.com/208541192666847/posts/1815731235281160/

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能夠好好地閱讀一本書，在當代流行文化中，似乎已經是一種難能可貴的「能力」，甚至是「休閒活動」。如果說書本，是一種知識傳播、儲存的載體，那麼閱讀就是這些知識的再生產實踐。也就是說，我們的文明與文化之根本，在很大一部分的時候，是倚賴「書本」來做為基礎。無怪乎，在文化研究中，就有「文化與文明」傳統，更有強調高級文化保存的「#李維斯學派」。
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▓ #文化與文明傳統
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李維斯（F. R. Leavis）承接阿諾德（Matthew Arnold）的「文化與文明」觀點，認為文化是一種「有教養的閒散」（cultivated inaction），一種對內在的耕耘（cultiver）。而當時（1990年代前後），大量印刷的書籍可以被認為是最有效的傳播管道，當然，能夠有良好的閱讀能力自然就成為通往「文化」的技巧。而李維斯在他的著作《#大眾文明與少數文化》、《#小說及閱讀大眾》、《#文化與環境》中，奠定了他對大眾通俗文化與30年代文化危機的觀點。
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▓ #鼓勵閱讀的李維斯學派
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他認為「文化向來靠少數人來保存」，這種文化精英論顯示，隨著民主精神的到來，通俗文化的席捲，傳統知識權威深感威脅，擔心某種無政府的失序。李維斯批評電影、電視、廣播、廣告等大眾傳播媒體，這些內容降低了語言文字，貶抑了情感生活，破壞了生活品質。他們嚮往一種神秘的純樸過往，未受商業污染的文化協調性（充滿秩序與分際）。所以他們鼓勵文學閱讀，甚至是一種「細讀」（close reading），以恢復高級文化的涵養。
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艾德勒（Adler）與范多倫（Van Doren）的《如何閱讀一本書》，也是在40年代的這個文化氛圍中誕生。強調培養一種「主動的閱讀」，希望讀者可以在接下來的時代中，促進「理解」，習得「知識」，持續「文化與文明」。書本就是一種溝通（傳播），是可以也應該增進的能力。想到大學時上林春明的課程，他很浪漫的說，書就是跟過去的哲學家對話，當初覺得僅是幽默，現在想來貼切，閱讀是一種超越時空條件限制的交流。
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他們幫書做了分類，一種是「實用性的書」（如果我們想做什麼，我們該怎麼做）、「理論性的書」（知道這是怎樣回事），前者是「教導性」的，後者是「規範性」的。例如，康德的「純粹理性批判」、「實踐理性批判」就是這麼回事。
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▓ #閱讀的四個層次
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然後，閱讀可以有四個層次，包含：
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「#基礎閱讀」（elementary reading），談論書本最基礎的語句理解，也就是「這些句子在說寫甚麼」。
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「#檢視閱讀」（inspectional reading），就是在一定的時間內，抓出一本書的重點，了解「書本包含了哪些內容」，例如看封面、封底、目錄、文獻、序文等，很有系統的略讀過一本書。接著可以進行較為粗淺的閱讀，先不管那些你不明白（沒有背景知識）的地方，直接看過去。
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「#分析閱讀」（analytical reading），分析閱讀就是全盤的閱讀、完整的閱讀，在這個層次的閱讀，讀者會緊抓著一本書，一直讀到這本書成為他自己為止。在這個階段中，我們會試圖找出書本（作者）想要解決的問題、表達的論點、甚至是展現的技巧，並且，身為讀者，我們開始進行詮釋，透過自己的分析架構，解構與再建構作者的「理解」世界。最後，對這本書進行「批判」，證明作者的論證、知識、技巧、邏輯有哪些優質與不足之處。
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「#主題閱讀」（synoptical reading），是所有閱讀中最複雜，同時也是最系統化的閱讀。在做主題閱讀時，我們會將多本書籍文件並置，並列舉出這些資料之間的關係，提出一個所有資料都談到的主題，並且形成論述。我們會在不同的陳述間，建立起一個論證的網絡，釐清問題，定義問題，解決問題，討論反思。例如在韋伯、桑德爾、韓炳哲、葉啟政、馬斯洛之間，找到西方社會對自我實現的社會學想像。艾德勒與范多倫，對閱讀與理解提出的四個層次，蠻受用的，十分適合檢視或歸納自己的閱讀動機。
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▓ #如何閱讀社會科學的書
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艾德勒與范多倫將所有的書籍分類為不同的讀法，包含「實用型」、「想像文學」、「故事、戲劇與詩」、「歷史書」、「科學與數學」、「哲學」、「社會科學」。社會科學被放在最後一個，是因為對於社科的閱讀，包含了前面所有的閱讀。社科閱讀的簡易之處，在於其關於我們的每日生活。
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社科作品閱讀的困難之處。首先在於讀者的立場是否願意同意作者，這關乎你的閱讀體驗。其次，作品中雜用的專有名詞，與各種來自多方領域的概念，你可能會看到一堆關鍵字，但隨便卡在個詞的脈絡中，你便不理解作者想要表達或批評的意思了。最後，社會科學的作品，通常脈絡相當的廣泛，可能需要同時閱讀多本書，才能明白某個作品的內涵，這必須要進入到第三、第四層次的閱讀。
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▓ #細讀的理論意義與技巧
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其實上述艾德勒與范多倫的閱讀法，就是一種李維斯學派想強調「細讀」。當然在年代上，它們可以呈現為同一個學術路徑。算是文學領域中40年代「新批評」的一種模樣。在李維斯學派中，他們認為，閱讀應該是字句斟酌，研讀文本中的細膩結構，像是用詞、文法、修辭、篇章結構、敘事、內容邏輯等，找出作者的深意，隱藏的結構，與多元性的觀點。這樣的試讀素養培養，在文學、外國文學的教育體制中，直到現在都是重要的核心能力。也是40-60年代，全球教育體制都很渴望提升的「#素養」（literacy），識讀能力。
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▓ #數位時代的閱讀力
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這個識讀能力，在文化研究的文化與文明傳統中，被認定為維繫文化發展的重要基礎。正如李維斯學派的知識份子們所擔心的，我們終究是在100年的發展中，受到「通俗的」媒體文化來襲，素養能力也就在不同時期呈現為「讀寫素養」（1930）、「媒體素養」（1960）、「媒體批評素養」（1980）、「多元文化素養」（1990）、「數位素養」（2000），甚至到今日的「運算數養」。
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最近，秦琍琍、胡全威、李佩霖、沈孟湄、費翠與我將出版一本新書《#數位語藝》，裡面就呼應了這種數位時代的各種素養。我們要知道當代的數位文本具有「更加對稱的互動與傳播」、「又產又用的「產用者」（produser）」、「文本的不穩定性」，如John Harrley（2009）高呼的「全民書寫運動」，一個數位時代的文化能力全面啟動。
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我們必須要同時兼顧「細讀」與「遠讀」，細讀就是鑽研到文本的結構當中，如今天所談的內容。而「遠讀」（distant reading）則是要從一個更加鉅觀的角度，去拆解文本，包含「技術」（techno）、「使用者/使用」（user/usage）、「內容」（content）、「所有權」（ownership）、「治理」（governance）、「商業模式」（business models）等構面，甚至用「文字探勘」等數位工具，去理解文本。將「細讀」與「遠讀」並置，才能夠掌握數位時代的文本本質。

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🌐 R星球頻道：https://www.facebook.com/readingplanet

📚 櫞花文庫：https://www.facebook.com/enkalibrary

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今天的聊天夥伴：林廷璋。私人圖書館「櫞椛文庫」館長｜文藝誌《圈外》總編｜「R 星球頻道」 Podcaster｜日本文化觀察、文學評論等文章，散見於各藝文雜誌及媒體平台。熱愛各種形式的閱讀，相信文字的力量，同時也懷疑所有的真理與事實。

Question 2

ownership精神 在Facebook 的評價

Accepted Answer

［茶走人涼］林建名一走，法國佬就反枱了明報link ：鱷魚恤遭終止「LACOSTE」分銷協議，　https://bityl.co/7HBA　＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝月頭訂最抵！2021比別人知得多。subscribe now（https://bityl.co/4Y0h）。Ivan Patreon，港美市場評點，專題號外，每日一圖，好文推介。每星期6篇，月費80，半年已1600人訂！ 畀年費仲有85折＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝1. 「坤叔過咗身，我咩嘢都冇興趣傾喎」2. 《無間道2》（＊）嘅敘事好快，一開始已經係倪坤（張同祖）被殺，四大馬仔即時埋夾造反，想另起爐灶玩歐超聯新和聯勝咁。然後介紹倪永孝（吳鎮宇）出場，安居平五路。3. 亦都話你知，人走茶涼嘅道理。當然表面上我地都講「法人」，上市公司更加係，ownership同management 分開，唔係啲老撚土華資（其實日資韓資都係）企業咁 朕即天下， 大股東CEO執行董事創辦人都係區區在下我本人。4. 甚至有一期，覺得根本唔需要有「靈魂人物」。公司嘅core value先係永續，傳承與壯大，相信一個人不如相信每一個人。所以有一期呢，股權分散晒，冇大股東，然後外面請專業經理人，先係王道咁話。未有咩ESG之前，咪就飛機呢啲企業管治。5. 邊間最出名？匯豐咯！然後就真係the rest is history6. 然後唔知係咁啱定點解，就變咗吹捧科企嘅創辦人，個人魅力（但，李澤楷廿年前都鏟青著卡其褲啦）。反過嚟就變咗你華爾街識條撚 股東識條撚  本人先最識間公司 冇我唔掂。所以創辧人要永續，同股不同權萬歲，大把人吹奏。然後而家DropBox之類做到一pat屎，但對沖基金都係趕佢唔走的，正如小朱一年唔知使幾多億做保安，一樣趕佢唔走。（＊＊＊）7. 講返，咁多教科書嘢背後，大家忽略咗，唔少嘢，都係「人」傾返嚟嘅。8. 我在星展，去到坡國，淡馬錫都會見我—就梗係因為畀面我公司（反正都係半國企），唔係畀面我啦，know me mouse．但，我在康宏，人地開個專欄畀我寫，就梗係因為我，唔係畀面康宏啦（＊＊＊＊＊）9. 上次先寫過林建名（https://fbook.cc/3TFV），一死咗就有人炒私有化。正如之前鄧成波，一死咗對家金朝陽已經要出通告講，可能close唔到刁10. 今次呢，就到法國佬。以前話同LaCoste有商標糾紛，後來講掂數，出嚟行求財唔係求氣，不如畀你賣埋。鱷魚恤就改Logo，變咗左邊開口嘅金鱷魚，La Coste就右邊開口綠色11. 但，邊個同法國佬傾？梗係林建名啦。「傾完做乜就自己心照」12. 理論上個rights去到20205年，「合約精神跟法人唔係跟林建名」。但而家，大將軍一去，後人就壓唔住場了。對家咪借機玩嘢反枱。13. 當然誰是誰非唔知啦，睇返通告內容，係法國佬話公司冇「履行分銷協議項下一項的責任」，傾唔掂，就法庭見了。14. 影響？都大㗎，都佔收入成20%．其他業務？就係賣鱷魚恤，仲有收租，觀塘嘛。（＊）的確拍得好，但，亦真係好多情節都抄《教父》抄得好明顯。包括後來倪永孝隊冧四個大佬，就照抄《教父》結尾了。同樣地，倪永孝係唔係大仔（有冇人留意到？），正如《教父》入面阿爾伯仙奴都唔係大仔（＊＊）。（＊＊）又我而家越嚟越少寫任何同電影有關嘅嘢，唔係因為唔識（不嬲都唔識都係咁寫），而係大家冇共鳴。問題係例如寫《無間道2》之類，都真係好多人睇過。但到現家嘅，觀影經驗係十分碎片化的。除咗超級英雄片外（而我係唔睇的），就冇乜嘢大家都會睇過。（＊＊＊）呢度都要講，有人就用 Steve Jobs咁叻都要畀人趕走做例子。但我覺得正好相反，正好畀你見到是金子就會發光。趕完佢走，咪之後發現唔掂，死死地氣搵返佢返嚟，然後就係全世界最值錢企業。同樣地，Jeff Bezos一樣冇同股不同權，Elon Musk一樣冇呢回事，但你見唔見「短視」嘅股東趕佢地走？（＊＊＊＊）（＊＊＊＊）不過亦講返轉頭，有話當時Elon Musk忽然話私有化，除咗係high大咗，亦因為怕畀人趕走。但後來股價升咗N倍，咁講真你要狙擊Amazon 或 Telsa，用既錢都真係唔少 — 而既然而家都唔係同股不同權，現有啲股東係不滿管理層嘅，理論上都可以踢走。（＊＊＊＊＊）你去落廣告買個專欄就另計，你畀多多錢嘅，日日畀全版你鳩up都得添，請睇《新喜劇之王》：表姐！都叫咗你唔好吸毒㗎啦！害死你呀！—呢段戲真係冇得頂＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝月頭訂最抵！2021比別人知得多。subscribe now（https://bityl.co/4Y0h）。Ivan Patreon，港美市場評點，專題號外，每日一圖，好文推介。每星期6篇，月費80，半年已1600人訂！ 畀年費仲有85折＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

Question 3

ownership精神江魔的魔界（Kong Keen Yung 江健勇） 在Facebook 的評價

Accepted Answer

這是前些日子爆出已經被加拿大法院接理對藏傳佛教噶舉派法王的訟訴。（加拿大法院鏈接在此：https://www.bccourts.ca/jdb-txt/sc/21/09/2021BCSC0939cor1.htm?fbclid=IwAR2FLZlzmUIGTBaTuKPVchEqqngcE3Qy6G_C0TWNWVKa2ksbIYkVJVMQ8f8）

這位法王的桃色事件，我是幾年前才聽到。但，藏傳佛教的高層有這些性醜聞，我已經聽了幾十年。我以前的一位前女友也被一些堪布藉故上她的家摟抱過，也有一些活佛跟她表白。（這不只是她，其他地方我也聽過不少）

這是一個藏傳佛教裡面系統式的問題。

很多時候發生這種事情，信徒和教主往往都是說女方得不到寵而報仇，或者說她們也精神病，或者說她們撒謊。

我不排除有這種可能性，但，多過一位，甚至多位出來指證的時候，我是傾向於相信『沒有那麼巧這麼多有精神病的女人要撒謊來報仇』。

大寶法王的桃色事件，最先吹哨的是一位台灣的在家信徒，第二位是香港的女出家人，現在加拿大又多一位公開舉報上法庭。

對大寶法王信徒來說，這一次的比較麻煩，因為是有孩子的。（關於有孩子的，我早在法王的桃色事件曝光時，就有聽聞）

如果法庭勒令要驗證DNA，這對法王和他的信徒來說，會很尷尬和矛盾，因為做或不做，都死。

你若問我，我覺得『人數是有力量的』，同時我也覺得之後有更多的人站出來，是不出奇的。

我也藉此呼籲各方佛教徒，如果你們真的愛佛教，先別說批判，但如鴕鳥般不討論這些爭議，你是間接害了佛教。

（下面是我從加拿大法院鏈接拷貝下來的內容，當中有很多細節。）

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

ANALYSIS

A. The Spousal Support Claim in this Case

B. The Test to Amend Pleadings

C. Pleadings in Family Law Cases

D. The Legal Concept of a Marriage-Like Relationship

E. Is There a Reasonable Claim of a Marriage-Like Relationship?

F. Delay / Prejudice

CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION
[1] The claimant applies to amend her notice of family claim to seek spousal support. At issue is whether the claimant’s allegations give rise to a reasonable claim she lived with the respondent in a marriage-like relationship, so as to give rise to a potential entitlement to spousal support under the Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25 (“FLA”).

[2] The facts alleged by the claimant do not fit within a traditional concept of marriage. The claimant does not allege that she and the respondent ever lived together. Indeed, she has only met the respondent in person four times: twice very briefly in a public setting; a third time in private, when she alleges the respondent sexually assaulted her; and a fourth and final occasion, when she informed the respondent she was pregnant with his child.

[3] The claimant’s case is that what began as a non-consensual sexual encounter evolved into a loving and affectionate relationship. That relationship occurred almost entirely over private text messages. The parties rarely spoke on the telephone, and never saw one another during the relationship, even over video. The claimant says they could not be together because the respondent is forbidden by his station and religious beliefs from intimate relationships or marriage. Nonetheless, she alleges, they formed a marriage-like relationship that lasted from January 2018 to January 2019.

[4] The respondent denies any romantic relationship with the claimant. While he acknowledges providing emotional and financial support to the claimant, he says it was for the benefit of the child the claimant told him was his daughter.

[5] The claimant’s proposed amendment raises a novel question: can a secret relationship that began on-line and never moved into the physical world be like a marriage? In my view, that question should be answered by a trial judge after hearing all of the evidence. The alleged facts give rise to a reasonable claim the claimant lived with the respondent in a marriage-like relationship. Accordingly, I grant the claimant leave to amend her notice of family claim.

BACKGROUND
[6] It should be emphasized that this is an application to amend pleadings only. The allegations by the claimant are presumed to be true for the purposes of this application. Those allegations have not been tested in a court of law.

[7] The respondent, Ogyen Trinley Dorje, is a high lama of the Karma Kagyu School of Tibetan Buddhism. He has been recognized and enthroned as His Holiness, the 17th Gyalwang Karmapa. Without meaning any disrespect, I will refer to him as Mr. Dorje in these reasons for judgment.

[8] Mr. Dorje leads a monastic and nomadic lifestyle. His true home is Tibet, but he currently resides in India. He receives followers from around the world at the Gyuto Monetary in India. He also travels the world teaching Tibetan Buddhist Dharma and hosting pujas, ceremonies at which Buddhists express their gratitude and devotion to the Buddha.

[9] The claimant, Vikki Hui Xin Han, is a former nun of Tibetan Buddhism. Ms. Han first encountered Mr. Dorje briefly at a large puja in 2014. The experience of the puja convinced Ms. Han she wanted to become a Buddhist nun. She met briefly with Mr. Dorje, in accordance with Kagyu traditions, to obtain his approval to become a nun.

[10] In October 2016, Ms. Han began a three-year, three-month meditation retreat at a monastery in New York State. Her objective was to learn the practices and teachings of the Kagyu Lineage. Mr. Dorje was present at the retreat twice during the time Ms. Han was at the monastery.

[11] Ms. Han alleges that on October 14, 2017, Mr. Dorje sexually assaulted her in her room at the monastery. She alleges that she became pregnant from the assault.

[12] After she learned that she was pregnant, Ms. Han requested a private audience with Mr. Dorje. In November 2017, in the presence of his bodyguards, Ms. Han informed Mr. Dorje she was pregnant with his child. Mr. Dorje initially denied responsibility; however, he provided Ms. Han with his email address and a cellphone number, and, according to Ms. Han, said he would “prepare some money” for her.

[13] Ms. Han abandoned her plan to become a nun, left the retreat and returned to Canada. She never saw Mr. Dorje again.

[14] After Ms. Han returned to Canada, she and Mr. Dorje began a regular communication over an instant messaging app called Line. They also exchanged emails and occasionally spoke on the telephone.

[15] The parties appear to have expressed care and affection for one another in these communications. I say “appear to” because it is difficult to fully understand the meaning and intentions of another person from brief text messages, especially those originally written in a different language. The parties wrote in a private shorthand, sharing jokes, emojis, cartoon portraits and “hugs” or “kisses”. Ms. Han was the more expressive of the two, writing more frequently and in longer messages. Mr. Dorje generally participated in response to questions or prompting from Ms. Han, sometimes in single word messages.

[16] Ms. Han deposes that she believed Mr. Dorje was in love with her and that, by January 2018, she and Mr. Dorje were living in a “conjugal relationship”.

[17] During their communications, Ms. Han expressed concern that her child would be “illegitimate”. She appears to have asked Mr. Dorje to marry her, and he appears to have responded that he was “not ready”.

[18] Throughout 2018, Mr. Dorje transferred funds in various denominations to Ms. Han through various third parties. Ms. Han deposes that these funds were:

a) $50,000 CDN to deliver the child and for postpartum care she was to receive at a facility in Seattle;

b) $300,000 CDN for the first year of the child’s life;

c) $20,000 USD for a wedding ring, because Ms. Han wrote “Even if we cannot get married, you must buy me a wedding ring”;

d) $400,000 USD to purchase a home for the mother and child.

[19] On June 19, 2018, Ms. Han gave birth to a daughter in Richmond, B.C.

[20] On September 17, 2018, Mr. Dorje wrote, ”Taking care of her and you are my duty for life”.

[21] Ms. Han’s expectation was that the parties would live together in the future. She says they planned to live together. Those plans evolved over time. Initially they involved purchasing a property in Toronto, so that Mr. Dorje could visit when he was in New York. They also discussed purchasing property in Calgary or renting a home in Vancouver for that purpose. Ms. Han eventually purchased a condominium in Richmond using funds provided by Mr. Dorje.

[22] Ms. Han deposes that the parties made plans for Mr. Dorje to visit her and meet the child in Richmond. In October 2018, however, Mr. Dorje wrote that he needed to “disappear” to Europe. He wrote:

I will definitely find a way to meet her

And you

Remember to take care of yourself if something happens

[23] The final plan the parties discussed, according to Ms. Han, was that Mr. Dorje would sponsor Ms. Han and the child to immigrate to the United States and live at the Kagyu retreat centre in New York State.

[24] In January 2019, Ms. Han lost contact with Mr. Dorje.

[25] Ms. Han commenced this family law case on July 17, 2019, seeking child support, a declaration of parentage and a parentage test. She did not seek spousal support.

[26] Ms. Han first proposed a claim for spousal support in October 2020 after a change in her counsel. Following an exchange of correspondence concerning an application for leave to amend the notice of family claim, Ms. Han’s counsel wrote that Ms. Han would not be advancing a spousal support claim. On March 16, 2020, counsel reversed course, and advised that Ms. Han had instructed him to proceed with the application.

[27] When this application came on before me, the trial was set to commence on June 7, 2021. The parties were still in the process of discoveries and obtaining translations for hundreds of pages of documents in Chinese characters.

[28] At a trial management conference on May 6, 2021, noting the parties were not ready to proceed, Madam Justice Walkem adjourned the trial to April 11, 2022.

ANALYSIS
A. The Spousal Support Claim in this Case
[29] To claim spousal support in this case, Ms. Han must plead that she lived with Mr. Dorje in a marriage-like relationship. This is because only “spouses” are entitled to spousal support, and s. 3 of the Family Law Act defines a spouse as a person who is married or has lived with another person in a marriage-like relationship:

3 (1) A person is a spouse for the purposes of this Act if the person

(a) is married to another person, or

(b) has lived with another person in a marriage-like relationship, and

(i) has done so for a continuous period of at least 2 years, or

(ii) except in Parts 5 [Property Division] and 6 [Pension Division], has a child with the other person.

[30] Because she alleges she has a child with Mr. Dorje, Ms. Han need not allege that the relationship endured for a continuous period of two years to claim spousal support; but she must allege that she lived in a marriage-like relationship with him at some point in time. Accordingly, she must amend the notice of family claim.

B. The Test to Amend Pleadings
[31] Given that the notice of trial has been served, Ms. Han requires leave of the court to amend the notice of family claim: Supreme Court Family Rule 8-1(1)(b)(i).

[32] A person seeking to amend a notice of family claim must show that there is a reasonable cause of action. This is a low threshold. What the applicant needs to establish is that, if the facts pleaded are proven at trial, they would support a reasonable claim. The applicant’s allegations of fact are assumed to be true for the purposes of this analysis. Cantelon v. Wall, 2015 BCSC 813, at para. 7-8.

[33] The applicant’s delay, the reasons for the delay, and the prejudice to the responding party are also relevant factors. The ultimate consideration is whether it would be just and convenient to allow the amendment. Cantelon, at para. 6, citing Teal Cedar Products Ltd. v. Dale Intermediaries Ltd. et al (1986), 19 B.C.L.R. (3d) 282.

C. Pleadings in Family Law Cases
[34] Supreme Court Family Rules 3-1(1) and 4-1(1) require that a claim to spousal support be pleaded in a notice of family claim in Form F3. Section 2 of Form F3, “Spousal relationship history”, requires a spousal support claimant to check the boxes that apply to them, according to whether they are or have been married or are or have been in a marriage-like relationship. Where a claimant alleges a marriage-like relationship, Form F3 requires that they provide the date on which they began to live together with the respondent in a marriage-like relationship and, where applicable, the date on which they separated. Form F3 does not require a statement of the factual basis for the claim of spousal support.

[35] In this case, Ms. Han seeks to amend the notice of family claim to allege that she and Mr. Dorje began to live in a marriage-like relationship in or around January 2018, and separated in or around January 2019.

[36] An allegation that a person lived with a claimant in a marriage-like relationship is a conclusion of law, not an allegation of fact. Unlike the rules governing pleadings in civil actions, however, the Supreme Court Family Rules do not expressly require family law claimants to plead the material facts in support of conclusions of law.

[37] In other words, there is no express requirement in the Supreme Court Family Rules that Ms. Han plead the facts on which she relies for the allegation she and Mr. Dorje lived in a marriage-like relationship.

[38] Rule 4-6 authorizes a party to demand particulars, and then apply to the court for an order for further and better particulars, of a matter stated in a pleading. However, unless and until she is granted leave and files the proposed amended notice of family claim, Ms. Han’s allegation of a marriage-like relationship is not a matter stated in a pleading.

[39] Ms. Han filed an affidavit in support of her application to amend the notice of family claim. Normally, evidence would not be required or admissible on an application to amend a pleading. However, in the unusual circumstances of this case, the parties agreed I may look to Ms. Han’s affidavit and exhibits for the facts she pleads in support of the allegation of a marriage-like relationship.

[40] Because this is an application to amend - and Ms. Han’s allegations of fact are presumed to be true - I have not considered Mr. Dorje’s responding affidavit.

[41] Relying on affidavit evidence for an application to amend pleadings is less than ideal. It tends to merge and confuse the material facts with the evidence that would be relied on to prove those facts. In a number of places in her affidavit, for example, Ms. Han describes her feelings, impressions and understandings. A person’s hopes and intentions are not normally material facts unless they are mutual or reasonably held. The facts on which Ms. Han alleges she and Mr. Dorje formed a marriage-like relationship are more important for the present purposes than her belief they entered into a conjugal union.

[42] Somewhat unusually, in this case, almost all of the parties’ relevant communications were in writing. This makes it somewhat easier to separate the facts from the evidence; however, as stated above, it is difficult to understand the intentions and actions of a person from brief text messages.

[43] In my view, it would be a good practice for applicants who seek to amend their pleadings in family law cases to provide opposing counsel and the court with a schedule of the material facts on which they rely for the proposed amendment.

D. The Legal Concept of a Marriage-Like Relationship
[44] As Mr. Justice Myers observed in Mother 1 v. Solus Trust Company, 2019 BCSC 200, the concept of a marriage-like relationship is elastic and difficult to define. This elasticity is illustrated by the following passage from Yakiwchuk v. Oaks, 2003 SKQB 124, quoted by Myers J. at para. 133 of Mother 1:

[10] Spousal relationships are many and varied. Individuals in spousal relationships, whether they are married or not, structure their relationships differently. In some relationships there is a complete blending of finances and property - in others, spouses keep their property and finances totally separate and in still others one spouse may totally control those aspects of the relationship with the other spouse having little or no knowledge or input. For some couples, sexual relations are very important - for others, that aspect may take a back seat to companionship. Some spouses do not share the same bed. There may be a variety of reasons for this such as health or personal choice. Some people are affectionate and demonstrative. They show their feelings for their “spouse” by holding hands, touching and kissing in public. Other individuals are not demonstrative and do not engage in public displays of affection. Some “spouses” do everything together - others do nothing together. Some “spouses” vacation together and some spend their holidays apart. Some “spouses” have children - others do not. It is this variation in the way human beings structure their relationships that make the determination of when a “spousal relationship” exists difficult to determine. With married couples, the relationship is easy to establish. The marriage ceremony is a public declaration of their commitment and intent. Relationships outside marriage are much more difficult to ascertain. Rarely is there any type of “public” declaration of intent. Often people begin cohabiting with little forethought or planning. Their motivation is often nothing more than wanting to “be together”. Some individuals have chosen to enter relationships outside marriage because they did not want the legal obligations imposed by that status. Some individuals have simply given no thought as to how their relationship would operate. Often the date when the cohabitation actually began is blurred because people “ease into” situations, spending more and more time together. Agreements between people verifying when their relationship began and how it will operate often do not exist.

[45] In Mother 1, Mr. Justice Myers referred to a list of 22 factors grouped into seven categories, from Maldowich v. Penttinen, (1980), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 (Ont. Dist. Ct.), that have frequently been cited in this and other courts for the purpose of determining whether a relationship was marriage-like, at para. 134 of Mother 1:

1. Shelter:

(a) Did the parties live under the same roof?

(b) What were the sleeping arrangements?

(c) Did anyone else occupy or share the available accommodation?

2. Sexual and Personal Behaviour:

(a) Did the parties have sexual relations? If not, why not?

(b) Did they maintain an attitude of fidelity to each other?

(c) What were their feelings toward each other?

(d) Did they communicate on a personal level?

(e) Did they eat their meals together?

(f) What, if anything, did they do to assist each other with problems or during illness?

(g) Did they buy gifts for each other on special occasions?

3. Services:

What was the conduct and habit of the parties in relation to:

(a) preparation of meals;

(b) washing and mending clothes;

(c) shopping;

(d) household maintenance; and

(e) any other domestic services?

4. Social:

(a) Did they participate together or separately in neighbourhood and community activities?

(b) What was the relationship and conduct of each of them toward members of their respective families and how did such families behave towards the parties?

5. Societal:

What was the attitude and conduct of the community toward each of them and as a couple?

6. Support (economic):

(a) What were the financial arrangements between the parties regarding the provision of or contribution toward the necessaries of life (food, clothing, shelter, recreation, etc.)?

(b) What were the arrangements concerning the acquisition and ownership of property?

(c) Was there any special financial arrangement between them which both agreed would be determinant of their overall relationship?

7. Children:

What was the attitude and conduct of the parties concerning children?

[46] In Austin v. Goerz, 2007 BCCA 586, the Court of Appeal cautioned against a “checklist approach”; rather, a court should "holistically" examine all the relevant factors. Cases like Molodowich provide helpful indicators of the sorts of behaviour that society associates with a marital relationship, the Court of Appeal said; however, “the presence or absence of any particular factor cannot be determinative of whether a relationship is marriage-like” (para. 58).

[47] In Weber v. Leclerc, 2015 BCCA 492, the Court of Appeal again affirmed that there is no checklist of characteristics that will be found in all marriages and then concluded with respect to evidence of intentions:

[23] The parties’ intentions – particularly the expectation that the relationship will be of lengthy, indeterminate duration – may be of importance in determining whether a relationship is “marriage-like”. While the court will consider the evidence expressly describing the parties’ intentions during the relationship, it will also test that evidence by considering whether the objective evidence is consonant with those intentions.

[24] The question of whether a relationship is “marriage-like” will also typically depend on more than just their intentions. Objective evidence of the parties’ lifestyle and interactions will also provide direct guidance on the question of whether the relationship was “marriage-like”.

[48] Significantly for this case, the courts have looked to mutual intent in order to find a marriage-like relationship. See, for example, L.E. v. D.J., 2011 BCSC 671 and Buell v. Unger, 2011 BCSC 35; Davey Estate v. Gruyaert, 2005 CarswellBC 3456 at 13 and 35.

[49] In Mother 1, Myers J. concluded his analysis of the law with the following learned comment:

[143] Having canvassed the law relating to the nature of a marriage-like relationship, I will digress to point out the problematic nature of the concept. It may be apparent from the above that determining whether a marriage-like relationship exists sometimes seems like sand running through one's fingers. Simply put, a marriage-like relationship is akin to a marriage without the formality of a marriage. But as the cases mentioned above have noted, people treat their marriages differently and have different conceptions of what marriage entails.

[50] In short, the determination of whether the parties in this case lived in a marriage-like relationship is a fact-specific inquiry that a trial judge would need to make on a “holistic” basis, having regard to all of the evidence. While the trial judge may consider the various factors listed in the authorities, those factors would not be treated as a checklist and no single factor or category of factors would be treated as being decisive.

E. Is There a Reasonable Claim of a Marriage-Like Relationship?
[51] In this case, many of the Molodowich factors are missing:

a) The parties never lived under the same roof. They never slept together. They were never in the same place at the same time during the relationship. The last time they saw each other in person was in November 2017, before the relationship began.

b) The parties never had consensual sex. They did not hug, kiss or hold hands. With the exception of the alleged sexual assault, they never touched one another physically.

c) The parties expressed care and affection for one another, but they rarely shared personal information or interest in their lives outside of their direct topic of communication. They did not write about their families, their friends, their religious beliefs or their work.

d) They expressed concern and support for one another when the other felt unwell or experienced health issues, but they did not provide any care or assistance during illness or other problems.

e) They did not assist one another with domestic chores.

f) They did not share their relationship with their peers or their community. There is no allegation, for example, that Mr. Dorje told his fellow monks or any of his followers about the relationship. There is no allegation that Ms. Han told her friends or any co-workers. Indeed, there is no allegation that anyone, with the exception of Ms. Han’s mother, knew about the relationship. Although Mr. Dorje gave Ms. Han’s mother a gift, he never met the mother and he never spoke to her.

g) They did not intend to have a child together. The child was conceived as a result of a sexual assault. While Mr. Dorje expressed interest in “meeting” the child, he never followed up. He currently has no relationship with the child. There is no allegation he has sought access or parenting arrangements.

[52] The only Molodowich factor of any real relevance in this case is economic support. Mr. Dorje provided the funds with which Ms. Han purchased a condominium. Mr. Dorje initially wrote that he wanted to buy a property with the money, but, he wrote, “It’s the same thing if you buy [it]”.

[53] Mr. Dorje also provided a significant amount of money for Ms. Han’s postpartum care and the child’s first year of life.

[54] This financial support may have been primarily for the benefit of the child. Even the condominium, Ms. Han wrote, was primarily for the benefit of the child.

[55] However, in my view, a trial judge may attach a broader significance to the financial support from Mr. Dorje than child support alone. A trial judge may find that the money Mr. Dorje provided to Ms. Han at her request was an expression of his commitment to her in circumstances in which he could not commit physically. The money and the gifts may be seen by the trial judge to have been a form of down payment by Mr. Dorje on a promise of continued emotional and financial support for Ms. Han, or, in Mr. Dorje’s own words, “Taking care of her and you are my duty for life” (emphasis added).

[56] On the other hand, I find it difficult to attach any particular significance to the fact that Mr. Dorje agreed to provide funds for Ms. Han to purchase a wedding ring. It appears to me that Ms. Han demanded that Mr. Dorje buy her a wedding ring, not that the ring had any mutual meaning to the parties as a marriage symbol. But it is relevant, in my view, that Mr. Dorje provided $20,000 USD to Ms. Han for something she wanted that was of no benefit to the child.

[57] Further, Ms. Han alleges that the parties intended to live together. At a minimum, a trial judge may find that the discussions about where Ms. Han and the child would live reflected a mutual intention of the parties to see one another and spend time together when they could.

[58] Mr. Dorje argues that an intention to live together at some point in the future is not sufficient to show that an existing relationship was marriage-like. He argues that the question of whether the relationship was marriage-like requires more than just intentions, citing Weber, supra.

[59] In my view, the documentary evidence referred to above provides some objective evidence in this case that the parties progressed beyond mere intentions. As stated, the parties appear to have expressed genuine care and affection for one another. They appear to have discussed marriage, trust, honesty, finances, mutual obligations and acquiring family property. These are not matters one would expect Mr. Dorje to discuss with a friend or a follower, or even with the mother of his child, without a marriage-like element of the relationship.

[60] A trial judge may find on the facts alleged by Ms. Han that the parties loved one another and would have lived together, but were unable to do so because of Mr. Dorje’s religious duties and nomadic lifestyle.

[61] The question I raised in the introduction to these reasons is whether a relationship that began on-line and never moved into the physical world can be marriage-like.

[62] Notably, the definition of a spouse in the Family Law Act does not require that the parties live together, only that they live with another person in a marriage-like relationship.

[63] In Connor Estate, 2017 BCSC 978, Mr. Justice Kent found that a couple that maintained two entirely separate households and never lived under the same roof formed a marriage-like relationship. (Connor Estate was decided under the intestacy provisions of the Wills, Estates and Succession Act, S.B.C. 2009, c. 13 ("WESA"), but courts have relied on cases decided under WESA and the FLA interchangeably for their definitions of a spouse.) Mr. Justice Kent found:

[50] The evidence is overwhelming and I find as a fact that Mr. Chambers and Ms. Connor loved and cared deeply about each other, and that they had a loving and intimate relationship for over 20 years that was far more than mere friendship or even so-called "friendship with benefits". I accept Mr. Chambers' evidence that he would have liked to share a home with Ms. Connor after the separation from his wife, but was unable to do so because of Ms. Connor's hoarding illness. The evidence amply supports, and I find as a fact, that Mr. Chambers and Ms. Connor loved each other, were faithful to each other, communicated with each other almost every day when they were not together, considered themselves to be (and presented themselves to be) "husband and wife" and were accepted by all who knew them as a couple.

[64] Connor Estate may be distinguishable from this case because Mr. Chambers and Ms. Connor were physically intimate for over 20 years, and presented themselves to the world as a married couple.

[65] Other decisions in which a marriage-like relationship has been found to exist despite the parties not living together have involved circumstances in which the couple lived under the same roof at previous points in the relationship, and the issue was whether they continued to be spouses after they took up separate residences: in Thompson v. Floyd, 2001 BCCA 78, the parties had lived together for a period of at least 11 years; in Roach v. Dutra, 2010 BCCA 264, the parties had lived together for approximately three years.

[66] However, as Mr. Justice Kent noted in Connor Estate:

[48] … [W]hile much guidance might be found in this case law, the simple fact is that no two cases are identical (and indeed they usually vary widely) and it is the assessment of evidence as a whole in this particular case which matters.

[67] Mr. Justice Kent concluded:

[53] Like human beings themselves, marriage-like relationships can come in many and various shapes. In this particular case, I have no doubt that such a relationship existed …

[68] As stated, Ms. Han’s claim is novel. It may even be weak. Almost all of the traditional factors are missing. The fact that Ms. Han and Mr. Dorje never lived under the same roof, never shared a bed and never even spent time together in person will militate against a finding they lived with one another in a marriage-like relationship. However, the traditional factors are not a mandatory check-list that confines the “elastic” concept of a marriage-like relationship. And if the COVID pandemic has taught us nothing else, it is that real relationships can form, blossom and end in virtual worlds.

[69] In my view, the merits of Ms. Han’s claim should be decided on the evidence. Subject to an overriding prejudice to Mr. Dorje, she should have leave to amend the notice of family claim. However, she should also provide meaningful particulars of the alleged marriage-like relationship.

F. Delay / Prejudice
[70] Ms. Han filed her notice of family claim on July 17, 2019. She brought this application to amend approximately one year and nine months after she filed the pleading, just over two months before the original trial date.

[71] Ms. Han’s delay was made all that more remarkable by her change in position from January 19, 2021, when she confirmed, through counsel, that she was not seeking spousal support in this case.

[72] Ms. Han gave notice of her intention to proceed with this application to Mr. Dorje on March 16, 2021. By the time the application was heard, the parties had conducted examinations for discovery without covering the issues that would arise from a claim of spousal support.

[73] Also, in April, Ms. Han produced additional documents, primarily text messages, that may be relevant to her claim of spousal support, but were undecipherable to counsel for Mr. Dorje, who does not read Mandarin.

[74] This application proceeded largely on documents selected and translated by counsel for Ms. Han. I was informed that Mandarin translations of the full materials would take 150 days.

[75] Understandably in the circumstances, Mr. Dorje argued that an amendment two months before trial would be neither just nor convenient. He argued that he would be prejudiced by an adjournment so as to allow Ms. Han to advance a late claim of spousal support.

[76] The circumstances changed on May 6, 2021, when Madam Justice Walkem adjourned the trial to July 2022 and reset it for 25 days. Madam Justice Walkem noted that most of the witnesses live internationally and require translators. She also noted that paternity may be in issue, and Mr. Dorje may amend his pleadings to raise that issue. It seems clear that, altogether apart from the potential spousal support claim, the parties were not ready to proceed to trial on June 7, 2021.

[77] In my view, any remaining prejudice to Mr. Dorje is outweighed by the importance of having all of the issues between the parties decided on their merits.

[78] Ms. Han’s delay and changes of position on spousal support may be a matter to de addressed in a future order of costs; but they are not grounds on which to deny her leave to amend the notice of family claim.

CONCLUSION
[79] Ms. Han is granted leave to amend her notice of family claim in the form attached as Appendix A to the notice of application to include a claim for spousal support.

[80] Within 21 days, or such other deadline as the parties may agree, Ms. Han must provide particulars of the marriage-like relationship alleged in the amended notice of family claim.

[81] Ms. Han is entitled to costs of this application in the cause of the spousal support claim.

“Master Elwood”

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ownership精神在偽學術 Facebook 的最佳貼文

ownership精神在 Facebook 的最佳解答

ownership精神在江魔的魔界（Kong Keen Yung 江健勇） Facebook 的最佳解答

ownership精神在 CH Music Channel Youtube 的最讚貼文

ownership精神在 CH Music Channel Youtube 的精選貼文