【程翔:新香港人將任特首 CHING Cheong: A "new Hongkonger" will be the next Chief Executive】Scroll down for English
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請點擊上述連結收聽Podcast節目 "What's up in Hong Kong" 第4集,Matthew Chapple (Lamma Matthew 南丫華哥) 和我與資深記者程翔談紫荊黨,重點包括:
1)紫荊黨的成立配合了北京以「新香港精英」取代原有建制派和AO的治港新策略
2)建制派對紫荊黨能力的質疑是出於無知,因為難以相信會被中共用完即棄
3)新香港人站穩陣腳後,中共對香港的控制會稍為放鬆,以保一國兩制的門面
4)林鄭雖被保皇KOL圍攻,但不至於不能做滿任期,因為這牽涉當年親自提拔林鄭的習近平的地位
5)林鄭不能連任,即代表「新香港人」特首在2022年就要登場:前港交所行政總裁李小加確是可能人選
綜合程翔和各方意見,我自己有以下推斷:
1)中共嘗試在香港最大程度複製中國的管治架構,首先是將議會改造為不會阻撓行政當局的「香港市人大」
2)通過政治審查和建立龐大國安系統,持續壓制反對派,原有建制派人物可留任「香港市人大」做橡皮圖章
3)短期內真正要做大手術的是行政系統,2022年的特首、問責官員和主要法定機構主席改由「新香港人」出任,推行「高質而有效的精英管治」(相對於土共培養的「廢人」和仲要跟程序的AO)
4)基層組織是否繼續由土共自由競爭,還是由紫荊黨統一收編重組,等下一階段才聽候發落
不管未來如何發展,有一點相當清晰:中共及其保皇勢力已不放香港人在眼內,正集中力量作內部鬥爭,希望在變動時勢搶佔位置。
Is the “Bauhinia Party” a CCP vehicle to establish the “One Party” system in Hong Kong? In early December a group of Hong Kong based, Pro CCP Mainland businessmen announced their intention to launch the “Bauhinia Party”. With a membership goal of 250,000, commentators speculate that the purpose of this new party may be to establish the “One Party” system in Hong Kong by absorbing the current Pro Beijing political groups and surfacing the underground CCP network here. In Episode #4 Eddie Chu and Matthew Chapple discuss this with veteran journalist CHING Cheong(程翔).
The highlights Mr CHING's thoughts include:
1) The establishment of the new Bauhinia Party is part of Beijing's new Hong Kong strategy to replace the original Pro Establishment camp and senior government officials with “new Hong Kong elites” which means Party loyal, first generation, Mainland born Hong Kongers.
2) The establishment’s questioning of the Bauhinia Party’s ability is out of ignorance, because it is difficult for them to accept they will be discarded.
3) After the "new Hongkongers" gain a foothold, the CCP's control over Hong Kong will be slightly relaxed to preserve the appearance of "one country, two systems".
4) Although Carrie LAM is currently being attacked by the Pro Beijing side it is likely she will still serve out her full term because she was personally selected and supported for the position by XI Jing-ping.
5) Carrie LAM will likely not be re-elected, which means that the next Chief Executive will probably come from the ranks of "new Hong Kongers" (e.g. a Mainland born or first generation patriot) in 2022: Charles LI, the former Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, is indeed a possible candidate.
Based on the opinions of CHING Cheong and others, my thinking is as follows:
1) The CCP is trying to replicate China's governance structure in Hong Kong to the greatest extent possible. The first is to transform our Legco into a "Hong Kong Municipal People's Congress" that will not obstruct the Administration.
2) Through political screening and the establishment of the National Security System, the opposition will continue to be suppressed, and the original establishment figures can remain in the "Hong Kong People's Congress" as a rubber stamp or "loyal opposition".
3) In the short term, the major reform will be on the administrative system. In 2022, the Chief Executive, key officials, and Chairpersons of major statutory bodies will be replaced by the "new Hong Kongers" to implement "high-quality and effective elite governance" (as opposed to the current "useless " local elites).
4) Will HK's grassroots Pro CCP organizations continue to compete freely in Hong Kong or will the Bauhinia Party consolidate and reorganize it as a united group? We will need to wait and see!
Listen to "What's up in Hong Kong?" Episode #4 with the following links:
🍏 Apple Podcast: https://apple.co/3rMIyRB
🍎 Google Podcast: https://bit.ly/3huFKE8
🍊 Spotity: https://spoti.fi/385myJY
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re establishment 在 外交部 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC(Taiwan) Facebook 的最佳解答
【Allons en Provence #臺灣 前進 #蔚藍海岸 🌊】
今年的 #七夕 有點浪漫 💜💜💜
我們要在地表擁有最寬最廣的紫色花海ㄟ所在
設立辦事處了‼️
這幾年臺法兩國在 #經貿 #科技 #文教 各領域交流熱絡
#魔法部 決定進一步搭起臺法鵲橋 🌈
在位於法國南部的 #艾克斯普羅旺斯市
設立 #駐普羅旺斯臺北辦事處 👊🏻
很浪漫也很務實~
2016-2019 期間
法國人民訪臺人數成長了30%
我國人前往法國的人數更激增62趴 📈
其中 #南法地區 更是許多臺灣人必遊的目的地
新成立辦事處的首要任務之一
就是作為我駐法國代表處在南部區域的辦公室
提供在當地僑胞和國人更即時貼心的服務~ 😘
#臺法友好 #踏實外交
#今晚來點普羅旺斯香草炸雞
🌿🍗 資訊補給站
法國為歐盟核心成員國,為我國人旅歐首要目的地及重要經貿夥伴,雙方在經貿、航太、生醫及科技產業的合作前景廣闊。艾克斯普羅旺斯市與法國第一大港馬賽市共構「艾克斯-馬賽-普羅旺斯大都會區 (Métropole d’Aix-Marseille-Provence), AMP」,位居法國南部城市群中線,為法國高鐵 TGV 停靠站,與法國第二大城里昂 (Lyon)、全球生態研究重鎮蒙佩里耶 (Montpellier)、法國尖端科研據點索菲亞科技園區 (Sophia Antipolis)、具法國矽谷美名的格勒諾柏 (Grenoble) 及航太重鎮土魯斯 (Toulouse) 均具地利之便。
🇫🇷
Comme les coopérations entre Taiwan et la France s’élargissent dans les domaines de l’économie, de l’aérospatial, de la biomédecine et des technologies, nous sommes très heureux d’annoncer que nous allons ouvrir un deuxième bureau en France !
Le nouveau bureau sera situé à Aix-en-Provence. Il n’est pas seulement prévu pour répondre aux nécessités de la collaboration entre les deux pays, mais aussi pour accueillir les touristes taiwanais en France, dont le nombre a progressé de 62% entre 2016 et 2019, et surtout les Français qui envisagent des vacances à Taiwan.
C’est le troisième bureau à être mis en place outre-mer cette année, après notre bureau de représentation au Somaliland et la reconstitution de celui de Guam, aux États-Unis.
🇬🇧
As we continue to expand cooperation with #France in the #economic, #spaceflight, #biomedical and #tech sectors, in addition to the long-standing cooperation in the #arts, #culture and #education fields, we’re pleased to announce that we’re establishing an overseas office in #Provence in the south of #France.
The new office will be in #AixEnProvence, which forms the Aix-Marseille-Provence Metropolis along with France’s biggest port Marseille and is connected to the rest of France by its TGV high-speed rail network. The new office is expected to help expand economic and tech cooperation. Taiwanese visitors to France grew by 62% from 2016 to 2019 and French visitors to Taiwan grew by almost 30% over the same period.
This will be the third overseas office to be established this year, following the opening of our representative office in #Somaliland and the re-establishment of our office in #Guam.
#CityOfAThousandFountains
re establishment 在 堅離地城:沈旭暉國際生活台 Simon's Glos World Facebook 的最佳貼文
【#TheDiplomat: 沈旭暉隨緣家書英文版🇭🇰】很久沒有向國際關係評論網 The Diplomat 供稿,但國際線十分重要,不應放棄。這次他們希望分享23條、國安法、反恐法風雨欲來的「新香港」前瞻,願國際社會能多了解快將出現的危機:
While the world is preoccupied with a fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing has been tightening its political grip on all aspects of Hong Kong’s civil society. Rumor has it that Beijing will push through legislating national security laws under Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law by unconventional means, such as massively disqualifying pro-democratic legislators or even directly applying a national law, widely argued as a major step to destroy the rights and freedom of Hong Kongers, and bring Chinese authoritarianism to Hong Kong.
After the 2019 protests, the administration of Carrie Lam, who theoretically is still leading the special administrative region of China, has little political capital at stake, with its legitimacy reaching rock bottom. The pro-government camp has dwindling prospects for the city’s upcoming Legislative Council election. The government‘s ”nothing to lose“ mentality is apparent from its recent blatant reinterpretation of the Basic Law’s Article 22 (another article that limits the influence of China’s offices in Hong Kong’s internal affairs). The debate is nothing new, but the pressure this time is quite different.
This article highlights the different strategies Beijing could adopt to enact Article 23 insidiously or under disguise to avoid backlash from the international community, while continuing to reap benefits from the city’s globally recognized special status. This seems to be part of Beijing’s brinkmanship to bring Hong Kong protesters and their supporters to their knees and move the city closer to authoritarianism. To counter these moves, Hong Kongers must define the boundaries beyond which Hong Kong falls into authoritarian rule and make a case as to why the city’s downfall is detrimental to the international community‘s interest.
The Long-Term Controversy Over National Security Laws
Back in 2003, the implementation of Article 23 was thwarted by the moderate pro-establishment politician James Tien. In face of overwhelming public disapproval of the law, he withdrew support and votes from his Liberal Party. However, 17 years later, it is hard to imagine Beijing following the old legislative playbook: start with a public consultation, followed by public discourse and political debate, and end with the majority rule. This playbook only works in peaceful societies ruled by a trustworthy government with integrity.
The aftermath of 2003, as well as the 2019 protests, should have taught Beijing and the Hong Kong government a lesson: pushing through national security legislation in a flawed parliament controlled by the minority pro-government camp would inevitably set off another full city-scale protest — and undoubtedly more fierce and focused this time. Given the current government’s numerous displays of dishonesty, it is conceivable that they will embark on a less-traveled path to implement Article 23.
Strategy One: “Anti-Terrorism”
In principle, one possible strategy could be to directly enact Chinese national law across Hong Kong, which can be achieved by declaring a state of emergency in the city. However, this is risky business as it would tarnish the integrity of “one country two systems” and subsequently Hong Kong’s international standing. Beijing, a risk-averse regime, is also unwilling to see Hong Kong’s status as a middleman for laundering money disappear into thin air.
Instead, Beijing could be concocting a narrative that would see Chinese national law applied to Hong Kong while not damaging Hong Kong’s international standing and Beijing’s own interests. The key word in this script is “anti-terrorism.” As early as 2014, pro-Beijing scholars have been claiming the emergence of “local terrorist ideology” on Hong Kong soil. Since the anti-extradition bill protests last year, government rhetoric frequently described the protests, which caused no deaths at all in the entire year, with phrases like “inclination to terrorist ideology.” That was a signal to the world that Hong Kong’s internal conflicts had ballooned into a national security issue. This gives the government the legitimacy to justify the implementation of Chinese national laws across the highly autonomous region to counter terrorism. The Chinese government knows that if it can persuade the world that terrorism exists in Hong Kong, and that it is as severe as the terror threat facing many other nations today, the international community will be less critical of Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong. Enacting Chinese laws directly is a convenient path that will save Beijing from having to tackle Hong Kong’s internal conflicts, basically turning the Hong Kong issue into a nonissue.
Strategy Two: Stacking the Legislature by Disqualifying Candidates
An even bolder strategy was probably foretold by a recent incident where the Hong Kong government and Beijing’s agencies for Hong Kong affairs (HKMAO and the Liaison Office) jointly criticized lawmaker Dennis Kwok for filibustering, framing it as “misconduct in public office” and “violating his oath.” It is incomprehensible to claim that filibustering goes against a lawmaker’s main duty; rather, it is common understanding that legislative work includes debating the law and representing public opinion against unreasonable laws. In a parliament controlled by the minority, pro-democratic members representing the majority of Hong Kongers are forced to express their objections using means like filibustering. Wouldn’t a lack of different political opinions turn the legislative branch into a rubber-stamp institution?
The above allegation has set a dangerous precedent for twisting the logic behind a certain provision in the Basic Law to target opposing lawmakers. In other words, to fulfill Beijing’s interpretation of the principal requirement for holding public office in Hong Kong, one could be required to take a meticulously legalistic approach to uphold the Basic Law down to its every single wording. A public official, by this new definition, not only needs to support “one country, two systems” or object Hong Kong independence, but also must abide by every single provision in the Basic Law. Worst of all, based on the previous cases, whether an official’s words or actions oversteps a provision is up to Beijing’s interpretation of his/her “intent.”
If this approach is applied, in the next election, there might be additional official questions for screening candidates like the following: “The Basic Law states that the enactment of Article 23 is a constitutional duty. Failing to support Article 23 legislation violates the Basic Law. Do you support it?” This question would suffice to disqualify even moderate or even pro-establishment candidates like James Tien. Even if any pro-democratic candidates were elected, once Article 23 re-enters the legislative process, they could risk ouster by raising objections.
Despite the absurdity of this tactic, the Chinese regime may just be tempted enough if such a strategy could resolve two of China’s current nuisances — voices of dissent in the Legislative Council and the previous failure to implement Article 23.
Strategy Three: The “Boiling Frog Effect”
Article 23 is not yet implemented, but the dystopian world that the protesters pictured in 2003 is already becoming reality. Regular citizens have been persecuted for “sedition” for sharing their views on social media or participating in legal protests; workers face retaliation for taking part in strikes; corporations are pressured to publicly side with the government’s stance; employees who have the “wrong” political views are fired; schools have been closely monitored for teaching material; protest-supporting fundraisers were framed for money laundering; a retweet or like may lead to persecution, under a colonial-era law. Only now have Hong Kongers woken up to their new reality — although the Basic Law technically protects citizens’ rights to speak, rally, march, demonstrate, and go on strike, the government could enfeeble civil rights by bending antiquated laws and legal provisions. The frequent abuse of law enforcement power on a small scale, such as improper arrests and police violence, is desensitizing the public and the international community. In a few years, Hong Kong will become unrecognizable. This is indeed a clever play on Beijing’s part to slowly strip away Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedom, without causing much international attention.
Counter-Strategies Against Beijing’s Brinkmanship
Beijing’s overarching goal is to hollow out Hong Kong but, at the same time, avoid major backlash from the international community, which could spell the end of the privileged global status of Hong Kong not granted to other Chinese cities. Beijing also aims at preventing single incidents that could cascade down into mass protests as seen in 2003, 2014, and 2019; and eliminating any resistance forces from within Hong Kong’s legislature. The tactics outlined above are typical in a game of brinkmanship.
In response, Hong Kongers in Hong Kong and on the so-called “international frontline” must know their strengths and bargaining chips on this negotiating table with Beijing.
Unlike Xinjiang and Tibet, Hong Kong is a city with transparency and free flow of information. Hong Kongers need to make a case to the world that the protests are not acts of terrorism. Some suggestions include comparing the Hong Kong protests to similar struggles in 20 or so other counties in the world at the present time, none of which were classified as terrorism; collecting a large amount of concrete evidence of the disproportionate use of force by the Hong Kong police; and showing how enacting Chinese national laws in Hong Kong will end the city’s autonomy and spell disaster for international community‘s interests.
The Legislative Council is the institution that can counteract Beijing’s “boiling frog” strategy and to keep Hong Kongers’ hope alive in the system. Those who plan to run for legislative office must be prepared to be disqualified from running. If only individuals are banned, there need to be alternative candidates as back-up plans. However, if and when the disqualification process is applied broadly to entire camps of candidates (for example, all who object to Article 23), the pro-democracy camp must make a strong case to the Hong Kong and global public that this is the endgame for Hong Kong democracy. Then the incumbent popularly elected legislators will hold the internationally recognized mandate from the public and serve as the last resistance.
These recommendations delineates how the slogan “if we burn, you burn with us,” often seen in the protests, may play out in the game of international relations. If the national security laws are “passed” by a legislature that is jury-rigged in this manner, or if related national laws are directly implemented in Hong Kong, Hong Kongers should signal clearly to the world that it goes way beyond the promised “one country, two systems.” Crossing this red line by Beijing should be seen by the world as a blunt violation of its promised autonomy to Hong Kongers. At that time, if the international community led by the United States and the United Kingdom decided to revoke the “non-sovereignty entity” status of Hong Kong and regard the SAR as an ordinary Chinese city, it shouldn’t come as a surprise.
Dr. Simon Shen is the Founding Chairman of GLOs (Glocal Learning Offices), an international relations start-up company. He also serves as an adjunct associate professor in the University of Hong Kong, Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and associate director of the Master of Global Political Economy Programme of the CUHK. The author acknowledges Jean Lin, Coco Ho, Chris Wong, Michelle King, and Alex Yap for their assistance in this piece.
▶️ 高度自治 vs 全面管治
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pwt8wZl8jHQ
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