大家有加「疾病管制署(疾管家)」或「衛生福利部」line嗎?
每天都有更新最新消息,
而且,
是正確消息👍🏼
.
現在又推出了英文版,
大家來學一下!
————————————————————-
💪🏻 俐媽新聞英文—防疫公告篇:
📱 CDC = Centers for Disease Control 疾病管制署
📱 MOHW = Ministry of Health and Welfare 衛生福利部
📱 CECC = Central Epidemic Command Center 中央流行疫情指揮中心
📱 bulletin board (n.) 公佈欄
📱 announce (v.) 宣布
📱confirm (v.) 確認
📱positive (a.) 陽性的<——> negative (a.) 陰性的
📱 release (v.) 解除
📱isolation (n.) 隔離
📱cumulative (a.) 累積的
📱imported (a.) 境外移入的
📱acquire (v.) 獲得
📱Navy (n.) 海軍
📱crew (n.) 全體船員
📱aboard (adv.)(prep.) 在船上
📱combat (v.) 對抗
—————————————————————
為了讓海內外的朋友能夠更了解台灣的防疫措施,外交部(Ministry of Foreign Affairs)製作了中英文雙語(bilingual)版的網頁專區,大家可以分享給有興趣的朋友!
中文連結: https://bit.ly/2WuX4P7
English version: https://bit.ly/35ysKHE
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#俐媽新聞英文 #俐媽新聞英文新冠肺炎篇 #俐媽英文教室口罩篇 #俐媽英文教室藥物篇 #俐媽英文教室健康篇
同時也有10000部Youtube影片,追蹤數超過2,910的網紅コバにゃんチャンネル,也在其Youtube影片中提到,...
「positive control中文」的推薦目錄:
- 關於positive control中文 在 辣媽英文天后 林俐 Carol Facebook 的最佳貼文
- 關於positive control中文 在 黃之鋒 Joshua Wong Facebook 的最佳貼文
- 關於positive control中文 在 DJ金寶 Facebook 的最讚貼文
- 關於positive control中文 在 コバにゃんチャンネル Youtube 的最佳貼文
- 關於positive control中文 在 大象中醫 Youtube 的最讚貼文
- 關於positive control中文 在 大象中醫 Youtube 的最佳解答
- 關於positive control中文 在 Re: [求救] 實驗的一些設計- 看板Biotech 的評價
positive control中文 在 黃之鋒 Joshua Wong Facebook 的最佳貼文
【After Winning Majority in LegCo: Beijing's Crackdown May Trigger International Intervention】
***感謝Hong Kong Columns - Translated,將我早前撰寫『議會過半想像:以「#國際攬炒」反制「臨立會2.0」』長文(https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.313299448762570/2887650867994069/)翻譯成英文,鼓勵國際社會關注立會選舉一旦過半的沙盤推演,在最惡劣形勢下的制衡策略。***
中文精簡版本:https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.564294826996363/2888641404561682/
Hongkongers have experienced our revolution for over half a year. They no longer take a consequentialist view to the effectiveness of their movement as they did years ago, or waste time second-guessing the intentions and background of fellow activists. Following the defensive battles at CUHK and PolyU, November’s District Council election saw a great victory of unity. More marvellous is the union between peaceful and “valiant” protesters.
In the process of resisting tyranny, the people have realised that one cannot prioritize one strategy over another. This is also how the common goal of “35+” came into being—the hope that we will win over half of the seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo) this September, such that the political spectrum that represents the majority of Hongkongers is able to gain control of legislative decisions. The political clout of Hongkongers will increase if 35 or more seats are successfully secured on our side. It is certainly one vital step to achieve the five demands within the system.
The possibility of realizing legislative majority
Technically it is not unrealistic to win a majority even under the current undemocratic system. Back in the 2016 LegCo election, we already won 30 seats. In addition to the District Council (First) functional constituency seat that is already in the pocket of the pan-democrats, as long as the candidates in Kowloon East and New Territories West do not start infighting again, we could safely secure 33 seats based on the number of pan-dem votes in 2016.
The other 3 seats required to achieve a majority depend on democrats’ breakthrough among the functional constituencies by dispersing the resources of the Liaison Office. They also count on whether the turnout this September could exceed 71.2% — that of last year’s District Council elections. Some of the factors that could affect the turnout include: will the epidemic persist into the summer? Will there be potential violent repression of protests in the 2 weeks preceding the election? Will Hong Kong-US relations be affected by the downturn of the global economy?
Therefore, the ambition of “35+” is to be prioritised by the resistance as both a means and an end. I have already expressed my support for an intra-party primary at the coordination meeting. In the meantime, it is pleasing to see the ongoing debates reaching a consensus of maximising the seats among geographical constituencies in the upcoming election.
Whilst enthusiastic coordination, we should also assess the post-election landscape and gauge Beijing’s reactions: if we do not reach 35 seats, Hong Kong will be subject to tighter control and more severe repression by China; but if the democratic parties successfully form a majority in LegCo, CCP’s fears of a “constitutional crisis” would become imminent. Hence, the key questions are how the Pan-Democrats should deal with the volatile political situation in Hong Kong and how they are going to meet Beijing’s charge head-on.
Watching out for Beijing’s dismissal of LegCo after reaching majority
To take back control of LegCo such that it faithfully reflects the majority’s principles and needs is the definition of a healthy democracy. Recently, however, DAB’s Tam Yiu-chung has warned that the plan of the Pan-Dems to “usurp power” in the LegCo would only lead to Beijing’s forceful disqualification of certain members or the interpretation of the Basic Law. This proves that winning a majority in LegCo is not only a popular conception but also a realistic challenge that would get on the nerves of Beijing. Could Beijing accept a President James To in LegCo? These unknown variables must be addressed upon achieving a majority.
While there is no telltale sign as to Beijing’s exact strategy, we are already familiar with the way CCP manipulated the Basic Law in the past 4 years. Having experienced three waves of disqualifications in LegCo, twice kicked out of LegCo with my team, and thrice locked up in jail, I have no false hopes of an easy compromise from Beijing: they would not let Pan-Dems control LegCo for half a year and wait (as is the proper procedure) until after having negatived the Budget to dissolve the legislature, and thereby giving them an easy victory in the re-elections. The greater the Pan-Dems threaten Beijing’s rule in Hong Kong, the more likely that it will trigger Beijing’s repression.
Since the disqualification and arrest of lawmakers have already become “normalised”, one can even imagine the police stepping into the LegCo building to force Pan-Dems into voting. Neither is it beyond our imagination to expect the CCP to kick out all 70 lawmakers in a fit of rage and replace them with a provisional LegCo “2.0” [HKCT note: The first was from 25 Jan 1997 to 30 Jun 1998]. To depend on a majority that could lead to a chapter of a “new testament” for One Country, Two Systems is perhaps what many elites long for, but they are overly optimistic:for a ticket to the promised land will not be available at the Chief Executive election campaign a year and a half later.
Admittedly, the Pan-Dems cannot unilaterally initiate “Laam-chaau” [HKCT note: mostly translated into “scorched-earth” mentality or “mutual destruction”; some even translated into “If I burn, you burn with us”]. The most they can do is to force a standstill of the government, and not for long the LegCo will have been eliminated from the equation to make the wheels turn again. It all leaves the plan of “Negativing the motion → Dissolving LegCo → Re-election after re-election → the stepping down of Carrie Lam” merely as overly positive speculation, probably resulting from their overestimate of CCP's capacity for rational calculation. The Pan-Dems must guard their frontlines and recognise what the biggest threat from Hong Kong to China could be. In this case, should LegCo sessions be disrupted or suspended, the Pan-Dems would have to be well prepared to surmount the expected obstacles and prevent the disqualification crisis 4 years ago—a Catch-22 indeed.
Productive tension from global intervention: Using Laam-chaau against the CCP
What aggravates the CCP the most is the potential threat to Hong Kong’s unique status as the one and only “separate customs territory”. Any miscalculation will compromise its role as the Chinese economy’s “white gloves”. Imagine if CCP were to disqualify all 70 elected lawmakers and convene a meeting north of the Shenzhen River to pass a resolution to Hong Kong’s affairs (much like the Provisional Legislative Council “1.0" in 1997), how great will the shock be in a world with an effective Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act? However hard it is to predict the future one thing is certain: With the US presidential election just around the corner, blows to the separation of powers would not be tolerated, and the West would necessarily effect countermeasures against the Hong Kong government.
Beijing has been relying upon Hong Kong to navigate the international community for decades. While clamping down on the political freedom of the cosmopolitan city, Beijing desires to maintain the financial centre’s economic freedom. Hence, we started lobbying for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act four years ago, and today we are determined to promote “Laam-chaau” on an international scale.
The will of the voters must be reflected in an election. If a “35+” legislature were to be dismissed and replaced, such flagrant violation of democracy would assuredly cause a greater backlash than the infamous extradition bill. Knowing what the reality ahead of us could be, we have to combine our election and international strategies to oppose the placement of a 35+ LegCo with an “Emergency Legislative Council 2.0”, to advance an international “Laam-chaau” to Hong Kong’s status as “separate customs territory”. Only then will we stand a chance to resist the regime and to realise the five demands.
Adjusting our mindset: Overcoming the “constitutional crisis” to reach a resolution
Upon the realization of the “35+” LegCo, it is expected that the CCP will launch a devastating counterattack. The Pan-Dems should not expect LegCo to run normally; neither can the lawmakers realise their governing blueprints they have for Hong Kong. Rather, candidates will be able to compete against one another with visions of a liberated Hong Kong through popular vote. Bringing this point up has nothing to do with undermining the common goal of reaching a majority in LegCo, but rather channels the battle of LegCo to positive use upon the rule of law’s death and a “constitutional crisis” ahead. Knowing that Hongkongers have nothing to fall back on, all Pan-Dems should not miss the only way to the realization of “35+”.
Thus, be they partisans, nonpartisans, incumbent politicians, amateur politicians, or the civil society as a whole – if we stay in the political discourse of 2016 and continue to perpetuate old stereotypes, that is to deal with the divisions on the pan-democratic camp by favouring the most “local” faction; to consider only resource allocation and self-aggrandizement as the purpose of a LegCo campaign; to ignore how potential lawmakers are fitted to what specific roles; to turn a blind eye to the journey of resistance since last summer (extending indefinitely into the future)—They would lead as astray and cost us lose a precious opportunity for change by winning a 35+ majority.
The extent to which the pan-democrats can stay united in light of the political atmosphere since last summer is another problem that our side must to address. Before the watershed moment of 12th June 2019, many democratic delegates were trapped in the mentality of needing to “preserve people’s livelihood”, “be content of what we have accomplished”, and other strategies that favours stability. As the government refuses to heed to the five demands, whether the democrats, especially those in the functional constituencies, have the political will to go all-in is the real difficult question that confronts us in the upcoming LegCo election.
All in all, if “35+” cannot be realised, it is unsurprising to see LegCo being more heavily suppressed in the next 4 years; even if "35+" is achieved, it is questionable whether the pan-democrats are able to weather multiple attacks, verbal or physical, from the regime (judging from its power in the last four years) and utilise the international Laam-chaau strategy against the displacement of LegCo. Adhering to the motto of “we fight on, each in his own way”, I can only hope that Hongkongers in elections, street confrontations and international front can reconcile with each other, so that we may collectively compel the government to yield to our demands in the next six months. It is only by reaching a resolution before a real constitutional crisis that we can combat the institutional violence of the regime and not be devoured by it.
https://hkcolumn.blogspot.com/2020/04/joshua-wong-after-winning-majority-in.html?fbclid=IwAR216gf53pG_j9JOpDfr2GItvjLfrFSekKTPzoEs3-s9KBqvPEwz865P8vw
positive control中文 在 DJ金寶 Facebook 的最讚貼文
雖然是早就知道的事情
但看了還是很感慨
因為
很多裝睡的人
依舊
叫不醒
今天國際間、很震撼的消息:
🔥當媒體、政客痛批蔡英文政府,他們說的,#是真的還是假的?
🔥當「蔡英文或政府」,被挑釁式的霸凌(不包括理性的批評),你心中是否 #油然升起一股仇恨、#嗜血的快感?
🔥你有想過嗎:
這股莫名仇恨,是誰帶給你的?
而他們,要帶你去哪裡?
【節錄中文訪問】
⚫2018年的九合一選舉,是我直接參與操作的,我們在三地建立了20多萬個網路帳號攻擊民進黨,還成立很多粉絲團作網路霸凌。
⚫我們還建立海陸空三軍全面攻擊臺灣選舉:
✔空軍:資助臺灣網路公司與媒體,僅媒體公司我們就花了15億人民幣。
✔陸軍:通過金錢,組織大陸、香港學生、觀光團等對臺灣的學校廟宇等進行統戰,讓他們給中共傾向當選的站臺。
✔海軍:就是直接給候選人捐款
最典型的就是 #通過海外捐款給臺灣候選人韓國瑜,從香港以海外名義捐款就有2000多萬人民幣。
⚫我們在臺灣九合一選舉的操作上非常成功,結果國民黨大勝,國民黨哪來這麼多錢?其實應該是我們(中共統戰)獲得大勝。
⚫面對2020年大選,中共願意不惜一切代價,也不能讓蔡英文連任
至少也要在輿論上把臺灣弄得一團糟。
⚫他們要我在5月28日去臺灣、配合掌握臺灣媒體與網路情況。
我看到了香港的情形,實在不希望我親手把臺灣變成香港,所以,我放棄了。
⚫為了改變臺灣人的民意走向,我們對臺灣各媒體投下重金,比如中天、中視、東森、TVB等。我們利用臺灣媒體來替我們的目標作宣傳。
⚫我們專門為大選設立了很多情報站,包括臺北101大樓裡的XX酒樓,我們已經在臺灣有50幾個網路公司與直播頻道。
我們全方位滲透各個傳媒領域,進行得非常成功,大批主要負責人已經接受錢款答應給我們工作,僅與我直接連線的人就高達30人,比如XX時報的總負責人,XX大學校長,XX文化中心總經理,還有許多政客與黑社會領袖。我們支付給每個人每年200萬-500萬人民幣。這些人的工作就是替我們間諜活動的開展與滲透進行各方面的幫助。
【節錄幾段翻譯】翻的匆忙,大家可幫忙共筆、修正
⚫The name, date and place of birth on the passport belonged to someone else but the photo was his. His orders were to shift his attention from a covert operation to undermine Hong Kong’s democracy movement and focus instead on meddling in Taiwan’s 2020 elections. The ultimate aim was to topple President Tsai Ing-wen.
護照上的名字、日期、出生地都是別人的,只有照片是他的。他的任務是將他的重心,從「暗中破壞香港民主運動」,移到「干涉台灣2020大選」。最終目的是拉下蔡英文總統
⚫The so-called “nine-in-one” elections in Taiwan in 2018 (during which officials from county magistrates to local mayors were elected) presented Beijing with an opportunity to challenge the rule of President Tsai Ing-wen. Wang helped direct a major operation which was ultimately aimed at throwing Tsai out of office in favour of a pro-Beijing candidate.
2018 台灣的九合一大選,給北京當局機會去挑戰蔡英文的治理。王的任務是主導行動,最終將蔡英文拉下,換上一個親北京的候選人
⚫“Our work on Taiwan was the most important work of ours – the infiltration into media, temples and grassroots organisations,” says Wang.
「我們在台灣的工作,是所有任務中最重要的:
滲透媒體、宗廟、地方組織。」
⚫He helped Chinese intelligence agencies build a “cyber army”, largely of university students, to shift political debate and candidates’ fortunes.
他幫中國間諜系統建立了網軍,絕大多數是大學生,來影響政治輿論。
⚫“In Taiwan we had many places - restaurants, and IT companies - which we either acquired or funded,” Wang says. “If we wanted to attack someone, we could instantly collapse their Facebook” from Hong Kong, using false IP addresses to put out anti-democracy messages.
在台灣我們有很多據點:餐廳、資訊公司等。我們贊助、或直接買下這些公司。
「當我們想攻擊某人,我們會馬上癱瘓他的臉書」
他們從香港使用假的 IP、並且在網路留下反民主的訊息
⚫Wang says CIIL also invested in Taiwanese media companies and built covert alliances with TV stations, allowing the control and censorship of news. He names food manufacturer and media owner the Want Want group as a key ally.
我們研究台灣媒體公司,並建立掩護的盟友、來控制新聞。旺旺蔡衍明就是一個關鍵的盟友
⚫“We also controlled media, like buying their ads to propagate the trend, and let them report in favour of those candidates we were supporting,
As well as directing positive media attention towards favoured politicians, including presidential candidate Han Kuo-yu,
我們控制媒體,購買他們的媒體來帶風向。幫北京支持的候選人帶正面風向,包括總統候選人韓國瑜
⚫Wang claims he helped finance grassroots political support for the opposition. “With the Kuomintang [the Chinese Nationalist Party] candidates we … gave them full support. Then we also made donations to the temples and organised those believers to tour mainland China and Hong Kong, and influence them with [the CCP-aligned] United Front propaganda.
我們對 #在野黨,金援其地方政治勢力;
「對於 #國民黨的候選人,我們給他們完全的支持。我們也捐贈宗廟系統、組織,讓信眾去中國、香港旅遊。」
⚫As a result, we had a huge win ... and it was a glorious record,” Wang says.
「結果,我們取得了巨大的勝利(2018 台灣大選),那是一個輝煌的紀錄。」
⚫‘My heart is extremely sad’
For Wang it was a hollow victory. His son had been born in November 2017. Wang wanted to travel to Australia to visit him but his success in the 2018 Taiwan elections meant he was given a new task: interfering in the 2020 presidential election with the aim of unseating Tsai. This was when he received the envelope bearing fake identity papers.
“I was requested to change my name and whole identity to go to Taiwan and be a spy there,” he says.
我的內心非常悲傷。對我來說,這是一個空虛的勝利,我的兒子在 2017 年出生,我很想去澳洲看兒子,但是 2018 在台灣的「勝利」,也帶給我新的任務:介入 2020 總統大選、目的是拉下蔡英文。我收到了一個信封,裡面有假身份的相關文件。
「他們要求我改名字、用全新的身份去台灣當間諜。」
⚫這是另一篇中文訪問,說明他為什麼決定放棄中共:
「隨著年齡的增長、世界觀的改變,我反黨反共的心也日漸清晰,計畫著離開這個組織。」
「尤其是隨著家庭的建立、和小孩的出生,我強烈的感受到那種內心意識帶給我更大的恐懼,那將是對孩子、妻子、對整個大家庭的威脅。」
「由於妻子在澳洲讀書,2018年12月來到澳洲看望孩子和妻子,在澳洲生活的幾個月,#我深深感受到這個國家的民主自由,這讓我更加對中共從事破壞世界民主與和平的相關行徑 #深感恥辱,所以我決定放棄新任務,徹底與中共決裂,我不願意繼續從事破壞民主自由的工作。」
►中文新聞:一位中共情報人員出走澳洲
https://reurl.cc/D1Yy45
【原始新聞來源】(英文、澳洲媒體 The Age)
🇦🇺🇹🇼🇨🇳The moment a Chinese spy decided to defect to Australia
https://reurl.cc/31yo3X
🇦🇺🇹🇼🇨🇳Defecting Chinese spy offers information trove to Australian government
https://reurl.cc/RdRrOZ
🇺🇸🇹🇼🇨🇳Would-Be Chinese Defector Details Covert Campaigns in Hong Kong and Taiwan
https://reurl.cc/D1Y33O
🔵Line:
►加入肉圓的 line 更方便分享:
https://line.me/R/ti/p/%40sto1107k
positive control中文 在 Re: [求救] 實驗的一些設計- 看板Biotech 的推薦與評價
發表淺見 :)
實驗是為了證實某個假設(或理論) 因此必須設計「實驗組」
為了證實某個假設(或理論)「正確無誤」 因此必須設計「對照組」
為了證實某個實驗過程和結果「正確無誤」 因此必須設計「控制組」
所以理想的實驗設計 除了「實驗組」、「對照組」之外 必須作「控制組」
實驗組:基於某個理論或是假說,在現有的技術上測試的組別。
對照組:證實實驗組現象,是由某一個「操控變因」引起,而做的比對組別。
理想上,好的對照組,和實驗組只能有一個(或一種)變因的差別。
通常對照組會將該變因設計為「無變因」或「背景值」。
控制組:為了證實整個實驗過程中沒有發生錯誤,而做可預期結果的組別。
即為確認「操控變因」以外的因素(控制變因)沒有錯誤。
理想上,好的控制組,除了判斷實驗過程沒有錯誤外,
還能幫助找出實驗失敗的原因。
※ 引述《linzhengzhan (研究所:碩士班vs博士班)》之銘言:
作個補充
控制組 是將某個實驗「測試項目」置換成「可預期結果的項目」
來確保實驗結果不是false positive(偽陽性)或false negative(偽陰性)
以下positive稱為(+) negative稱為(-) control稱為ctrl
(因為要確定「控制變因」沒有問題 因此稱為「控制組」)
: 簡單的說:
: positive control:就是一定有的東西,如果實驗結果沒有出來,就可能是實驗有問題…
正控制是將測試項目置換成「確定會做出結果的項目」
因為預期會「有」因此稱為「正」
若(+)ctrl結果呈現(-),表示控制變因有問題,
通常是reagents少加,或是變質。
此時若test項目也呈現(-),則可能為false(-)
(因為可能是reagents發生問題才導致negative)
此時若test項目呈現(+),那就要檢查日期是否為農曆七月(好吧~很難笑)。
而找出問題的方式為:
1.先將(+)ctrl重跑一次(勿將上次的mixture拿來重複使用),
如果可以的話在再找另外一個「確定有結果的測試項目」來同時測試。
此為測試是否因為「少添加」某reagent(s)而導致上次ctrl的失敗。
2.若依然呈現(-),則將所有reagents(控制變因)換成新的(或另一來源),
重新再跑一次(+)ctrl,能的話測試兩個以上「確定應有結果的測試項目」。
此為主要測試「確定應有結果的測試項目」沒有發生問題。
3.另將reagents的一項(或一組)逐一更換新的,來找出有問題的reagent(s)。
如果實驗經費充裕,可以不做此步驟而將可能有問題的reagents全部丟棄。
4.以上1~3項可三者同時或挑兩項同時測試(自行拿捏時間和實驗經費的平衡點)。
若依然1~3項都是(-),則必須檢查protocol或instrument是否有問題。
: negative control:就是一定不會有的東西,如果結果有,就“自求多福“……
負控制是將測試項目置換成「確定不會有結果的項目」
因為預期會「沒有」因此稱為「負」
若(-)ctrl結果呈現(+),表示控制變因有問題,
通常是reagents受到污染。
此時若test項目也呈現(+),則可能為false(+),若為定量則會造成數據的不正確。
(因為可能是reagents發生問題才導致positive)
此時若test項目呈現(-),那有很有可能「確定不會有結果的測試項目」受到污染。
而找出問題的方式為:
1.先將(-)ctrl重跑一次(勿將上次的mixture拿來使用),
再多找另外一個「確定不會有結果的測試項目」的來源做同時測試。
此為測試或是操作過程是否造成污染(技術問題,甚至換人操作),
同時也測試「確定不會有結果的測試項目」是否為污染源。
2.更換新的一組耗材(會接觸reagents的項目)或操作環境。
確定不是耗材或環境本身引起的污染。
3.另將reagents的一項(或一組)逐一更換新的,來找出有污染的reagent(s)。
如果實驗經費充裕,可以不做此步驟而將可能有問題的reagents全部丟棄。
4.以上1~3項可三者同時或挑兩項同時測試(自行拿捏時間和實驗經費的平衡點)。
若依然1~3項的結果都是(+),則要認真思考污染來源為何。
: internal control:控制實驗的條件,已減少變因;在結果方面,是大家長的一個樣;
: ex. western blotting 常用就是β-actin,以確定每個well的
: protein量都一樣……
: RT-PCR常用的就是GAPDH之類的……
internal ctrl跟實驗結果的(+)/(-)無關(定性部份) 而是跟「定量」有關。
也就是「相對定量」所做的normalization ,
確保test項目的數據的相對大小(即倍率)為正確。
通常挑選為internal ctrl的項目,應該要為穩定(變異性小)、均勻、不易受影響。
例如某測試項目的結果 A為B的兩倍,
但是internal ctrl的結果 A亦為B的兩倍,
那麼經過normalization後(將測試數據除以internal ctrl數據),
A與B並無差異。
通常定性實驗都會做(+)ctrl和(-)ctrl
而定量實驗都會做internal ctrl和(-)ctrl(因為(-)ctrl呈現(+),那定量就有問題)
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